

**The European Corps:
Diplomats and International Cooperation in Western Europe**

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Abstract

Are diplomats agents of international cooperation or transmission belts for states? In other words, do they really deliberate and why? Many scholars of the European Union tend to assume that supranational governance is determined by relative power of states, and underpinned by the maximization of self-interest. However, there is an important distinction to be made between diplomacy as foreign policy, and diplomacy as the *process* of negotiation and deliberation. By looking more closely at the internal processes of deliberation and the subjective realities of the diplomats themselves I argue that diplomats as actors are instrumental in enabling cooperation among Western European states. European diplomats comprise a kind of “epistemic community,” with shared norms, expertise, worldviews, and identity by virtue of their continued interaction. The concept of epistemic community has thus far not been applied to diplomats, but I argue that this is an appropriate and useful expansion of the concept.

This book looks historically at diplomatic processes to generalize about the endurance and importance diplomats have in fostering transnational ties in ways that impact outcomes of cooperation among states. The case studies include the 1648 Peace of Westphalia, 1878 Congress of Berlin, 1919 Treaty of Versailles, and 1992 Treaty on European Union (Maastricht). Through in-depth secondary, historical and primary document research, as well as ambassadorial interviews, I demonstrate the extent to which and why diplomats have agency, and most importantly, how the diplomatic community operates within the complex and ever-evolving administrative structure of the European Union. This study draws upon and adds to the constructivist and sociological approaches to understanding the important role of transnational networks and cooperation.

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Chapter One

An Epistemic Community of Diplomats

Introduction

The following chapters in this book explain the significance of diplomats as agents of cooperation among states. They tell four different stories, each of a critical point in history, to illustrate how and why (or why not) diplomats in Western Europe have directly impacted the outcomes of international cooperation. Diplomats are defined as high-level government officials engaged in professional interaction as plenipotentiaries on the transnational level.¹ They represent their home states, and are often called upon by state leaders to negotiate at international meetings and write treaties. I argue that diplomats constitute an “epistemic community”, which, according to the definition offered by Peter Haas, is “a network of professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue area.”² The concept of epistemic community has thus far not been applied to diplomats, but I argue that this is an appropriate and useful expansion of the concept. Although diplomats start out as generalists, they quickly acquire specific expertise in their assigned region, and are from the start professional experts at negotiation procedure, relationship-building among nations, and the art of compromise. In the international system they are the quintessential actors who resolve conditions of uncertainty in international cooperation and impact changes in the definition of state interests.

In a special issue of *International Organization* (1992), Peter Haas, Emanuel Adler, G. John Ikenberry, and others fully detail the importance of a research agenda based on epistemic

¹ The diplomats considered in this project deal with political issues, and tend to be ambassadors or deputy ambassadors since historically they are the actors actually granted plenipotentiary power. Thus, lower-ranked diplomats and/or those dealing solely with consular, commercial, economic, or cultural work are not within the scope conditions.

² Haas, Peter M. "Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination." *International Organization* 46, no. 1 (1992): 1-35. In addition, he argues that an “epistemic community” is “a knowledge-based network of specialists who shared beliefs in cause-and-effect relations, validity tests, and underlying principled values and pursued common policy goals.”

communities.³ They write in the conclusion, "...we also offer a research program with which students of world politics can empirically study the role of ideas in international relations."⁴ Since then, little work has gone into the development of the concept of epistemic community in political science, neither through mid-range theorizing nor through empirical research.⁵ One way to bring the epistemic community literature closer to the forefront of political science theories is to focus on those actors central to the international decision-making process.

Thus far, the concept of epistemic community has been reserved for scientific or technical groups.⁶ In the same issue of *IO*, Ethan Barnaby Kapstein writes about the policy convergence among central bankers from different countries during the crisis of the international payments system of the 1980s, but he declines to consider these central bankers as an epistemic community. The reason for this, he argues, is because they not only engaged in rigorous scientific investigation, but also made political decisions.⁷ However, there is more potential in this concept than has been realized, and to tap into this potential, a re-conceptualization is necessary. A new interpretation for epistemic community is offered here which includes consideration of non-scientific or technical groups, as well as those who directly impact political decision-making. In addition, an epistemic community does not simply exist or not exist by virtue of a particular kind and level of knowledge, but is characterized by strength or weakness. Shared knowledge or expertise in a particular domain can be abundant or not depending on the

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ Adler, Emanuel, and Peter M. Haas. "Conclusion: Epistemic Communities, World Order, and the Creation of a Reflective Research Program." *International Organization* 46, no. 1 (1992): 367-90.

⁵ Some examples of this are: Zito, Anthony R. "Epistemic Communities, Collective Entrepreneurship and European Integration." *Journal of European Public Policy* 8, no. 4 (2001): 585-603. Radaelli, Claudio M. "The Public Policy of the European Union: Whither Politics of Expertise?" *Journal of European Public Policy* 6, no. 5 (1999): 757-74. Antoniadis, Andreas. "Epistemic Communities, Epistemes and the Construction of (World) Politics." *Global Society* 17, no. 1 (2003): 21-38.

⁶ Examples of epistemic communities are environmentalists, lawyers, human rights advocates, health networks like the Red Cross, and other scientists. Many of these groups rely on diplomats to help achieve their goals at the policy level. An interesting future study would be to look more closely at the interaction between diplomats and other epistemic communities or to consider the role of other epistemic communities in devolving international norms.

⁷ Kapstein, Ethan Barnaby. "Between Power and Purpose: Central Bankers and the Politics of Regulatory Convergence." *International Organization* 46, no. 1 (1992): 265-87. p. 267.

social background, selection, and training of the members. A strong epistemic community is defined as one that is cohesive with strong professional norms, high status, and homogeneity, whereas a weak epistemic community is one that has overall low status, weak norms, and heterogeneity among members. It is important to recognize that epistemic communities may range from nascent to fully established, and their strength may change over time depending on how often they hold meetings and interact to reinforce their cohesiveness. Most importantly, epistemic communities may actually be a part of the policy-process, rather than just tangential to it. Under this interpretation, Kapstein's central bankers may be considered an epistemic community, just one that was not technically strong at the time. The significant scholarly debate about the purpose, definition, and method pertaining to the concept of epistemic community will be addressed more fully in Chapter Two.

Are European diplomats agents of international cooperation or simply transmission belts for states? The argument that follows, in brief, is that the degree of cohesion of the epistemic community of diplomats in large part determines whether diplomats exercise agency during international meetings or merely serve as transmission belts of states. When statesmen or national governments delegate authority to diplomats, this delegation is defined as autonomy. When diplomats act beyond this autonomy in ways that statesmen do not anticipate, they have exercised agency. Thus, if the epistemic community of diplomats is weak, diplomats tend to act within their delegated autonomy, and thus states themselves tend to dictate outcomes of international cooperation using their diplomats as transmission belts.

Many scholars argue that diplomats exist simply to minimize transaction costs of negotiations among states, thus they facilitate accomplishment of the Pareto optimum.⁸ Others argue that diplomats do not matter at all because outcomes of international relations simply reflect relative power. By contrast, I argue that diplomats can have an impact in international

⁸ See for example, Pollack, Mark A. *The Engines of European Integration: Delegation, Agency, and Agenda Setting in the EU*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003.

relations since processes of negotiation and persuasion often result in outcomes which do not conform to neo-realist, neo-functionalist, or bargaining theory explanations. In the next chapter, the theoretical debate about the role or non-role of epistemic communities and diplomats will be fully addressed.

Diplomacy and Foreign Policy

First, to provide an overview of this book, I begin with a critical distinction made by Adam Watson, one of the main proponents of the English school⁹, some thirty years ago. This distinction is between diplomacy as foreign policy, and diplomacy as the *process* of negotiation and deliberation that promotes peace and cooperation among states.¹⁰ Diplomacy as foreign policy is simply the expressed desire of states to use words before force. It is the default mode of operation for liberal states, and it is often the aim among non-liberal states to engage in diplomacy if they seek acceptance in international politics. However, diplomacy as foreign policy only captures a superficial element of the workings of international relations, and it encompasses a great number of international activities that do not include processes of cooperation. For example, states can engage in unilateral contact such as propaganda, espionage, and political or economic intervention. They can also engage in violent contact such as threat, deterrence, and economic war.¹¹

Among early political scientists, the word “diplomacy” was used interchangeably with “international relations.” Realists today use the word to describe how states receive information about relative power or threat before engaging in war. Liberals talk about diplomacy in terms of

⁹ The English School is the theoretical school of thought which argues that there is a distinction between international system and international society. For a definitive work see: Bull, Hedley. *The Anarchical Society*. Second ed. New York: Columbia University Press, 1995.

¹⁰ Watson, Adam. *Diplomacy: The Dialogue between States*. London: Eyre Methuen, 1982. Preface. The distinction is made a bit differently here, but the idea of differentiating between superficial and procedural diplomacy is the same. Watson does not explicitly require a preference of words before force and/or liberalism in his definition of diplomacy as foreign policy.

¹¹ Magalhaes, José Calvet De. *The Pure Concept of Diplomacy*. Translated by Bernardo Futscher Pereira, *Global Perspectives in History and Politics*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1988. p. 13.

how inter-state dialogue aids in identifying the “other” or the non-liberal states from themselves. Neo-liberal institutionalists speak of diplomacy in terms of its function. Their argument is that it promotes information exchange and reduces transaction costs for governments to produce the most efficient, interest-maximizing outcomes for states belonging to international institutions. These broad definitions of diplomacy are not only vastly different, but conceptually vague. With the ambiguity and inaccuracy inherent to arguments based on relative power, it is necessary to examine alternatives.

Adam Watson defines diplomacy as “the process of dialogue and negotiation by which states in a system conduct their relations and pursue their purposes by means short of war.”¹² The definition of diplomacy as “the dialogue between independent states,” must be made more specific. How do states have a dialogue, and does it matter that this dialogue takes place? Is diplomacy merely foreign policy of states or an ongoing process of dialogue among diplomats? Diplomacy as simply foreign policy, as an end in itself, does not exist in the real world. Diplomats are people with individual and collective agency who interact over time. Every diplomat is the product of a rich historical tradition of norms, negotiation, and representation. As can be observed in world politics today and in the past, whether the country is democratic, communist, or authoritarian, diplomacy is really a dialogue among people assigned to the job – the diplomats.

Watson rightly points out that it is important to distinguish between the power of the state and its ability to persuade through diplomatic means.¹³ A definition of diplomacy as a dialogue among states may disguise the fact that there is this all-important disjuncture between power and cooperation. Relative power may play a role in determining whether or not state leaders decide to try to cooperate, but persuasion is to a significant extent out of the grasp of power. The ability to persuade is in the hands of the diplomats. This has most recently been evident in the mammoth

¹² Watson, *Diplomacy: The Dialogue between States*. p. 11. See also, Bull. *The Anarchical Society*.

¹³ Watson, *Diplomacy: The Dialogue between States*. Chapter 5 “Power and Persuasion”

efforts of Colin Powell to sell the Bush policies – often relying more on the perception of his own independence and public respect to bring some credibility to a policy that is otherwise resisted. This occurred perhaps most notably in the United Nations debates over the Iraq war, where some distancing by Powell made him more credible in the assurances he gave. Whether diplomats are successful in persuading depends in large part on whether they exercise agency. State instructions to diplomats rarely coincide with the situations that diplomats face at the negotiating table, and decisions need to be made on the spot taking full advantage of the cultivated relationships among the diplomatic epistemic community. Thus, diplomacy is defined here more narrowly as the operations of professional diplomats.

The cases in the following chapters capture precisely this process that occurs between the two points of power and cooperation. The main argument in this regard is that the time period when persuasion occurs (primarily during meetings to conduct international negotiation) is just as important as the circumstances that lead up to the creation of the *corps diplomatique*. For example, who the diplomats are, whether they have interacted on prior occasions, what kind of training they have received, how they were selected, their skill level, etc. are all important. The lead-up to episodes of persuasion, even before the issues are known, can make or break the negotiations, even if everyone involved in devising foreign policy of states has the full intention of cooperating. Naturally, the power and resources of each state has a bearing on the leverage diplomats have in negotiation, but outcomes still rest on the abilities of individual diplomats, and their dynamic as a collective. Perceptions of power, not actual power, are the key to any form of international relations whether in war or peace.¹⁴ Diplomats may often contribute to such perceptions.

While much emphasis of political science has been on the success or failure of cooperation, the winners and losers, and the role of international organizations in creating

¹⁴ Jervis, Robert. *Perception and Misperception in International Politics*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976.

efficient outcomes, very little study has gone into the actual processes of cooperation by the individuals, usually diplomats, who create and carry through the terms of international agreements.¹⁵ This is the process of diplomacy, as opposed to diplomacy as foreign policy.

The Theoretical Framework

Are European diplomats agents of international cooperation or simply transmission belts for states?¹⁶ What variables most contribute to successful diplomatic compromise? Diplomatic epistemic communities are also affected by structures, defined as the international rules or institutions that diplomats must abide by. What is the relationship between the structures constraining diplomats, and their agency in making decisions? The nature of diplomatic agency and its impact on international cooperation are the main issues addressed in the empirical work of this book. Diplomatic agency can be seen at the level of the individual diplomat or at the level of the collective *corps diplomatique*, but the distinction is highly interrelated. It is difficult for an individual diplomat to exercise agency if no other diplomat will pay attention to him. Rather, the historical evidence shows that diplomats will individually exercise agency when they are strong as a collective.¹⁷

To understand the emergence and strength of the epistemic community during any given period of time, the primary independent variables that I consider to be contributing factors to the strength or weakness of the epistemic community of diplomats are: meeting frequency among diplomats, social background (class- and education-based), training, and professional status.¹⁸

¹⁵ The most significant work on this topic is: Putnam, Robert D. "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games." *International Organization* 42, no. 3 (1988): 427-60. Checkel, Jeffrey T. "Taking Deliberation Seriously." *Harvard Conference* (2001). Moravcsik, Andrew, and Kalypso Nicolaidis. "Explaining the Treaty of Amsterdam: Interests, Influence, Institutions." *Journal of Common Market Studies* 37, no. 1 (1999): 59-85, Risse, Thomas. "'Let's Argue!': Communicative Action in World Politics." *International Organization* 54, no. 1 (2000): 1-39.

¹⁶ States are defined as the central decision making authority of foreign policy, whether it involves a monarchical ruler or a democratically elected president constrained by public opinion.


¹⁷ See discussion on the distinction between autonomy and agency in Chapter Two.

¹⁸ Technology is also considered in each case study, but is shown to not be a critical variable in determining the strength of the diplomatic epistemic community.

Diplomats who meet more frequently prior to negotiations develop a rapport as well as a working and personal relationship. Diplomats of similar social background are more easily able to share and appreciate each others' world views, and this facilitates action as a collective corps. Many diplomats, starting from the early twentieth century, attend the same universities and undergo a similar selection process, and these factors clearly contribute to maintaining a similar social background across the European *corps diplomatique*. Training for diplomats is a continuation of earlier education, but it also contributes strongly to a greater degree of professionalization and cohesion. Status affects recruitment and self-selection for the post, and is also indicative of the autonomy and trust state leaders are willing to grant to diplomats.

Shared professional norms allow diplomats to persuade each other and to reach consensus amongst themselves, and in large part constitute the epistemic community of diplomats. Shared professional norms are defined as the protocol, procedure, and norms of consensus that diplomats share in common. They are distinguished from shared worldviews among diplomats which refer to their substantive causal values about the operations of international relations. For example, European Union diplomats could share a worldview that more authority should be ceded from the member-state level to the supranational level of governance. In this project, norms do not include worldviews, but are confined to norms governing the professional interaction *within* the epistemic community. Depending on the strength of the epistemic community, diplomats will exercise agency at instances of major negotiations.

Epistemic Community as an independent variable for diplomatic agency in outcomes of international cooperation¹⁹



International meetings constitute critical points in time in which diplomats achieve cooperation on behalf of their states. Thus, episodes of international negotiation are the mechanism by which diplomats exercise agency.²⁰ The outcome of each meeting is defined as the extent to which diplomatic agency contributed to the treaty stipulations. A strong diplomatic epistemic community leads to agency and is reflected in the outcomes included in treaties.²¹ Are the outcomes different from state instructions to diplomats? Was the process itself dictated by states or left in the hands of diplomats? To what extent did diplomatic agency result in outcomes unanticipated by statesmen? Ultimately, it is necessary to understand the processes leading up to and including the international meetings of diplomats to predict outcomes. The evidence in the following chapters shows why and to what degree diplomats impact outcomes of international

¹⁹ Chapter Seven contains a summary chart of the four cases with the variables and outcomes labeled as high, medium, or low for each time period.

²⁰ Sebenius, James K. "Challenging Conventional Explanations of International Cooperation: Negotiation Analysis and the Case of Epistemic Communities." *International Organization* 46, no. 1 (1992): 323-65. p. 325.

²¹ In a future project, the author will look at outcomes substantively to determine whether shared worldviews among diplomats help or harm supranational democracy in the European Union. The current project, however, is confined to proving whether and under what circumstances the epistemic community of diplomats impacts outcomes more broadly. This is a necessary first-step to determining how values or worldviews impact the actual substance of outcomes.

cooperation through a cross-time comparison of diplomacy and international meetings of diplomats in Western Europe.

The existence of a cohesive diplomatic corps in Europe points to one major example of an explosion in the growth of epistemic communities in the twentieth century, and it is an example that brings to light important international issues and policy choices. Many other epistemic communities, such as lawyers, judges, finance ministers, environmentalists, human rights activists, and bureaucrats interact with the diplomatic epistemic community, particularly in today's global world. They are often even composed of the same qualities that define diplomatic epistemic communities and also share professional norms.

Why is the study of epistemic communities in general, and of the diplomatic community in particular, so important? Europeanists tend to focus on smaller elements of EU epistemic communities, such as communication networks²², social networks based on symbolic interactionism²³, or simply a shared solidarity (*esprit de corps*).²⁴ However, this narrow focus tends to leave out important factors that are part of the *genesis* of a transnational network, such as professional status, meeting frequency and social background including the selection and training that go along with this. By including expertise and professionalism as important criteria, the concept of epistemic community goes beyond simple consideration of shared social, communication, or symbolic interactions to become a more dynamic theory.

In addition, the impact of diplomatic agency has major implications for modern theories of international relations (IR) that see outcomes of IR as only the consequence of state actions and intent. This book questions the effectiveness of two competing and widely held viewpoints in the political science literature. First and more broadly, the neo-realist argument is that

²² Beyers, Jan, and Guido Dierickx. "The Working Groups of the Council of the European Union: Supranational or Intergovernmental Negotiations?" *Journal of Common Market Studies* 36, no. 3 (1998): 259-317.

²³ Glarbo, Kenneth. "Wide-Awake Diplomacy: Reconstructing the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union." *Journal of European Public Policy* 6, no. 4 (1999): 634-51.

²⁴ Westlake, Martin. *The Council of the European Union*. London: Cartermill International Ltd., 1995. pp. 319-20.

diplomats do not have a role at all in determining outcomes because states are the only actors in the international system and outcomes always reflect relative power and self-interest. While relative power considerations may occasionally determine the issues brought to the negotiation table, they do not determine outcomes of international cooperation.

Second, bargaining theory predicts that diplomats are important to outcomes of international cooperation because they reduce “transaction costs” in negotiations among states, and exercise delegated autonomy (as opposed to agency) to accomplish this.²⁵ Transaction costs consist of the expense and inefficiency that would be involved in international cooperation if the principals (statesmen), as non-expert negotiators, were to conduct all foreign policy on their own. Rather than discounting the role of diplomats altogether, bargaining theory assumes that diplomats are useful and autonomous. Otherwise, why would they exist?

It is not necessarily true that bargaining theory never predicts outcomes, but I argue that it is significantly inadequate to explain *all* outcomes, particularly when diplomats go beyond their delegated autonomy to exercise agency. As noted above, I define autonomy as the amount of decision-making “space” given to them by statesmen or international rules. Agency, however, is demonstrated when diplomats go beyond their “space” and take more decision-making into their own hands than they were given. In effect, autonomy is the reason they have jobs, but agency is what they do with the job that statesmen did not expect. Through the methodology of historical process-tracing it is possible to identify when diplomats go beyond their autonomy to exercise agency in ways not predicted by bargaining theory. This book is *not* primarily about bargaining theory, although it examines in part the related phenomenon of international decision-making. The focus here is explicitly on the dynamics of the European epistemic community of diplomats, the conditions that determine whether overall it is strong or weak, and the implications for this. The reason for this departure from bargaining theory or rational choice is that it is largely

²⁵ Pollack. *The Engines of European Integration: Delegation, Agency, and Agenda Setting in the EU*.

overdeterministic and advances a “snapshot view”, as many scholars have argued.²⁶ By ignoring factors such as relationships among negotiators, professional background, expertise, and shared normative frameworks many scholars pass up explanatory power.

I argue that diplomats are actors in their own right, and constitute a transnational community with shared norms and worldviews. The stronger the epistemic community of diplomats, the more likely it is that they will reach agreements, though not necessarily ones that may benefit the common good of all states.²⁷ Constructivism is the main perspective in political science which does advance specific, mid-range theories that offer predictions about how processes and norms among transnational communities impact outcomes of international cooperation in concrete ways.²⁸ The focus of constructivist work has been on both governmental and non-governmental actors. This perspective has elucidated the role of influential “norm entrepreneurs”²⁹ as well as a variety of international agents who are not simply an extension of the realist or functionalist power-play among states. I argue that diplomats are not only “norm entrepreneurs”, but also at times key actors in their own right in the international arena.

The goal of this research is ultimately to explain the role of diplomacy in today’s European Union, predict its future importance for Europe and other regions, and pave the way for the development of effective international regimes and policy creation in other regions. For

²⁶ See for example: Mazzucelli, Colette. *France and Germany at Maastricht: Politics and Negotiations to Create the European Union*. New York: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1997. Barnett, Michael N., and Martha Finnemore. "The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of International Organizations." *International Organization* 53, no. 4 (1999): 699-732, Risse. "'Let's Argue!': Communicative Action in World Politics.", Ruggie, John Gerard. "What Makes the World Hang Together? Neo-Utilitarianism and the Social Constructivist Challenge." *International Organization* 52, no. 4 (1998): 855-85, Watson. *Diplomacy: The Dialogue between States*, Young, Oran R. "Political Leadership and Regime Formation: On the Development of Institutions in International Society." *International Organization* 45, no. 3 (1991): 281-308. Pierson, Paul. *Politics in Time: History, Institutions, and Social Analysis*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004.

²⁷ Diplomats may agree to something that does not benefit the common good, such as they did at the Munich Conference in 1938.

²⁸ For example see: Martha Finnemore and Michael Barnett, *Rules for the World*. Frank Dobbin, *The New Economic Sociology*, Neil Fligstein and Mara-Drita, *American Journal of Sociology* (1996).

²⁹ Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink use the term “norm entrepreneurs” in describing their model of a “norm life cycle” in Finnemore, Martha, and Kathryn Sikkink. "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change." *International Organization* 52, no. 4 (1998): 887-917.

example, several multilateral organizations exist in the East Asian region, but are mostly hollow with little power to implement multilateral initiatives. What explains this difference? Is the case of Europe necessarily exceptional? The prospects for future application of this project will be discussed more thoroughly in the conclusion.

Methodology

A powerful way of understanding the present is to take a historical, comparative approach to test the key determining variables for why diplomats have agency, to what degree, and how this impacts cooperation. The research design is historical process-tracing with case-studies. While a cross-time comparison may not be useful in all topics of political science, diplomacy is distinctive for its continuity over time alongside simultaneous change. Thus, it is an ideal topic for a cross-time analysis; its fundamentals remain, while it adapts to the climate of the times. Because the degree of cohesion varies considerably over time, a historical approach provides a natural method of weighing the importance of the variables that contribute to a cohesive epistemic community of diplomats, as well as identifying possible trends.

The methodology combines historical sociology, interpretivism, and causal inference. Historical sociology is an important qualitative method among international relations scholars that emphasizes history as a means of problematizing present-day phenomena. The aim of historical sociology is to rethink how we see the present, not by assuming that the past repeats itself, but by providing the context for today's world. Historical sociology uses historical process-tracing to link events causally. The research in this project is based on semi-structured ambassadorial interviews³⁰, secondary research³¹, archival work³², and governmental

³⁰ There is much criticism directed at the use of diplomatic interviews as data as diplomats are obviously skilled orators who may phrase their opinions according to what they want to consciously convey rather than what is the most accurate. Diplomatic interviews are thus used here to back-up other forms of research, rather than as the primary evidence.

documents³³. Much political science research that deals with history has been criticized for lacking rigor, yet theories are greatly enhanced through a consideration of the past. As Clausewitz writes, “Historical examples clarify everything and also provide the best kind of proof in the empirical sciences.”³⁴

The second methodology employed here is interpretivism, which involves elements of descriptive inference or thick description. The focus on thick description enables consideration of multiple realities that are socially constructed.³⁵ In this project, the aim is to understand the complexity of diplomatic epistemic communities rather than to simplify them. The research is engaged in understanding the “subjective” view of the diplomats themselves to understand their socially constructed reality. The interpretivist approach is the best method to understand the prior composition of the diplomatic corps which heavily relies upon social construction and shared normative frameworks. The interviews conducted for this project are more conversational than close-ended. They are used as a source of insight for my hypotheses rather than for testing the hypotheses.³⁶

The independent variables examined at both levels of the theory are structured as “family resemblance” concepts as opposed to necessary and sufficient concepts.³⁷ That is, not all of the independent variables must have a high level of presence in order for the epistemic community of diplomats to be strong. There is naturally a “sufficiency minimum”, which I measure through

³¹ Secondary historical accounts are from the Princeton University Library, Columbia University Library, Bibliothèque Nationale – Richelieu and Mitterand (Paris), Institutes des Sciences Politiques (Paris), British Library, European University Institute (Florence), Documentation Centre (Brussels).

³² Archival documentation is from the Bibliothèque Richelieu Salle des Manuscrits (Paris) for the Westphalia case study, British Library Manuscript Room for the Congresses of Berlin and Versailles case studies, and Princeton’s Firestone Library microfiche room.

³³ Governmental documentation is obtained from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Paris (Congress of Berlin and Versailles), the European University Institute in Florence (translated German documents for the Congress of Berlin case study), the Council of the European Union (Maastricht case study), and the British Library (Congresses of Berlin, Versailles, and Maastricht).

³⁴ Clausewitz, Carl von. *On War*. Translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976. p. 170.

³⁵ Feldman, Martha S. *Strategies for Interpreting Qualitative Data*: Sage, 1995.

³⁶ Leech, Beth L. "Asking Questions: Techniques for Semistructured Interviews." *Political Science and Politics* 35, no. 4 (2002): 665-8.

³⁷ Goertz, Gary. *Social Science Concepts: A User's Guide*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005.

descriptive inference in each case study. If all of the independent variables belonging to the family resemblance group are present at high levels then it is likely that the epistemic community will be strong. However, in cases when not all the variables are present at high levels it is the overall combination of the presence and strength of the independent variables that indicate the strength of the epistemic community. At the same time, the epistemic community itself serves as an independent variable as it is mutually constitutive with status, training, social background, meeting frequency, and shared professional norms. In effect, the passing of time is an implicit variable in this project. Overtime, diplomats have professionalized their own profession thus as an epistemic community they play a strong role in impacting the formation of future diplomatic corps.

The third methodology is causal inference. Positivist causality is an important aim of this study, although it is confined largely to the second part of the argument. Rather than using causal inference to understand the prior composition of the epistemic community of diplomats, which I argue is largely mutually constitutive, I engage in causal inference to understand how the strength or weakness of the epistemic community impacts outcomes of international cooperation during particular instances of negotiation. I still engage in process-tracing, but I elucidate a causal relationship between the strength of the epistemic community and outcomes. Simply looking at outcomes and comparing them to starting positions as snap-shots does not elucidate motivations and causal mechanisms. The methodology of historical process-tracing seeks to determine often unobservable causal mechanisms by looking at the observable.³⁸ Although process-tracing is less parsimonious than other forms of data, it also tends to be less erroneous than large scale comparisons with broad generalizations.

The second part of the argument can also be part of a larger “family resemblance” group. There may hypothetically be other reasons why a transnational diplomatic corps exercises

³⁸ George, Alexander L., and Andrew Bennett. "Process Tracing and Historical Explanation." In *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*, Chapter 10. Cambridge: MIT Press, 2004.

collective agency besides the strength of their epistemic community, though these would be rare cases. For example, another possible trigger for diplomatic agency could be a coincidence of preferences different from state interests that diplomats happen to share *despite* a weak epistemic community. Additionally, a strong epistemic community of diplomats may happen to agree entirely with state instructions and all state instructions from different countries may happen to be the same. Thus, it is possible to conceive of the concept of an epistemic community of diplomats (the independent variable) as a member of a larger family resemblance group, but these other potential concepts are beyond the scope of this book and rare. This study considers the phenomenon of epistemic communities as a strength-weakness continuum rather than a dichotomous manner as is typical of necessary and sufficient concepts. A sufficiency minimum requires a cut-off point which dichotomizes the argument, but it is not necessary to define one here because a diplomatic epistemic community does not simply exist or not exist.³⁹ Thus, a “family resemblance” methodological approach to the concepts examined here is the most suitable.

There are certain important scope conditions for consideration of the diplomats who constitute the epistemic community. They tend to be highly-ranked, and are mostly of the ambassadorial or deputy-ambassadorial rank as these diplomats are actually granted plenipotentiary power or autonomy by statesmen. Diplomats of lower-rank or those who are not granted any decision-making power are not relevant to this study. The diplomats are for the most part residing in Western European, but European diplomats in non-European countries are considered part of the overall transnational diplomatic corps if they correspond regularly with those engaged in major negotiations. However, they are tangential to the process of negotiation as they are not present. It is important to recognize the role of diplomats who contribute to negotiations from a distance. Naturally, some diplomats are more prone than others to foster

³⁹ Ragin, Charles. *Fuzzy Set Social Science*. Chicago: University of Chicago, 2000.

transnational relationships, but it is the overall strength of the epistemic community, which is critical to understanding outcomes.

Overall, the research design of this project is a cross-time study of the Western European region, tracing the changes in the diplomatic corps over time (1) to observe the external impact of technology, regime change, and emergence of IOs on the diplomatic epistemic community;⁴⁰ (2) to generalize about the potential impact of the variables contributing to the socialization and professionalization of diplomats; and (3) to suggest future trends. Not only is the whole project historically-oriented, but each individual case study takes a longer-term historical approach rather than a “snap-shot”, before-after approach.⁴¹ However, it is important to note that this study is not path-dependent as this approach tends to discount human agency and the ability of actors to create unexpected paths of decision-making over time and to reverse their decision-making. Paul Pierson argues that once actors make a decision it is irreversible, and particular paths drops out of the realm of possibility. However, through the course of a single negotiation or in history more generally, diplomats often reverse their decisions or take a different path to a particular outcome.

Each case is designed to decipher the degree of strength or weakness of the epistemic community and to deal with the counter-factual or alternative arguments provided by bargaining theory and neo-realism. According to bargaining theory, supranational actors do not play a significant role in outcomes of international cooperation because national governments have interest-maximizing preferences that they rank according to the conditions of the negotiation and relative power. If they must compromise, national governments will only make concessions based on their rank-ordered preferences, thus it is possible to predict outcomes on the Pareto frontier.⁴² It can be treated as a counter-factual because it assumes the non-existence of an epistemic community of diplomats. Bargaining theory will be explained more fully in the second

⁴⁰ Some historians refer to early to mid twentieth century international treaties or congresses as IOs, but for the purposes of clearly delineating and recognizing the relatively permanent, concrete, transnational, and formal institutional quality of modern IOs, this book will refer to mid to late twentieth century IOs.

⁴¹ Pierson. *Politics in Time: History, Institutions, and Social Analysis*.

⁴² Moravcsik, and Nicolaidis. "Explaining the Treaty of Amsterdam: Interests, Influence, Institutions."

chapter. The cases also deal more broadly with the neo-realist alternative argument which provides the null-hypothesis that diplomats do not matter at all. Neo-realism can also be used to develop a counter-factual argument as it also assumes that outcomes can be predicted without consideration of the existence of an epistemic community of diplomats. Although some scholars now consider neo-realism as a straw-man argument, it is actually still the dominant and most widely accepted view of international relations and is thus important to address.

The following research brings to light the ample evidence of diplomatic correspondences, meeting transcripts, governmental documents, state instructions, and historical context to decipher the causes of diplomatic processes and the outcomes of international cooperation. This book not only seeks to fill a gap in the literature about the processes of international cooperation, but also to offer some useful new insights about the role of transnational groups in international society. Are the international policy outcomes of these meetings or congresses of diplomats divergent from initial state preferences and instructions to diplomats? If deliberation among diplomats actually occurs, why is it or is it not successful? In the lead-up to the creation of the Treaty of Versailles, deliberation occurred but diplomatic status had fallen, making it impossible for diplomats to persuade recalcitrant state leaders. During other time periods state leaders, Cabinet members, and kings believed in the effectiveness of diplomats as skillful, professional negotiators. These leaders, each sitting in his or her own seat of power, were often not acutely aware of the grander transnational network among their own diplomats and those of other states. But entire archives filled with evidence show that its overarching presence, whether weak or strong, made the network bigger than its component parts, and many times an actor in its own right.

Many scholars, the media, and society in general tend to assume that diplomats, as professional negotiators, mediators, and coordinators, are decreasing in relevance because technology and globalization make the world a faster, smaller place. Why send a team of diplomats to meet with their counterparts in foreign countries when the leader of a country can

simply pick up the phone and speak to the leader of another country? Many statesmen recognize that diplomacy is as necessary as ever, and to ignore the value of diplomacy is to take great risks with foreign relations. It is precisely *because* of globalization that there are many new issues on the table, powerful international organizations in place, and a multitude of transnational actors impacting the awareness of political choices and policy decisions. Consequently there is a general increase in the number of diplomats acting as envoys to international organizations. Alongside the renewal of the profession brought about by changes in global politics and the consolidation of international organizations, diplomats maintain many of the qualities, norms, protocols, and behavior that characterized them in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. It was popular in the 1950s and 60s among historians to describe the somewhat surprising simultaneous evolution and stasis of the diplomatic role, but a new exploration of diplomacy with due regard to contemporary theories of political science is of the utmost importance.

Chapter Two

The Diplomatic Dialogue: Between Power and Cooperation

Why is it important to investigate diplomats as an epistemic community? What does the concept of epistemic community explain that other theories of cooperation do not explain? If such an epistemic community of diplomats exists, what are the implications for our understanding of international cooperation? To answer these questions, it is important to first review the political science literature pertaining to international cooperation and negotiation more generally. There are three broad categories of theories that seek to explain these outcomes: neo-realism, bargaining theory, and constructivism. This book builds upon the work of sociologists, organizational theorists, and constructivists as these approaches provide more explanatory power. Scholars from these fields have made substantial progress in the investigation of transnational networks, shared ideas, and shared causal beliefs, qualities critical to epistemic communities.

Although the neo-realist school faces serious criticisms, it is necessary to fully engage this approach in investigating any theory of cooperation, as it provides the null hypothesis (diplomats do not matter at all). If it is true that power relationships are the exclusive determinants then there is no role for diplomats. Bargaining theory also provides a critical alternative argument or null-hypothesis to the hypothesis that diplomats exercise collective agency and impact outcomes. This chapter provides a more in-depth look at the theoretical literature that attempts to explain outcomes of international cooperation, and draws upon sociology and constructivism to highlight the potential for the epistemic community approach to better account for outcomes.

Alternative Explanations for International Cooperation

Realist Diplomacy

Neo-realist arguments that touch upon the topic of diplomacy tend to view it as synonymous with foreign policy. For some, diplomats constitute such an insignificant backdrop to the international power-play that they are not mentioned at all. For others, the fact of the existence of diplomats, and their clearly influential role in world politics is a major point of contention that cannot be ignored. In the neo-realist literature, diplomats are referred to both directly, and as a part of the somewhat amorphous concept of “international society”.

The general neo-realist perception of the world is that relative power is the determining factor of international relations.⁴³ All states behave in a way to maximize self-interest, sovereignty, security, and influence in the world arena. Thus, diplomacy is simply the playing out of these competing state forces by individuals who are servants of the state. In other words, diplomats in a realist world are merely transmission belts of state preferences. A realist would assume that everything a diplomat says leads to power-maximizing of his home state’s position. At the same time, a realist would argue that it does not really matter what diplomats say to each other because outcomes of international relations will reflect the interests of the most powerful states, and this is true down the line to the very smallest states that have no choice but to simply comply with the rules set by the bigger states.

J.W. Burton argues, for example, that it is not necessary to distinguish between the role of decision makers and the diplomatic corps because diplomacy is based on power needs.⁴⁴ All foreign policy activity can thus be subsumed under one label of diplomacy. He writes:

⁴³ Waltz, Kenneth. *Theory of International Politics*. Reading, Mass: Addison-Wesley Pub. Co., 1979.

⁴⁴ Burton, J.W. *Systems, States, Diplomacy, and Rules*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968.

In contemporary conditions of highly developed permanent civil services and improved communications the term diplomacy is best used to include the whole process of managing relations with other States and international central office, assessment of immediate and longer-term interests, balancing of internal and external pressures, testing of likely responses to proposed policies, final implementation, and perception of the environment.⁴⁵

The effect of bundling all foreign relations into one package essentially dismisses any possibility that these complex processes *independently* impact outcomes of international relations.

Diplomacy, in this view, is the playing out of competition among states that has a pre-determined outcome based on relative power and the “billiard ball effect”⁴⁶.

Intergovernmentalism

In terms of today’s European Union (EU), intergovernmentalists support the neo-realist and neo-liberal institutionalist argument that EU institutions merely aid in member state decision-making by providing a set of rules for leaders to advance their states’ preferences. Policies at the supranational level are simply a reflection and continuation of policies at the domestic level. Thus, according to the intergovernmentalists, expert national or supranational representatives such as the College of Commissioners or the Committee of Permanent Representatives (Coreper) have a negligible impact on integration or cooperation. Instead, the most powerful states act according to power-based interests, and the result is the adoption of *minimalist* measures in favor of the common good of EU member states. The intergovernmentalist approach only allows for the least common denominator to determine outcomes. It does, however attempt to salvage structural realism by at least allowing that international institutions exist for a reason, but outcomes will still conform to predictions based on power; they will just be obtained more efficiently.

⁴⁵ Ibid. p. 199

⁴⁶ Each state acts unitarily in its best interests, unless another state directly changes the composition of those interests simply by the way in which that state pursues *its* own interests.

Glarbo also tries to get around this problem by arguing that there is either low salience of the issue at hand, so it does not really matter that states choose to cooperate, or there is an underlying material motive.⁴⁷ Andrew Moravcsik, though a prominent liberal, is a major proponent of “intergovernmental institutionalism”, arguing that states reach bargains to advance their interests in the EU, and that if the Commission were to overstep its bounds, the members would see that it is restrained.⁴⁸ He summarizes the main components of intergovernmental institutionalism: (1) intergovernmentalism is the continuation of domestic policy at the supranational level; (2) lowest-common-denominator bargaining is agreement based only on shared preferences among the largest states, unless exclusion forces agreement; and (3) strong limit to future sovereignty transfers is a unanimous agreement among states to adopt EC policies and preference for intergovernmental institutions such as the Council of Ministers, rather than the Parliament or Commission.⁴⁹

As Moravcsik argues, intergovernmentalism is not unlike structural realism because supranational institutions and transnational phenomena are only permitted if they do not conflict with national preferences and power maximization. It places more of an emphasis on national leaders bargaining, but their preferences tend to coincide with the maximization of self-interest. Intergovernmentalism is different from pure realism in that it recognizes the value of international institutions as providing a common-framework within which states bargain, and where transaction costs are minimized. Intergovernmental institutionalism is a more refined, and EU-specific version of intergovernmentalism, which also accounts for changes in state preferences that are based on domestic factors, not just relative power.

⁴⁷ Glarbo, Kenneth. "Wide-Awake Diplomacy: Reconstructing the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union." *Journal of European Public Policy* 6, no. 4 (1999): 634-51.

⁴⁸ Moravcsik, Andrew. "Negotiating the Single European Act: National Interests and Conventional Statecraft in the European Community." *International Organization* 45, no. 1 (1991): 19-56.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.* p. 25.

The English School

In one respect, the realist school overlaps with the English school, a looser, quasi-constructivist variant of realism. Both agree that international cooperation is more likely with increased interaction over time among states. However, the causal *processes* advocated by the two approaches are different. Structural realism uses functionalism⁵⁰ to explain the emergence of international society, and points to the inevitability of growing compromise among states as they increasingly interact to solve problems.⁵¹ The English school also advances this temporal argument that over time the development of international society is inevitable, but it happens through purposeful interaction. Hedley Bull and Adam Watson argue that international society exists when “states (or, more generally, a group of independent political communities)...have established by dialogue and consent common rules and institutions for the conduct of their relations, and recognize their common interest in maintaining these arrangements.”⁵² More specifically, in support of the English school approach, I argue that this dialogue is advanced through purposeful relationship-building among diplomats. Diplomacy can be included under the umbrella of international society because it is one of the key transnational activities that allow states to cooperate, and to co-exist within a power-based international system. At times, it is the only component of international society.⁵³

The structural realist approach contrasts with the English school as it focuses on functionalism to the neglect of such English School concerns as shared norms, collective identity and common worldviews. Buzan, a structural realist, argues:

⁵⁰ Functionalism is defined as a system in which outcomes are pre-determined because they will always represent efficiency and exigency.

⁵¹ Buzan, Barry. "From International System to International Society: Structural Realism and Regime Theory Meet the English School." *International Organization* 47, no. 3 (1993): 327-52.

⁵² Bull, Hedley, and Adam Watson. "Introduction." In *Expansion of International Society*, edited by Hedley Bull and Adam Watson. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984. p. 1

⁵³ During the mid to late seventeenth century, diplomats may have been the only non-religious members of international society. Merchants also interacted at the transnational level were driven by personal self-interest and thus did not have a meaningful collective identity.

Whether or not units share a common culture, at some point the regularity and intensity of their interactions will virtually force the development of a degree of recognition and accommodation among them...international society could evolve functionally from the logic of anarchy without preexisting cultural bonds.⁵⁴

Thus, structuralists argue that international society develops overtime, through a *non-purposeful* “spillover effect”⁵⁵. The English school attributes more agency to diplomats as it allows for diplomats to recognize common interest through “dialogue”, while the structuralists tend to discount it as purely inadvertent. In sum, both approaches, by virtue of the world becoming a smaller place through globalization, communication technology, transportation, and international organizations, would agree that increased interaction among diplomats inevitably leads to mutual recognition among states. But, they disagree about the cause. For the structural realists, the interaction remains power-based, and simply conforms to functional efficiency because when diplomats act upon knowledge acquired through increased interaction to make strategic decisions that benefit their home states it reduces transaction costs.

The key factor missing from many realist approaches as well as the English school is acknowledgement that international actors may find that their own power or even “soft power”⁵⁶ benefits from outcomes that maximize the interest of all states in the international system or the common good.⁵⁷ The development of international society and transnational identification can become an intentional goal of diplomats.

Second, there are ambiguous definitions of power and perceptions of power. There is a lag between changes in power, and people’s perceptions of it. For example, on several occasions in the seventeenth century, state officials drew up lists of what they believed to be an accurate

⁵⁴ Buzan. "From International System to International Society: Structural Realism and Regime Theory Meet the English School." p. 334

⁵⁵ A “spillover effect” is defined as the inadvertent political consequences of units engaging in interest-maximization.

⁵⁶ “Soft power” is defined as factors that indirectly impact a state’s influence in the international realm, such as ability to persuade, to inspire trust, or to be considered an important element in other states’ calculations.

⁵⁷ Throughout this book, the “common good” often refers to peaceful outcomes or avoidance of war even though militarily powerful states could actually maximize interests through engaging in war.

ordering of states according to their relative levels of power.⁵⁸ Not surprisingly, many of the lists were different. Because of the desire to establish a “visible pecking-order” there was a constant dispute about precedence.⁵⁹ A letter addressed to the Duc de Longueville at the beginning of the negotiations of Westphalia warned: “Of course after the ambassadors of the emperor, the first rank should belong to France. There will be contestations from the Swedish who will not want to cede to Spain or France.”⁶⁰ At the same time, the Swedish diplomats were instructed that *they* were to have precedence after the Emperor. Protocol was a major question for diplomats, and one that did not have an obvious answer. Even today, in a seemingly unipolar world, scholars who advance different definitions of power debate whether the EU may actually be a serious contender to US hegemony.⁶¹

Third, along these lines, competition to maximize power is not a zero-sum game. This is compounded by the fact that cooperation occurs over time and so if a state defects from the general interest in the beginning, it sabotages all future deals. Diplomats, more specifically, may maximize their own power leverage by building up the agency of diplomats as a collective. Thus, the “go-it-alone” mentality, portrayed by realists who view diplomats as simply transmission-belts for states, may not be the best way to maximize gain during international negotiations. Finally, the nature of the goals themselves can change with increased interaction among diplomats, thus causing everyone to shift their expectations based on discovering where the consensus point lies. Diplomats as individuals must have a degree of autonomy from their states in order to build independent and collective agency with other diplomats in the negotiation room. These arguments are intended simply to critique the realist approach through its own logic.

⁵⁸ For example, Pope Julius II wrote a table of precedence in 1504, and William Penn (intellectual and founder of the state of Pennsylvania) in 1691.

⁵⁹ Luard, Evan. *The Balance of Power: The System of International Relations, 1648-1815*. London: MacMillan, 1992. p. 133

⁶⁰ Bibliothèque Nationale Richeilieu, Manuscrits Françaises, 4144, “Instructions to Longueville” January 1644.

⁶¹ Andrew Moravcsik argues that the EU is the world’s super power because of its civilian power. *European Conference*, Princeton University, October 3-5, 2003.

In conclusion, the shortcut of realist logic, which collapses diplomacy under the concept of foreign policy, does not hold up under logical deduction. The empirical chapters of this book will provide evidence for this. To highlight one example, the main negotiations of the Treaty of Versailles consisted of state leaders conducting a kind of ad-hoc summit known as the Group of Four. Despite their intention to cooperate and efforts to accomplish the best outcome for the winners of the Great War (Italy, France, England, Japan, and the US) they were unable to produce a tenable Treaty. The failure of this monumental diplomatic meeting was solely due to what occurred in the negotiation room. The leaders had already agreed to cooperate, but power reasoning alone does not automatically lead to the desired outcomes. As Checkel argues, realist arguments “define the universe of possible outcomes but do not explain why particular ones occur.”⁶²

Two-Level Game Diplomacy

The two-level game argument is a functional approach which states that diplomats enable efficient outcomes by reducing transaction costs. Thus, there exists a Pareto optimum for outcomes of international cooperation, and the results of diplomatic interaction will always lie somewhere on the Pareto frontier. According to this argument, the result “sets” are pre-determined and it is only a matter of time for diplomats to discover the arena in which they may operate or the “win-set” of possible outcomes.

The notion of two-level games was first articulated by Robert Putnam in “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games”,⁶³ and is hailed by both international relations and comparative politics scholars for its emphasis on the domestic-international nexus. However, Putnam’s theory builds on numerous precursors. Pauline Rosenau writes about

⁶² Checkel, Jeff. "Ideas, Institutions, and Gorbachev Foreign Policy Revolution." *World Politics* 45, no. 2 (1993): 271-300.

⁶³ Putnam, Robert D. "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games." *International Organization* 42, no. 3 (1988): 427-60.

“linkage politics” and provides instances of foreign policies where domestic factors influence international affairs. Nye and Keohane developed the notion of “complex interdependence” where international regimes are created and maintained through a system of interactions between states. Delison takes a bureaucratic politics approach emphasizing intra-national games, but does not consider factors outside of bureaucratic interests in foreign policy making. Katzenstein looks at the contribution of state strength and structural factors in the successful development of policies. Finally, Katz argues that the main purpose of foreign economic policy is to make domestic policies compatible with the international political economy.

Putnam synthesizes these precursors by operationalizing the international-domestic nexus. In his model of two-level games, Level I is the negotiation phase where diplomats bargain at the international table. Level II consists of the ratification stage in which there are separate discussions within each group of constituents about whether to ratify the agreement. The focus of this project is what happens on Level I. For Putnam, there is a “win-set” which represents all the possible Level I agreements that would “satisfy” Level II constituencies. The size of the win-set depends on the distribution of power, preferences and possible coalitions among Level I constituents. The assumption is that the negotiator is faced with trade-offs based on what will satisfy his or her Level II group, and this can be mapped with indifference curves. The combination of each negotiator’s indifference curves, along with the strength of the state vis-à-vis domestic pressures, and the strategies of each negotiator determines the cooperative outcomes.

Putnam’s model represents a clear improvement on previous “second-image” and “second-image reversed” theories that favor either domestic or international variables. However, looking specifically at the Level I group of negotiators, it is clear that a significant degree of elaboration is necessary to capture the complexities that routinely occur. First and foremost, outcomes rarely fall into the “win-set” category. Second, the interaction and processes among diplomats themselves are too simplified in the model. Putnam’s model does not consider the impact of prior contact among diplomats in creating shared norms and worldviews and the

ongoing processes of diplomatic identity, role, and norm construction engendered from the present diplomatic exchange. Third, the division between the domestic and international levels is not so clear cut.

Delegation and Principal-Agent Diplomacy

Classic Principal-agent theory also provides an explanation for diplomatic behavior similarly building upon neo-functionalism assumptions. In this approach, the principals or statesmen delegate authority to the diplomats or agents to resolve issues of “contracting” in the international arena. Contracting refers to minimizing transaction costs by pursuing goals that would be too costly or difficult for the principal to perform himself. By virtue of being “on location” and having better access to information, the agent can exercise personal agency in his decision-making. Proponents of principal-agent theory assume that this agency is necessarily opportunistic behavior and thus disadvantages the principal. The assumption rests on neo-functionalism, that individual actors always maximize self-interest.⁶⁴ Opportunistic behavior is characterized as “shirking” or “slippage”.

The second assumption follows from the first, and that is that the solution must be a perfect means to control the agent so that the principal’s interests are always represented. Examination of such principal-agent scenarios and their solutions is commonly taken up by rational choice theorists using the tools of micro-economics to understand processes and outcomes. Studies typically focus on the US Congress.

Principals continue to delegate authority, despite the risks that agents will exercise agency. First, according to the principal-agent approach, delegation occurs because agents may be more successful in resolving collective action problems with regard to long-term goals.⁶⁵ In other words, it is possible that they may reduce transaction costs when “incomplete contracting”

⁶⁴ Kassim, Hussein, and Anand Menon. "The Principal-Agent Approach and the Study of the European Union: Promise Unfulfilled?" *Journal of European Public Policy* 10, no. 1 (2003): 121-39. See p. 123.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.* p. 124.

occurs, and only agents can clarify disputes since they were present at the original negotiation. Second, agents can take the blame for principals, or in this case elected officials, when unpopular decisions are made. The typical goal of principal-agent theorists is to understand how to control the potential unwieldiness involved in delegation.

Principal-agent theory is a popular approach among EU scholars, and can be an interesting approach to understanding the relationship between diplomats and statesmen. However, the assumption of opportunistic behavior is problematic empirically because of the countless examples of diplomats who assume personal risk for their love of country or desire for peace. Theoretically, these kinds of neo-functionalist arguments suffer the major drawback of only being able to assign preferences to actors after they act. If the assumption of opportunistic behavior is set aside, the theory is then reduced to information asymmetry and the realization that diplomats may exercise agency. It does not offer a comprehensive or causal means of understanding why, and ignores the possibility that agents may not be interest maximizing.

Bargaining Theory

Bargaining theory is arguably the most relevant theory that is directly opposed to the notion that epistemic communities have a real impact on outcomes of international cooperation. Andrew Moravcsik and Kalypso Nicolaïdis address three prominent structural bargaining theories in their analysis of the Treaty of Amsterdam: garbage-can, geopolitical, and interdependence theories.⁶⁶ Garbage-can theory is when those negotiating do not have clear ideas of what their preferences are and thus form them during the process of negotiation. The geo-political approach argues that governments' preferences are defined by their larger ideological stance, rather than the specific issues, i.e. their preferences are defined by whether they are federalist or not. Interdependence theory, which Moravcsik and Nicolaïdis support, stipulates that preferences

⁶⁶ Moravcsik, Andrew, and Kalypso Nicolaidis. "Explaining the Treaty of Amsterdam: Interests, Influence, Institutions." *Journal of Common Market Studies* 37, no. 1 (1999): 59-85.

depend on economic and political-military interdependence. Empirically, they argue that national governments understood their preferences during the Amsterdam Treaty negotiations and ranked them accordingly. Although national representatives and supranational actors were involved in the negotiations, they did not alter outcomes any differently than the rational weighing of national preferences. Thus, they claim that bargaining theory can predict outcomes by analyzing initial preferences of national governments.⁶⁷

The major weakness of this approach, when specifically compared to the Berlin and Maastricht case studies of this book, is that the empirical evidence does not support it. State leaders did not spend much time negotiating the Treaty on European Union, nor did they maintain fixed preferences during the period of negotiation.⁶⁸ For the Maastricht Treaty, to the extent that statesmen or ministers did meet, diplomats provided all the documentation and draft Treaties negotiated ahead of time for state leaders to use as a starting basis. It is only through a methodology of historical process-tracing examining the inter-delegation memos, working papers, and secretariat summaries that it is possible to observe the strong role diplomats played behind-the-scenes, and the extent to which agreement would not have been possible had statesmen only bargained amongst themselves. Moreover, it is difficult, if not impossible, to determine what outcome statesmen would have reached had they performed the negotiations themselves unless one assumes that their preferences remain fixed. In this regard, preferences based on rational choice theory tend to be similar to realist predictions. Before the circumstances of negotiation are known, state leaders' preferences typically support maximizing their own relative power in the international sphere.

⁶⁷ Other studies that assume actors' preferences remained fix are: Tsebelis, G. *Nested Games*. Berekely and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1990. Shepsle, K. *Perspectives on Positive Political Economy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990. Keohane, Robert. *After Hegemony*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984.

⁶⁸ In an earlier article, (Moravcsik. "Negotiating the Single European Act: National Interests and Conventional Statecraft in the European Community.") Moravcsik argues that changes in national preferences are a key component of institutional intergovernmentalism. In a more recent article, (Moravcsik, and Nicolaidis. "Explaining the Treaty of Amsterdam: Interests, Influence, Institutions.") he argues that initial state preferences remain stable throughout the negotiations.

Other examples of bargaining theory are the “Tit for Tat” strategy and coercive diplomacy.⁶⁹ In a “Tit for Tat” bargaining strategy negotiations open with one side trying to be cooperative, and every subsequent move from each side reflects a balancing out of cooperative and confrontational negotiation stances.⁷⁰ Thomas Risse (formerly Risse-Kappen) argues that this theory is flawed as it does not consider the political context nor the possibility that negotiators are unable to always identify what is conciliatory and what is confrontational. The negotiators will continuously wonder whether they are being tricked and what the motivations behind a conciliatory gesture really are. Coercive diplomacy, on the other hand, involves only confrontational negotiations meaning that the other side has to back down or else war will ensue.⁷¹ Coercive diplomacy is thus, not really diplomacy at all, but a series of threats. Risse also outlines conditional reciprocity, which is a softer version of coercive diplomacy involving some points of compromise if the opponent agrees to the main stipulation of the negotiation. However, Risse argues that this approach is difficult to distinguish from coercive diplomacy because the main point is still to threaten war, which ultimately makes it difficult for the opponent to cooperate.

Theories of bargaining rest on the assumption that diplomats are instrumental otherwise they would not exist and statesmen would not delegate authority to them. Kassim and Menon write that principals continue to exercise delegation, despite the risks that agents will exercise agency.⁷² They recognize the distinction between autonomy and agency, and actually consider agency as a cost that principals must bear rather than the main point of delegation.⁷³ However, much bargaining theory scholarship clumps autonomy together with agency, which I argue is a

⁶⁹ For an analysis of these two approaches see: Risse-Kappen, Thomas. "Did "Peace through Strength" End the Cold War? Lessons from Inf." *International Security* 16, no. 1 (1991): 162-88.

⁷⁰ Axelrod, Robert. *Evolution of Cooperation*. New York: Basic Books, 1984.

⁷¹ Snyder, Glenn, and Paul Diezeng. *Conflict among Nations*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977.

⁷² Kassim, and Menon. "The Principal-Agent Approach and the Study of the European Union: Promise Unfulfilled?"

⁷³ See Chapter One pp. 3-4 or p. 40 of this chapter for my discussion on the critical difference between autonomy and agency.

critical distinction in predicting outcomes of international cooperation. For example, Pollack writes, "I argue that the 'agency' or autonomy of a given supranational institution depends crucially on the efficacy and credibility of control mechanisms established by member-state principals, and that these vary from institution to institution leading to varying levels of supranational autonomy."⁷⁴ He uses agency and autonomy interchangeably.

It may be the case that bargaining theory predicts outcomes when diplomats are merely acting within their autonomy. When they act beyond their autonomy to exercise collective agency of their own, the results are not predicted by bargaining theory. There is evidently some "wobble room" in which statesmen expect that diplomats may stretch the bounds of their autonomy and diplomats will anticipate that statesmen will not overrule their actions.

Bargaining theory's methodology of comparing initial state preferences to final outcomes misses the critical processes that occur in between. The area beyond this wobble room is what is really interesting in an analysis of the processes of international cooperation. Diplomats deliberate and persuade each other as well as statesmen. Their ability to do this rests on their strength as an epistemic community. Much of bargaining theory examines the results after they have occurred, and defines initial state preferences in such a way that they explain outcomes.

Two-level game, principal-agent, and bargaining theories do not discount the role of diplomats, but treat them as part of the transmission belt for achieving Pareto-optimum results. Diplomats reduce transaction costs because they are professionals who have a greater understanding of rules and regulations, and have access to information. Thus, Putnam sees diplomats as having an important role, yet denies the importance of human agency. Diplomats are agents of states, but with no ability to impact outcomes beyond choosing a pre-determined "win-set". However, international cooperation is more complicated than state power and

⁷⁴ Pollack, Mark A. "Delegation, Agency, and Agenda Setting in the European Community." *International Organization* 51, no. 1 (1997): 99-134. p. 101.

preferences because it involves actors who are embedded in community, structures, and norms.⁷⁵ As Sverdrup argues, “The decision-making process needs to be situated in a distinct historical, institutional and contextual setting, revealing how actors are embedded in a web of structuring elements.”⁷⁶ Indeed, Zito argues that epistemic communities influence actors’ preferences themselves so they cannot only fall within a “win-set”.⁷⁷

Diplomats as an Epistemic Community

There are several hypotheses advanced here that do not conform to the alternative theories of cooperation discussed above, but rather rely on an examination of micro-processes and internal group dynamics. By ignoring the subjective realities of the people who actually make decisions, explanations that fall under the rubric of neo-realism and bargaining theory fail to explain outcomes in most cases. They take state and actor preferences as given (self-interest and/or power maximization) and unchangeable. By contrast, I argue that diplomats as influential, high-level actors do impact outcomes in significant ways, and their ability to do so rests on the shared meanings and norms within their epistemic community. As stated in Chapter One, the strength of the epistemic community of diplomats is mutually constitutive with their social background, professional status, training, meeting frequency and shared professional norms. In other words, over time diplomats continuously redefine and perpetuate their own profession and epistemic community. Thus, I advance the following general hypotheses:

⁷⁵ Sverdrup, Ulf. "An Institutional Perspective on Treaty Reform: Contextualizing the Amsterdam and Nice Treaties." *Journal of European Public Policy* 9, no. 1 (2002): 120-40.

⁷⁶ Ibid. p. 20

⁷⁷ Zito, Anthony R. "Epistemic Communities, Collective Entrepreneurship and European Integration." *Journal of European Public Policy* 8, no. 4 (2001): 585-603.

1. If the epistemic community of diplomats is strong, they are more likely to (a) exercise collective agency to reach a cooperative outcome, (b) change their preferences during the negotiation, (c) and successfully persuade their statesmen of their collective decisions.
2. Thus, if the epistemic community of diplomats is strong, they hold a stronger norm of consensus which encourages them to exercise agency.
3. If the epistemic community of diplomats is weak, they are less likely to (a) exercise collective agency to reach a cooperative outcome⁷⁸, (b) advance different preferences from those expressed in their instructions, (c) and perform the negotiation without the heavy interference of statesmen.
4. Thus, if the epistemic community of diplomats is weak, they hold a weaker norm of consensus which does not encourage them to exercise agency.

These hypotheses will be tested in the four cases to come. However, it is first necessary to explain the significance of epistemic communities and to detail the sociological and constructivist underpinnings that form the theoretical basis of this study.

Sociology and Networks

Sociologists have contributed a great deal to our understanding of how professional networks arise, evolve, and influence outcomes. The study of sociology is based on the key notion that individuals behave according to their social roles which are defined as “scripts” or collective “conventions” and individual (cognitive) “schemas”.⁷⁹ The focus is on micro-processes within groups or networks and the dynamics of group members as they create social institutions and shared meanings. In addition, certain contexts are conducive to producing more general worldviews that are spread and shared outside of the network. The individual actor-driven model from sociology is particularly relevant to this study.

Frank Dobbin argues that institutions, power, cognition, and networks are the four main components that explain the creation of “scripts” and how they change.⁸⁰ According to Dobbin, *institutions* are conventions, traditions, and laws which provide individuals with behavioral scripts and causal meanings. They may confine behavior as well as provide roadmaps for new

⁷⁸ Unless in the rare case that instructions from all the states involved in the negotiation happen to coincide.

⁷⁹ Dobbin, Frank. *The New Economic Sociology*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004. Introduction.

⁸⁰ Ibid.

behavior. There is a substantial literature on institutional change.⁸¹ *Cognition* is the psychological process in which each individual engages to understand his or her society's conventions. *Powerful* people influence customs and legal institutions through membership in certain professional networks. *Networks* not only provide individuals with an identity, but provide prescriptive solutions based on shared causal meanings developed within the network. Importantly, networks house "norm entrepreneurs" or expert individuals who come up with critical new ideas which continuously re-define their subjective reality. Like institutions, networks have a dual-role. They "may generate durable ties and practices through constitutive processes of social interaction or by shaping the opportunities and obstacles to exchange and cooperation."⁸² Unlike institutions, networks emphasize the agency and culture of its members, and are less reliant on "punctuated equilibrium" or "exogenous shocks" for change.⁸³

An understanding of the micro-processes within epistemic communities can be enhanced through identifying all four of these concepts. As will be observed in the four cases, diplomatic institutions are the rules of protocol and procedure, and professional norms that are inherited from one set of diplomats to another, and re-shaped over time. These institutions can be enduring so that change is not recognized until after the fact, like the gradual diminishing of grand processions that would take place before a diplomatic negotiation during the seventeenth century. They can also be continuously redefined by the diplomats themselves, like when it is appropriate to allow the other diplomat to enter the room before you. Diplomats were increasingly given

⁸¹ For a good overview see: Clemens, Elisabeth S., and James M. Cook. "Politics and Institutionalism: Explaining Durability and Change." *Annual Review of Sociology* 25 (1999): 441-66. p. 445. Also, Fligstein, Neil, and Iona Mara-Drita. "How to Make a Market: Reflections on the Attempt to Create a Single Market in the European Union." *The American Journal of Sociology* 102, no. 1 (1996): 1-33.

⁸² Clemens, and Cook. "Politics and Institutionalism: Explaining Durability and Change." p. 446.

⁸³ Krasner's "Punctuated equilibrium" is the argument that institutions are stable unless forced to change by an "exogenous shock" or sudden influence from outside of the institution.

precedence for their *own* reputations rather than for the relative power of their home-state. The process of institutionalization is “the spread and maintenance of sets of meanings”.⁸⁴

Cognition plays a critical role in allowing these changes in institutions to occur as well as socializing new diplomats into the profession. Individual cognition enables each diplomat to realize his or her identity as a member of the epistemic community. Emile Durkheim’s argument that social background or location impacts identity is a critical component to understanding the European diplomatic corps.⁸⁵ In support of Durkheim, a large part of the development of professional expertise and socialization among diplomats occurs prior to joining the epistemic community through social background, selection, and training. Upon joining the diplomatic corps, diplomats undergo a new phase of socialization within the “organizational field”⁸⁶. Paul DiMaggio and Walter Powell argue, “In the initial stages of their life cycle, organizational fields display considerable diversity in approach and form. Once a field becomes well established, however, there is an inexorable push towards homogenization.”⁸⁷ Through empirical investigation of the diplomatic epistemic community, it is possible to observe the cognitive or identity-based origins of their organizational field.

Power is often a given for this particular type of epistemic community as long as they have high professional status. Power allows diplomats to influence people outside of their epistemic community, in particular the statesmen who issued their instructions. As will be seen in three of the four cases (excepting the Versailles Treaty), power allows diplomats to persuade their statesmen. Power is particularly relevant in the literature on “organizational fields” as it considers the influence of outside organizations on the organization being studied. Some

⁸⁴ Fligstein, and Mara-Drita. "How to Make a Market: Reflections on the Attempt to Create a Single Market in the European Union." p. 2.

⁸⁵ Dobbin. *The New Economic Sociology*.

⁸⁶ DiMaggio and Powell define “organizational fields” as “organizations that, in the aggregate, constitute a recognized area of institutional life.” DiMaggio, Paul J., and Walter W. Powell. "The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields." *American Sociological Review* 48, no. 2 (1983): 147-60. p. 149.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.* p. 148.

sociologists have argued that organizations are externally controlled, and that there may be competing external pressures.⁸⁸ Diplomats, however, are in a unique position because power is vested in them as plenipotentiaries of states, and thus rather than being pulled in multiple directions they have only two main loyalties: to their state and to each other. The study of organizational fields also addresses the creation of a single, stable organizational field, which is particularly relevant to diplomats as they have historically professionalized their own profession. Fligstein argues that there are two problems with creating a stable organizational field: (1) the relationships within the field must be enforceable, and (2) governments must legitimize their agreements.⁸⁹ Again, diplomats are in the unique position of being protected from these concerns because (1) their job is treaty creation which naturally enforces their relationships, and (2) governments grant them legitimacy from the start.

Finally, the concept of networks is the most closely associated with epistemic communities, as defined in the current political science literature, because it emphasizes elements of expertise, shared causal beliefs, and the importance of agency. The focus on networks of *agents* in sociology emerged in the late 1980s when DiMaggio and others moved away from examining only structures and institutions to bring in the role of “institutional entrepreneurs”.⁹⁰ I argue that the concept of networks in sociology corrects for the short-comings of a purely institutional approach. Whereas institutions tend to embody “path dependence”, networks embody agency. Institutional arguments were not intended to leave out the possibility of idea generation and change, but they emphasized the ways in which institutions constrained by “structuring what is possible”⁹¹. This analysis of an epistemic community of diplomats is

⁸⁸ For an overview of this see: Fligstein, Neil, and Peter Brantley. "Bank Control, Owner Control, or Organizational Dynamics: Who Controls the Large Modern Corporation?" *The American Journal of Sociology* 98, no. 2 (1992): 280-307.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.* p. 286.

⁹⁰ Fligstein, and Mara-Drita. "How to Make a Market: Reflections on the Attempt to Create a Single Market in the European Union." p. 2.

⁹¹ *Ibid.* p. 5.

intended to highlight the ways in which diplomats have pushed the boundaries of what is possible by continuously redefining preferences.

Constructivism and Epistemic Communities

Besides sociology, this study also draws upon constructivist theories to articulate the role of epistemic communities. Andreas Antoniadis explicitly links the epistemic community concept to social constructivism.⁹² Constructivist approaches to political science argue that reality is socially constructed, not an objective state of being. Thus, social interactions produce worldviews, norms, and ideas of what constitutes reality. Antoniadis argues that the “structures” of international political life are social rather than material, and this is why epistemic communities are so important. Socially constructed beliefs about reality are particularly strong in epistemic communities as shared causal beliefs are the main criteria that bring individuals together in an epistemic community. Clearly, there is close familiarity between constructivism in political science and networks theory in sociology.

In contrast to how neo-realist and bargaining theory treat international cooperation, I consider diplomats as an epistemic community in order to conceptualize their potential as actors in their own right. Ernst Haas, one of the chief proponents of the epistemic community concept, argues that interactions among elite transnational actors can result in outcomes that lie above or below the so-called Pareto frontier.⁹³ Furthermore, such a frontier representing optimal outcomes does not exist because the world never operates in such an idealized fashion with fixed national preferences.

⁹² Antoniadis, Andreas. "Epistemic Communities, Epistemes and the Construction of (World) Politics." *Global Society* 17, no. 1 (2003): 21-38.

⁹³ Haas, Ernst. *The Uniting of Europe. Political, Social and Economic Forces 1950-57*. Stanford CA: Stanford University Press, 1958.

According to Haas, results are not pre-determined, and can reflect worldviews and norms acquired during interaction leading to coalitions that cut across national boundaries.⁹⁴ Thus, during the course of negotiation, diplomats can change their preferences based on current factors. In the case of the EU, this is because diplomats know that they will continue to interact with each other. Issue linkage and forward-linkage occur locking participants into a transnational community. Consequently, they become quickly socialized in this environment and develop a loyalty to the transnational sphere, thus strengthening their epistemic community.⁹⁵ Glarbo articulates a similar constructivist position arguing that decisions about CFSP⁹⁶ “emerge as social constructions, that is, as the results of national diplomacies intentionally and unintentionally communicating to themselves and to each other their intents and perceptions of political co-operation.”⁹⁷

Following the work of Ernst Haas, Peter Haas argues that the notion of epistemic communities provides a conceptual tool to understanding conditions of uncertainty.⁹⁸ It is a means of understanding the value of ideas and collective meaning through a methodologically pluralistic program. Emanuel Adler and Peter Haas write:

Between international structures and human volition lies interpretation. Before choices involving cooperation can be made, circumstances must be assessed and interests identified. In this regard, to study the ideas of epistemic communities and their impact on policy making is to immerse oneself in the inner world of international relations theory and to erase the artificial boundaries between international and domestic politics so that dynamic between structure and choice can be illuminated.⁹⁹

⁹⁴ Haas, Ernst B. "Is There a Hole in the Whole? Knowledge, Technology, Interdependence, and the Construction of International Regimes." *International Organization* 29, no. 3 (1975): 827-76.

⁹⁵ For a good summary of Haas' approach, labeled “neo-functionalism”, see Hayes-Renshaw, Fiona, and Helen Wallace. *The Council of Ministers*. London: MacMillan Press Ltd, 1997. pp. 254-255. The beginning part of Haas' theory is a variant of functionalism, although it considers individual actors' (diplomats') preferences rather than simply state interest. However, it quickly becomes a constructivist theory of worldviews, socialization, and loyalty when cooperation over time becomes a factor, particularly in the case of the EU.

⁹⁶ Common Foreign and Security Policy of the 1992 Maastricht Treaty.

⁹⁷ Glarbo. "Wide-Awake Diplomacy: Reconstructing the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union." See p. 635

⁹⁸ Adler, Emanuel, and Peter M. Haas. "Conclusion: Epistemic Communities, World Order, and the Creation of a Reflective Research Program." *International Organization* 46, no. 1 (1992): 367-90. pp. 367-390.

⁹⁹ Ibid.

The above quote implicitly critiques Putnam's approach as creating a false dichotomy between the domestic and international levels. Rather, they argue that the international system has strong transnational linkages.

There have also been a variety of critiques of the epistemic community literature. James Sebenius argues that the epistemic community concept is useful in that it is not necessarily confined to binary outcomes, i.e. either cooperation or defect.¹⁰⁰ Rather, it takes processes into consideration. Just as Robert Keohane and Robert Jervis point out, to understand outcomes of cooperation it is necessary to pay attention to the unique blend of agreement and disagreement. Sebenius's second critique of the epistemic community approach is that it does not define the mechanism of cooperation, which he argues is negotiation. A study of diplomats, as professional negotiators clearly overcomes this shortcoming.

Another critique, from Thomas Risse and Jeff Checkel, is that the epistemic community literature does not explain why members choose some ideas over others. Checkel writes, "How and under what conditions are [ideas] influential determinants of policy?"¹⁰¹ Risse and Checkel support the notion that ideas, norms, and transnational networks are an indispensable part of understanding international relations. Structural theories such as realism and liberalism will never fully explain international outcomes unless they consider these factors. In particular, Risse argues that the end of the Cold War was largely due to the spread of ideas among transnational networks that advanced new understandings of Soviet security interests.¹⁰² Western liberal internationalists formed ties with people from policy think-tanks in the Soviet Union, including Mikhail Gorbachev, and their shared ideas had a causal impact on Soviet foreign policy. Risse

¹⁰⁰ Sebenius, James K. "Challenging Conventional Explanations of International Cooperation: Negotiation Analysis and the Case of Epistemic Communities." *International Organization* 46, no. 1 (1992): 323-65.

¹⁰¹ Checkel. "Ideas, Institutions, and Gorbachev Foreign Policy Revolution."

¹⁰² Risse-Kappen, Thomas. "Ideas Do Not Float Freely: Transnational Coalitions, Domestic Structures, and the End of the Cold War." *International Organization* 48, no. 2 (1994): 185-214.

seeks to correct for the short comings of the epistemic community approach by figuring out why “new thinkers” choose some ideas over others. In Risse’s words:

Ideas do not float freely...access to the political system, as well as the ability to build winning coalitions are determined by the *domestic structure* of the target state, that is, the nature of the political institutions, state-society relations, and the values and norms embedded in the political culture.¹⁰³

In Risse’s empirical analysis he argues that three transnational networks during the Cold War held similar ideas, but had varying degrees of success. For him, this can be explained by the variation in domestic structure. Checkel concurs, criticizing constructivist approaches for being too weak to draw the connection between international norms and domestic agents.¹⁰⁴

Risse and Checkel’s focus on domestic structure is an important part of the picture, and is particularly relevant when examining single cases in which the goal of the research is to find out why certain ideas were favored over others in a certain context. In this regard, diplomats are unique as an epistemic community for two reasons. First, they are not subject to domestic pressures or public opinion, but receive their instructions from a single source. The impacts of “political institutions, state-society relations, and the values and norms embedded in the political culture” are largely transmitted through the instructions of democratically elected representatives to ambassadors. Moreover, they themselves are domestic actors so they can be said to embody certain kinds of domestic institutions. However, they do not reside in their home country so the broader diversity of domestic political culture and policy interests interfere less in their day-to-day lives. It is important to remember that domestic structures have not mattered greatly until relatively recently with the rise of democracy.

Second, the diplomatic epistemic community is unique because their main goal is to reach agreement, and this is not easy. The focus here is not so much on why some ideas are selected over others, but why diplomats *agree* on which ideas are selected. Moreover, to be able

¹⁰³ Ibid. p. 187.

¹⁰⁴ Checkel, Jeffrey T. "Norms, Institutions, and National Identity in Contemporary Europe." *International Studies Quarterly* 43, no. 1 (1999): 83-114.

to generalize across time, rather than focusing on a single case, the actual content of the agreed upon ideas is less important. Epistemic communities have an overarching norm of cooperation and consensus, which can be strong or weak depending on the composition of the network. It is this norm of consensus which determines the extent to which diplomats will be able to agree on certain ideas. When it comes to often contentious negotiations where gridlock is a real possibility, reaching any agreement in the first place is a difficult proposition. This, in part, explains why in the past diplomats have reached negative outcomes reflecting ideas that do not benefit the common good.

Empirically, the literature on epistemic communities and transnational networks has addressed both governmental and non-governmental actors. Adler, Haas and others focus their empirical attention on the impact of *non-governmental* epistemic communities. The research of their volume is aimed at showing how and why epistemic communities impact state behavior and policy innovations, and how they evolve largely independently of government influence. Keck and Sikkink similarly look at non-governmental epistemic communities or as they label them, “transnational advocacy networks.”¹⁰⁵ Kathleen McNamara and Anne-Marie Slaughter are among the scholars who have focused on *governmental* transnational communities. McNamara focuses on central bankers and treasury and finance officials in the European Union who are close to the policy process. Anne-Marie Slaughter argues that it is no longer prime ministers, statesmen, and foreign ministers who drive international decision-making, but “government networks” comprised of judges, police investigators, financial regulators, and legislators.

This book supports the previous work of such scholars as McNamara, Risse, Checkel, Slaughter, and Sikkink who examine transnational linkages and bridge the gap between structural and ideational approaches. I seek to add to this growing body of literature by advancing the argument that ambassadors, as high-level diplomats in the political realm, also constitute a critical

¹⁰⁵ Keck, Margaret, and Kathryn Sikkink. *Activists Beyond Borders*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998.

transnational group. As an epistemic community directly involved in various processes of official governmental interaction the importance and uniqueness of diplomats cannot be ignored.

Structural constraints on Diplomats: Rules, Norms, and Organizations

Now that the theoretical context is laid out, it is important to return to the role of structure which does not determine everything but nevertheless plays an important role. On one side of the coin are diplomats as actors within an epistemic community, and on the other side is the structure that confines diplomatic processes. Sociology tends to emphasize the structures or constraints actors face in their behavior.¹⁰⁶ Structural constraints on behavior result from the institutionalization of previous conventions and customs and can be manifested as Adam Smith's "best practices" or Emile Durkheim's "myth and ritual". They also work to ensure that new practices or ideas conform in some way to the greater understanding of what is rational within the subjective reality of the diplomatic epistemic community.¹⁰⁷ Thus, structures such as rules, norms, and organizations allow autonomy of action within certain boundaries.

Here I emphasize a critical distinction about the dual nature of structure in impacting the epistemic community of diplomats. I argue that diplomats simultaneously have autonomy from the state, and that they exercise agency of their own. Autonomy is the room diplomats have to act within the structure that constrains them. It is mainly the explicit rules-of-the-game, usually provided by states or institutions, specifying the context under which diplomats must operate. Agency is defined as what diplomats *do* with their autonomy, and whether they go beyond it. In light of this distinction, I argue that previous work in the field of sociology is helpful in elucidating the nature of diplomatic agency. As sociologists contend, when new ideas are introduced by a network of professionals, these new ideas must in some way conform to an

¹⁰⁶ Clemens and Cook argue, "The patterning of social life is not produced solely by the aggregation of individual and organizational behavior but also by institutions that structure action." Clemens, and Cook. "Politics and Institutionalism: Explaining Durability and Change."

¹⁰⁷ Dobbin. *The New Economic Sociology*. Introduction.

accepted form of rationality to be accepted as conventions. In other words, for diplomats to reach consensus on a particularly contentious issue, a successful outcome must be found among the options that implicitly fall within the shared meanings of all participants. Critically, these shared meanings can and do change during the course of interaction.

As mentioned, there is naturally a bit of “wobble room” in the distinction between autonomy and agency. Diplomats may be able anticipate what statesmen would allow them to agree to beyond what they stipulate in instructions. However, in some of the following cases diplomats exercise agency even beyond this “wobble room” to create outcomes that statesmen were initially against. Diplomats do not want to get overruled by statesmen, and they are skilled at determining when they could be overruled. This skill is derived from their collective professional expertise and ability to persuade statesmen using the cognitive tools derived within their network. Anticipation of being overruled is thus strongly related to the strength of the epistemic community. If the diplomatic epistemic community is strong, diplomats will anticipate that they can persuade statesmen.

The question of autonomy requires research of structure. One type of structure is the rules regulating the relationship between the diplomats and the state. During the Congress of Westphalia, diplomats were given full plenipotentiary powers so they could make on-the-spot decisions, however, they were also given orders to correspond regularly with the state, and sometimes they were sent specific instructions. Thus, their autonomy or structure was heavily regulated, but there was room for them to exercise agency, particularly in the short-term. A remarkable finding in the case study of Westphalia is that the diplomats took liberties beyond their state-given autonomy to defy their state instructions in several instances. Similar occurrences happened during the Congress of Berlin.

A second type of structure faced by diplomats is less explicit and overlaps with agency. These are *norms*, defined as unwritten codes of conduct, which bind diplomats. It goes without saying that explicit rules are difficult for diplomats to change, but non-explicit norms can be just

as binding for different reasons. For example, norms of protocol among diplomats express status and respect. There are cases in which lapses in following norms of protocol have had disastrous consequences for negotiations. Disregarding norms could seriously undermine a diplomat's attempt to reach reconciliation before the negotiations have even begun. Norms are strong forms of structure even though they are usually learnt on the job and can change over time. Explicit rules tend to govern the relations between diplomats and the state, while implicit norms apply more to the relations within the international diplomatic community. This is why norms can both constrain and aid diplomatic interaction and the strength of the epistemic community, hence both serving as a source of agency and legitimizing that exercise of agency.

The normative school of thought arose in reaction against the argument that integration and regional institutionalization is functional or interest maximizing. Scholars such as Elster, Finnemore, Sikkink, and McNamara argue that it is necessary to incorporate the role of norms and ideas in looking at the emergence of institutions and regionalism. Ideas are related to norms in that they constitute the pre-institutionalized version of norms. Ideas here are defined as 'shared causal beliefs'.¹⁰⁸

During the process of discourse and persuasion, certain ideas become institutionalized as norms. Jon Elster focuses on social norms as independent variables arguing that norms hold emotional tonality that give them a grip on the mind.¹⁰⁹ Many ideas may be discarded in the process of negotiation and discourse before some gain a grip on the mind, and attain the status of norms. Elster, however, chooses not to explain what he calls the 'residual variable' that bridges the gap between preferences and opportunities. He argues that norms, like self-interest, are a natural human motivation, thus it is not possible for social scientists to fully understand how and why norms become more important than self-interests. In short, norms are at least partially shaped by self-interest, but not fully reducible.

¹⁰⁸ Kathleen R. McNamara. *The Currency of Ideas*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998. p. 4.

¹⁰⁹ Jon Elster. *The Cement of Society: a study of social order*. Cambridge University Press, 1989.

Finnemore and Sikkink resolve the problem of the residual variable by setting out a dynamic norm life-cycle framework arguing that norm emergence depends on norm entrepreneurs, organizational platforms, expertise, and transnational network resonance.¹¹⁰ First, norm entrepreneurs trigger the emergence of a norm and try to spread the idea through persuasion. If enough people buy the idea, then it reaches a 'tipping point', and enters the second phase, the norm cascade. Finally, the norm is internalized in the third phase through socialization. The norm life-cycle framework provides a solution to the geo-political school's reliance on systemic shocks, the neo-functionalists' assumption of interest maximization, and Elster's decision not to explain the residual variable. However, the norm life-cycle framework does not fully explain norm emergence because it skips one prior step in the time line. What are the origins and motivations of the norm entrepreneurs themselves? I argue that diplomats are a strong example of norm entrepreneurs whose impact relies in part on the strength of their epistemic community. As mentioned, sociological studies of networks also provide a template for understanding the origins of norm entrepreneurs.

A third type of structure is international organizations that serve as an umbrella for diplomatic interactions. The European Union institutional structure is a major example of this. In Brussels, the Council provides common ground, literally, for diplomats to interact under the same roof both on a daily basis, and for major inter-governmental meetings. As huge bureaucracies, international organizations provide the most structure for diplomats today. The hierarchy, decision-making procedures, and protocol are all highly institutionalized within each international organization. The supranational level mirrors the bureaucratic structures of national civil services and ministries of foreign affairs to a great extent. What does this leave for the role of diplomats today? This question is addressed in Chapter Six. Overall, it is critical to examine both sides of the coin, agency and structure.

¹¹⁰ Finnemore, Martha, and Kathryn Sikkink. "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change." *International Organization* 52, no. 4 (1998): 887-917.

The Case Studies

Scarcely a time exists since the development of the modern state that a scholar has not described the period as one of “new diplomacy.” Mattingly attributes this to seventeenth century, for Mangone the late nineteenth century was a “new age of consultation”, Craig and Gilbert make reference to “new diplomacy” in their examination of the post-WWI period, and Hamilton and Langhorne label the post-WWII period as a new era of “total diplomacy”. Interestingly, none really contradict the choices of others in deciding the timing of new diplomacy. I contend this is largely because no one is wrong. It would be inaccurate to completely distinguish one period of diplomacy from another and to describe diplomatic developments as sharp breaks from past traditions. The evolution of diplomacy is seamless, yet ever changing. A diplomat from Renaissance Italy could slip into an embassy of today and recognize his profession.

Rather than trying to identify one major transition into an era of “new diplomacy” and embarking on the impossible task of justifying such a choice, I have selected four periods of new diplomacy. These time periods are more distinguishable than others as prime examples of changes in the diplomatic profession, though they are simply bigger targets along the continuum. For example, I did not choose the 1815 Congress of Vienna because even though the diplomatic conference itself was critical to international cooperation, the diplomatic profession at this time was not strikingly “new” compared to other times.¹¹¹ This chapter emphasizes the vast continuity in the practice of diplomacy, but the bulk of this book deals with change and development. Diplomats have existed and worked towards goals of international cooperation long before particular issues were brought to the table, and long after the issues were forgotten by outsiders to the profession. The diplomats ideally have a grander, loftier goal than any single negotiation or treaty, and that is to promote peace, cooperation, and the common good. Reaching towards a lofty goal is an intimate part of their identity as diplomats, but at the same time, one cannot

¹¹¹ I will make reference to its contribution to international rules of diplomatic protocol in Chapter Four. In general, the spirit of the Congress of Vienna was to glorify past diplomacy.

neglect their self-interest. Diplomats typically have individual career aspirations as well as a collective goal to gain more power and authority for their profession. Many treaties created by diplomats in some way augment the power of the transnational diplomatic corps itself by attributing to them new powers in the form of monitoring or implementation of agreements. Additionally, individual diplomats will strive to please the statesmen who control their promotions. Thus, the lofty goal of the common good is only one part of diplomatic identity, and represents the ideal. The diplomatic practice has admittedly fallen short of its stated purpose on occasion.¹¹²

The aim of this project is to understand the importance of diplomacy today and in the future. However, given the continuity of diplomacy over time, alongside its constant evolution, a historical analysis is necessary to understand the direction diplomacy is going, and to provide comparative examples. The four case studies are the mid-seventeenth, late-nineteenth, early-twentieth, and late-twentieth centuries, and the corresponding negotiations are the Congresses and Treaties of Westphalia (1648), Berlin (1878), Versailles (1919), and Maastricht (1992).

In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, diplomats were accessories to war. They negotiated the conditions for beginning wars, conducting wars, and terminating wars. Members of the international system had no expectation that war could be prevented, but rather that war was a necessary way of life. After the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia, and the gradual international acceptance of a more formal, sovereign state system, the role of diplomats began to change. Diplomats were considered essential not only for negotiating the conditions of going to war, but also the conditions for preventing war. Resident embassies, which are diplomats or ambassadors who remain in foreign countries to maintain state relationships, began to emerge first in the Italian states, then France, and finally in all of Europe. These diplomats were former ministers or

¹¹² In several instances, diplomatic decisions have resulted in highly detrimental policies going against the common good such as the 1938 Munich Pact which secured France and Britain's support of Adolf Hitler. It is important to remember, however, that statesmen (British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain, French Premier Édouard Daladier, Germany's Adolf Hitler, and Italy's Benito Mussolini) not diplomats negotiated the terms of the agreement.

secretaries of state, and had no formal education in diplomacy, as they would in future centuries. Anecdotally, the word “diplomacy” even originated from these resident embassies.¹¹³ The ambassadors carried a “diploma” or a letter of credence certifying their power to negotiate and represent their sovereigns.

In the nineteenth century, diplomats were even more numerous, and maintained basically the same role they had developed since they were first professionalized in the seventeenth century. However, advances in communication technology, particularly the invention of the telegraph, brought the state closer to its diplomatic representatives. Interestingly, the telegraph did not restrict the autonomy of diplomats more than letters had previously. In addition, during this period diplomats underwent a more competitive selection and educational process, though most were still hand-picked from the ranks of the privileged classes. Many changes in international relations, intellectual life, and worldviews had also occurred. The age of irreconcilable religious differences of the seventeenth century was replaced with an age of reason, scientific advancement, and relative peace in Europe. The only event akin to war, though more like a small battle, was the Crimean War. Nevertheless, territorial disputes remained a major source of international concern and diplomatic negotiation because the idea of state sovereignty was increasingly accepted as an international norm.

During the nineteenth century, not all conferences were to end war, but also to prevent war.¹¹⁴ Mangone argues that this “new age of consultation” was marked by a willingness of states to negotiate and plead for cooperation as a *preventative* measure. The Congress of Berlin is just such an example, as it aimed to prevent war among the Great Powers to resolve Russia’s unilateral action in the Balkans. In contrast to the seventeenth century, bureaucratization and

¹¹³ Watson, Adam. *Diplomacy: The Dialogue between States*. London: Eyre Methuen, 1982.

¹¹⁴ For example in 1864, Great Britain, Denmark, France, Austria, the German Confederation, Germany, Sweden-Norway, and Russia held a meeting to prevent war between Austria-Germany and Denmark. Another example is the London conference of 1867 where all the states of Europe and the new Kingdom of Italy met to decide on the permanent neutrality of Luxembourg. This served to prevent conflict between France and Germany over the future of Luxembourg. Examples from Mangone, Gerard J. *A Short History of International Organization*. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1954. p. 54

professionalism made the nineteenth century seem like an era of “new diplomacy”. Yet, it is still described by many scholars in hindsight as the age of “old diplomacy”.¹¹⁵ A stronger international society existed than in early modern times, but respect for international law and the establishment of international organizations and tribunals were still largely a distant dream.¹¹⁶ It offered only the naissence of the idea of permanent international cooperation. In comparison to the twentieth century, nineteenth century diplomacy was distinct for its lingering patronage and aristocratic ethos.

The post-World War I period experienced changes in the international system and a sharp break with past norms and worldviews. It was a time of “new diplomacy” because of these breaks with the past, but the newness was doomed to fail. The case of the Treaty of Versailles is distinctive from the others as it is the only one in which a satisfactory cooperative solution to the Great War was not attained. Nevertheless, there is much to draw from the processes of diplomacy within the European corps during this era. It is an important case study in the evolution of diplomatic relationships and protocol because it points to the new direction towards summitry evident in the twentieth century. In many ways, it represents a low-point in diplomatic agency. Efforts were articulated by statesmen to transform the diplomatic process into a transparent, open one in which public opinion could have an impact as the negotiations went forward. Ultimately this was not accomplished, and much of the decision-making at the Paris Peace Conferences occurred behind closed doors with vague procedures and ad hoc protocol. Moreover, the major discussions to produce the Treaty of Versailles occurred in separate rooms creating a cleavage between the statesmen in attendance who were together in one room, and the professional diplomats in another. In this case, the statesmen did not grant autonomy to their diplomatic representatives to the detriment of outcomes of international cooperation. It is still revealing of diplomatic agency to look at what diplomats did accomplish under this highly

¹¹⁵ Hamilton, Keith, and Richard Langhorne. *The Practice of Diplomacy: Its Evolution, Theory and Administration*. London: Routledge, 1995. Ch. 4

¹¹⁶ Mangone. *A Short History of International Organization*. p. 54.

constraining context, and as a counter-factual example of what happens when statesmen, rather than diplomats, largely determine outcomes.

Little more than a century after the Congress of Berlin, Europe is now organized under the supranational institution of the European Union (EU). The diplomats of today are the members of the Committee of Permanent Representatives (Coreper). Communications technology, information-sharing, and the ability to travel all mean that states could potentially carefully control their diplomats and maintain them as transmission belts of state power preferences. The strength of the diplomatic epistemic community, however, prevents this from happening. Diplomats are chosen under a meritocratic system of recruitment, education, and promotion. The general trend is that there are more and more European diplomatic representatives to international organizations, and a complex institutional apparatus with rules and regulations has developed alongside them. The intense bureaucratization of today's diplomats and emphasis on technocracy is changing the way diplomacy is conducted, yet they still exercise agency, and informally determine 70-90% of EU decision-making.¹¹⁷

While many studies of international security in the modern era analyze why states fight wars in terms of state preferences or power interests, few have considered the decision-making process itself, and the role of modern diplomats in preventing international anarchy. This book does not contain an "amelioration bias," the assumption that over time our ability to cooperate on the supranational level is always better now than it was in the past. Rather, by looking at past international negotiations, I argue that there are lessons to learn from past generalizations about diplomatic processes. Striking the right balance between the structural constraints of institutions

¹¹⁷ Claudio Radaelli, another author who addresses the epistemic community approach, argues that epistemic communities play a role in international cooperation only under the constrained conditions of high uncertainty and high salience of the issue at hand. (Radaelli, Claudio M. "The Public Policy of the European Union: Whither Politics of Expertise?" *Journal of European Public Policy* 6, no. 5 (1999): 757-74.) However, an examination of the epistemic community of diplomats demonstrates that diplomats often exercise agency for issues that are not necessarily of high salience and uncertainty.

and the space for diplomats to exercise agency will be of utmost importance to outcomes of international cooperation in the future EU, and whether it is perceived as democratic.

Chapter Three

The Seventeenth Century and Treaty of Westphalia

Climate of the Times: The Emergence of International Society

The climate of international relations during the mid-seventeenth century was essentially absolutist and mercantilist. It was absolutist because monarchs vied for power over their territory, and tried to maximize this power in relation to other countries. It was mercantilist because merchants took the same attitude believing that there was a limited amount of resources in the world. Just as kings aimed for a balance of power, merchants strove for a balance of trade. They engaged in ruthless economic competition for what they believed was a finite quantity of precious metals or bullion. International diplomacy and the emergence of a more codified system of international law were the only contenders against the prevalent climate of zero-sum gain, especially at the highest echelons of international society. During the lead-up to the Peace of Westphalia, there were fewer diplomats residing abroad than during the century before, but the quantity flourished greatly after 1648.¹¹⁸ Their numbers were limited, but they were much more often representatives of states, than of religious leaders, merchants, and large-scale land-owners, as they often had been in the previous century. The quasi-diplomacy of the middle ages was gradually brushed aside¹¹⁹ making room for the first important stages of diplomatic professionalization.¹²⁰

The correspondence among diplomats and state leaders shows that diplomats often had different opinions from the state, and most significantly, acted upon them. They did this first of all because they had developed a greater, more-educated understanding of the position of other states through continued contact with other diplomats during and prior to negotiations at

¹¹⁸ Luard. *The Balance of Power: The System of International Relations, 1648-1815*. p. 48

¹¹⁹ During the middle ages, the conduct of diplomacy was vaguely defined. Merchants, bishops, and other non-sovereigns could send diplomatic representatives just as Kings and Princes could. See Anderson, M.S. *The Rise of Modern Diplomacy 1450-1919*. London and New York: Longman, 1993. p. 42.

¹²⁰ "Professionalization" is defined as the process by which norms, rules, behavior, and duty become standardized among a group of individuals who share a profession. For diplomats, professionalization is inherently transnational.

international meetings. Second, because they developed and maintained ties with other diplomats, both directly through face-to-face meetings, and indirectly through mutual acquaintances. These were akin to the relationships among businessmen today, where a networking culture and a similar background and worldview often enables them to discover their common connections and shared knowledge relatively quickly. Without first establishing a common ground it is difficult to reach reasoned compromises in daily meetings and negotiations.¹²¹ Finally, diplomats acted upon their differing opinions because they were faced for the first time with the possibility of a conflict between duty to the prince and duty to peace or the common good.¹²²

This chapter will first provide an overview of the mid-seventeenth century diplomatic profession as a slowly modernizing, but rapidly spreading phenomenon in Western Europe, and of the historical significance of the Treaty of Westphalia. At this time, an epistemic community of diplomats was developed by virtue of shared status, similar social background, and meeting frequency, but diplomatic training was low as it was primarily on-the-job. It is important to note that training does not preclude a professionalized diplomatic corps, although it can strengthen the cohesion and shared professional norms of the epistemic community.¹²³ Because diplomats spent several years together negotiating the Peace treaty, they developed relationships over time, even though they had spent limited time together beforehand. The second part of the chapter will focus on the process of decision-making at the Congress of Westphalia as a major diplomatic event. The analysis will consist of a detailed examination of the relationship between state leaders and diplomats, and among diplomats themselves. To what extent did diplomats exercise

¹²¹ Risse. "'Let's Argue!': Communicative Action in World Politics."

¹²² Mattingly. *Renaissance Diplomacy*. London: Butler & Tanner Ltd., 1955. Chapter 27.

¹²³ Training can strengthen the epistemic community of diplomats, but is not a necessary component of many professional groups. For example, many merchants during the seventeenth century were not trained in business, and for that matter, many businessmen today do not receive training. However, they were and are still professional merchants.

collective agency and to what extent did they follow their instructions? To what extent did the strength of their epistemic community determine the outcomes at Westphalia?

The European Corps: Seventeenth Century

The 1648 Treaty of Westphalia was the first significant, large-scale multilateral meeting involving diplomats. The negotiations were more formal than the regular day-to-day meetings, and with the express purpose of reaching an official, written agreement or treaty. Daily information-sharing, by contrast, was an informal act conducted at the court of princes or with other ambassadors. It was basically a part of the “job description” of early resident ambassadors, but the style and manner with which it was carried out was open to interpretation. Minor understandings, concessions, or agreements could be reached through these regular communications, but they were often unwritten and subtle.

During this period, diplomacy was recognizable as a professional endeavor with standards of conduct, permanent embassies, and constant communication between the states and diplomatic representatives. It is an interesting time to consider because the act of diplomacy by professionals contained elements of fifteenth- and sixteenth-century Italian Renaissance diplomacy, such as grand processions with great pomp, as well as qualities that continue to exist today, such as the emphasis on the order of proceedings and bureaucratic procedure. The special contribution of Venice to the diplomatic profession is significant. The excellence of their ambassadors set high standards from the start, and England had a permanent representative in Venice since the 1590s. The Swedish Chancellery (foreign ministry) created the practice of specialized “desks” in which experts were assigned to each particular state with which the Swedes dealt. Modernizing change occurred incrementally, and in the process many of the customs and ceremonials of the past were recognized as inefficient and were gradually discarded.

Although there were numerous differences among countries and various levels of advancement in the field of diplomacy there were certain characteristics – social background (who they were and why they were selected), status, and how often they met – which distinguished diplomats as a collective, and thus gave them a basis of shared norms, identity, and experiences. I argue that these shared qualities to some degree reinforced and created new bases of transnational ties. Alongside the more structural diplomatic professionalization, there existed a growing international society of diplomats that was based on agency and norms. The following sub-sections discuss how and why the variables of social background, meeting frequency, status, and shared professional norms contributed to a kind of diplomatic “epistemic community” in Western Europe.¹²⁴

Qualities of a Diplomat: Social Background

In the early seventeenth century, ambassadors were chosen simply by virtue of being in the king’s service. They were key figures in government, and were thus likely candidates for the king to send away as his representatives abroad. In the middle to late seventeenth century, diplomats continued to be selected through appointment, but they were often chosen for their ability to negotiate, engage in courtly manners, and maintain close ties to the crown.

There were, however, numerous disadvantages to pursuing a diplomatic assignment. As a result of the significant financial cost of taking on the position, many diplomats were wary of having to use up their own resources to carry out the job. Some even refused to become ambassadors if they were unwilling to spend their own money. At the time, it was often considered more prestigious to have a court appointment at home than to go abroad. Another disadvantage was that after being abroad for many years, diplomats frequently found that the

¹²⁴ As stated in Chapter One, “epistemic community” is defined by Peter Haas as “a network of professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue area.” Haas. "Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination."

chances of returning to a high-level, well-paid job in the home state were slim. After a while, people tended to regard them almost as foreigners, and hence with suspicion and uncertainty about their loyalties. There were also the physical discomforts and dangers of traveling long distances. With all these disadvantages, unqualified people were occasionally picked for jobs when those more qualified would have refused. However, despite the hardships, some of history's most intelligent and able individuals, such as Hugo Grotius, the Count of Gondomar, and Peter Paul Rubens, became ambassadors at some point. To many, a sense of serving their country and gaining membership in an elite international society drove them to ignore the costs. Because of the contributions of so many talented individuals, the diplomatic career professionalized rapidly, the assignments and rewards became more regularized, and a hierarchy was established.

Watson argues that, "Over the course of the seventeenth century, diplomacy became an art, a consciously and deliberately creative achievement in the European states system."¹²⁵ These professional diplomats were individuals authorized in the name of their country to conduct world politics on its behalf. Although they may have performed similar functions to soldiers, their domain was confined to peaceful means. One of the most famous original documents that reflect the qualities required of a diplomat in this era was François de Callières's manual titled, *On the Manner of Negotiating with Princes*, written in the 1690s.¹²⁶ Although this is somewhat later than the period considered here, the qualities and expectations of diplomats had not changed much from the mid-seventeenth century. Callières gives a detailed account of the attributes, talents, and appropriate behavior of diplomats. He stressed above all that to maintain the security of his state a diplomat should keep his master informed, make important friends, and take timely action. To accomplish this, a diplomat must have vast knowledge of the relative position of each state, all treaties in effect, territorial boundaries, and conflicting claims. Various sections of the

¹²⁵ Watson. *Diplomacy: The Dialogue between States*.

¹²⁶ Callières, François de. *On the Manner of Negotiating with Princes*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1919.

European international system came together when previously they had had nothing to do with each other. Consequently, there was a virtually universal need to conduct continual negotiations, and disseminate information through permanent missions. Richelieu, in his *Testament Politique*, writes that the key to successful diplomacy is permanent negotiations, whether or not there is an important issue on the table.¹²⁷

As Callières describes the profession, a diplomat needed to be a professional negotiator, primarily governed by rationality instead of passion.¹²⁸ Among other things, a diplomat should be intelligent, observant, handsome, possessing good judgment, of medium wealth (so as not to be distracted), and able to easily probe the minds of others. They were expected to have a gift for languages, courtly manners, sympathetic charm, and to be careful of flattery and bribery.¹²⁹ The goal was to avoid unnecessary misunderstandings, so a good diplomat used reason and persuasion to get princes to act on an accurate understanding of what their interests were. In conducting these meetings, diplomats constantly strove to find the potential for common ground rather than to prove that foreign sovereigns were wrong.

They were thus increasingly valued for honesty, and the ability to inspire confidence.¹³⁰ It was best if the corps was not drawn from high nobility who were in many cases too proud to study foreign languages and cultures, but also not from people of low status who were considered incapable of conducting themselves elegantly. Unlike the beginning of the seventeenth century, they were not selected from a military or ecclesiastical background. Rather, they constituted a new professional class with a particular level and kind of education. Overall, the rise of a permanent diplomatic corps in each capital was accompanied by the creation of norms guiding the evolution of their international network.

¹²⁷ Richelieu, Armand du Plessis, *Testament Politique*, A Amsterdam, chez Henry Desbordes, 1688.

¹²⁸ Callières. *On the Manner of Negotiating with Princes*.

¹²⁹ Many books were written during the seventeenth century providing guidelines for the ideal qualities of diplomats. De Callières is the most well known. Another good example is Juan António de Vera, *El Embajador* translated into French (*Le Parfait Ambassadeur*).

¹³⁰ Anderson. *The Rise of Modern Diplomacy 1450-1919*. p. 45

It is important to remember that despite the long list of ideal qualities for a diplomat, few possessed them. The reason for this was largely because of a lack of training. Since diplomats were chosen for their connections, titles, and/or wealth, they typically had no experience at all.¹³¹ As M.S. Anderson argues, “high social standing and systematic training do not mix.”¹³² The emphasis on proper training for diplomats was not really institutionalized until the nineteenth century, although some serious efforts were being made by the mid-eighteenth century.

Meeting Frequency

Seventeenth-century diplomats in Western Europe not only interacted daily to maintain inter-state relationships and deliver *démarches*,¹³³ they were also called upon to represent states at international meetings with full powers of decision-making, or as “plenipotentiaries”.¹³⁴ The diplomatic profession, although not fully bureaucratized, consisted of regular information-sharing punctuated by major, bilateral, negotiations. As M.S. Anderson summarizes, “The most essential function of the diplomat...had always been the collecting and sending home of information.”¹³⁵ They also sent frequent letters containing vital information to their counterparts in other countries.

The seventeenth century was marked by the widespread use of the resident diplomat in Western Europe. That is, diplomatic envoys could remain in their host countries for as long as there was an alliance with the home states. The rise of the resident diplomat created a kind of “envoys club” in each capital, and a permanent transnational *corps diplomatique*. This enabled certain key norms of conduct and protocol to develop over time. Watson writes, “...friendly personal relations among the envoys, even when their masters quarreled, helped to provide the oil

¹³¹ Luard. *The Balance of Power: The System of International Relations, 1648-1815*. p. 50

¹³² Anderson. *The Rise of Modern Diplomacy 1450-1919*. p. 91.

¹³³ The term “*démarche*” is still used today in reference to meetings among diplomats for the express purpose of conveying information contained in instructions from the state.

¹³⁴ “Plenipotentiary” is defined in the *Webster’s New World Dictionary* as “a person, especially a diplomatic agent, given full authority to act as diplomatic representative of a government.”

¹³⁵ Anderson. *The Rise of Modern Diplomacy 1450-1919*. p. 42.

which the institution needed in order to function smoothly.”¹³⁶ To accomplish this, diplomats had to be able to meet with some frequency.

By the early seventeenth century, the Italian states, Spain, France, the Dutch republic (United Provinces of the Netherlands), and England all had permanent missions in other countries. Diplomatic envoys consisted of much more than the head ambassador. There would be translators, at least one secretary, a lawyer, sub-ambassadors, a cook, household staff, musicians, horses, and supplies. Extraordinary ambassadors were the most senior in rank, followed by ordinary ambassadors, agents, and envoys.¹³⁷ The size of the diplomatic staff was an indication of the status and the power of the home state. Once an ambassador and his staff endured the long and treacherous journey to the host state, it was typical for them to reside there for an extended period of time – in some cases for over a decade – and to send a constant stream of messengers back home with the information they had gathered.

Even during this relatively early stage of professional diplomacy certain standards of conduct and cultivation of shared worldviews provided a common ground for diplomats to draw upon. In the case of Westphalia, when the negotiators arrived they may never have had occasion to meet before, yet they soon found they formed a kind of elite international society by virtue of their shared worldviews and experiences, and their status as colleagues at the Congress. Each diplomat remained at the negotiations on average from four to six years, and as a consequence intensified their connections and shared understandings, building a basis for future interaction.

The Diplomat at Court: Professional Status & Norms

Diplomatic professional norms of behavior were perhaps the most visible element of diplomatic protocol. Including such things as diplomatic ceremonials, gift presentation, courtly

¹³⁶ Watson. *Diplomacy: The Dialogue between States*. p. 103.

¹³⁷ Extraordinary ambassadors were sent for a specific event or issue, such as the celebration of a royal wedding or to take a king's oath to support a newly signed treaty. Ordinary ambassadors were those who resided in the foreign capital on a permanent basis.

manners, and proper placement of each country's representative based on state power, norms of protocol were a major concern of diplomats when they traveled abroad. New ambassadors arriving in their host states were greeted with much pomp, and their procession of caravans and costumes were a source of public entertainment. Often times, programs were printed in advance to let spectators know the order, time, and place of the ambassadorial procession.¹³⁸

Knowledge of protocol or ceremony was of utmost importance. In a letter shortly after the death of Louis XIII, the instructions for the Duke de Longueville, ambassador in Munster, stipulated: "The first difficulty that will be encountered in the peace treaty will concern the order of the meetings."¹³⁹ Understanding the implicit rules of protocol was as much the key to reaching compromise as skill at negotiation. Protocol was the way that ambassadors could show deference to each other as a reflection of the prestige of the countries they represented. It was based on a very complex and subtle knowledge of the intricacies of the history and relationships among states. During the course of the Congress of Westphalia, the diplomats increasingly learnt to communicate, negotiate, and read each others' subtle tactics before finally signing off on the agreement.

Perhaps the most important component of protocol was precedence, or the order in which countries were ranked according to supremacy. The qualifications for precedence were seniority (defined as the age of the state), independence (the autonomous power of the sovereign), power (in terms of military strength), and custom (the traditional protocol of the past).¹⁴⁰ It was widely acknowledged that the Holy Roman Emperor had precedence in all matters. First, the Emperor's ancient lineage could be traced back to Charlemagne; second, he had a close relationship with the Catholic Church which had a great deal of influence over the Empire; and third, the Emperor had

¹³⁸ Anderson. *The Rise of Modern Diplomacy 1450-1919*. p. 56.

¹³⁹ Bibliotheque François Mitterand, Manuscript Room, MSS Français, Number 4144, *Instructions to Longueville*. January 1644.

¹⁴⁰ Andreas Osiander, *The States System of Europe, 1640-1990: Peacemaking and the Conditions of International Stability*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994. pp. 82-83.

influence over the member states.¹⁴¹ The historical record shows that many sovereigns and diplomats believed that questions of precedence were a trivial matter, but the ceremony associated with it continued well into the eighteenth century making it a crucial symbolic norm.¹⁴²

The reason why protocol and precedence were so important was because status was one of the main preoccupations of the seventeenth century diplomat. M.S. Anderson describes the age in general as “avidly status-conscious.”¹⁴³ The manner in which the diplomat was received, where he sat at the table, the order in which diplomats spoke at meetings, all indicated the position of his country in the international arena. Any time a group of diplomats were assembled at one place there was the potential that someone would be offended. Sometimes the ceremonial display of relative state status would lag behind the actual power positions, and this was one of the reasons diplomats became increasingly concerned with how these ceremonials played out.¹⁴⁴ As long as this norm persisted, status was a key factor in diplomacy, neglect of which resulted in grave insults and even revenge through duels. In the streets of London in 1661 almost fifty men were killed and wounded as a result of a protocol violation.¹⁴⁵ Interestingly, in the following century, status became more connected with the skills and reputation of the diplomat himself and not just the position of his country. This was an indication of the growing independent role of diplomats as agents of cooperation, not just transmission belts for states, and of their success at Congresses.¹⁴⁶

The location of diplomatic meetings and negotiations was also an important diplomatic norm. Diplomats did not want to be seen as giving ground or being at a disadvantage before the negotiations even began, so it was important to find a neutral location agreeable to all parties.

¹⁴¹ Luard. *The Balance of Power: The System of International Relations, 1648-1815*. p. 134.

¹⁴² M.S. Anderson's translation (p.63) of F. Dickmann, *Der Westfälische Friede*, (Münster, 1959), p. 210. For example, King Gustavus Adolphus in dealing with a struggle between the English and French ambassadors argued that all kings should be considered equal because they get their authority from God.

¹⁴³ Anderson. *The Rise of Modern Diplomacy 1450-1919*. p. 64.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid. p. 61

¹⁴⁵ Ibid. p. 63.

¹⁴⁶ “After the negotiations of Westphalia a new diplomatic style was established directed by members of a high status and prestige.” (translation) from Sanz Camañes, Porfirio. *Diplomancia Hispano-Inglesa En El Siglo XVII*. Cuenca: Ediciones de la Universidad de Castiall-La Mancha. p. 25

Sometimes this involved meeting in the middle of a bridge connecting two territories, or picking a neutral host country. In 1659 for example, Cardinal Mazarin and Don Luis de Haro met in a small pavilion on the middle of a bridge on a small island between their two countries just so neither would walk on the other's territory and neither would appear inferior.¹⁴⁷ Neutral location is still an important factor that exists today. The institutions of the European Union are carefully situated in Brussels, Luxembourg, and Strasbourg for politically strategic reasons.¹⁴⁸

Finally, bribery was an important custom to be practiced with great care. Information was gathered either through payment or exchange of other information. Gift giving was necessary to avoid inadvertent insults and to maintain relationships, and it was considered a normal part of civilized behavior. A strategic bribe could result in big gains. It was up to the diplomat to figure out the rules of the game at each social gathering because certain key figures inevitably expected a gift. Diplomats, especially heads of missions, were rewarded upon their return. These gifts could be anything from gold chains to diamonds to albino falcons. In addition, successful diplomatic service also often led to greater rewards such as knighthood, nobility, or government positions.

Because of the custom of bribery and the necessary display of status, there was always a shortage of money required to maintain the big diplomatic household. The life of a diplomat during the seventeenth century was not an easy one. An ambassador was placed in a tough situation when resources ran out, and he had to continue to display his status, while duly respecting the status of others. Many state leaders were neglectful about providing for these ambassadors, and when they did, transporting the letters of credit or bills of exchange was a difficult proposition, encountering the same obstacles as diplomatic letters.

¹⁴⁷ Anderson. *The Rise of Modern Diplomacy 1450-1919*. p. 65. By the mid-eighteenth century, status, protocol, and ceremony were very clearly on the decline.

¹⁴⁸ Strasbourg lies on the border between France and Germany, and Brussels and Luxembourg have been historically neutral locations, relatively equidistant from the various large states.

Rules of protocol and other norms evolved as a result of an increasingly status-conscious world in which diplomats were taking center-stage. From today's perspective these norms may seem like relics of a quaint time, but they are really indicative of the strength of international society, and more specifically of an epistemic community that demonstrated due respect for transnational norms as a common platform to reach mutual understanding.

Communications: Before Technology

Even before the advent of the telegraph and postal service, certain methods of communication with the home state were institutionalized in the diplomatic profession. The king, prince, regent, or minister expected information to be sent constantly, even though the journey between countries was often long and dangerous. An ambassador would initially leave with a formal set of instructions, including credentials and opening remarks, then receive subsequent orders by mail. Couriers would deliver their messages with the risk of encountering wars, bandits, rough terrain, and foreign governments eager to steal information. Many of the letters were sent in code or cypher, and could occasionally arrive dangerously out of date. The lag in information often meant that the state could not participate in decision-making because by the time the state leader received the information it was too late to react.

An ambassador abroad was clearly the expert on the information of the host state, and had to take initiative in decision-making based on his perceptions of what was in the best interest of his state. By the time he received word from his king, the pressing issues might already have been resolved out of necessity. Moreover, diplomats often wrote to their colleagues at other courts nearly as often as to their sovereign, enhancing their transnational community even across long distances. A great deal of trust was placed in those diplomats representing state interests abroad. However, there was always the risk of disagreement between diplomats and the state, and even between diplomats

themselves, since there were, as today, numerous conceptions of what constituted the state's best interests. Moreover, as shall be seen a little later on, the epistemic community of diplomats was not as strong as it would be in subsequent periods.

Diplomacy and International Relations

How did diplomacy contribute to international order? On a micro-level, specific individuals interacted to create the diplomatic system while at the same time these interactions defined and institutionalized the profession. As they were increasingly sent abroad to conduct meetings with other diplomats, an entirely new collective identity based on membership emerged. Their constant correspondence and frequent meetings with one another helped enforce this. They were all bound by the transnational norms discussed in the previous sections. Violation of these norms would mean jeopardizing their membership in the transnational corps, which would in turn impair their ability to play an effective representative role for their state. Their motivations were different from other political actors because they were the only group to interact regularly, form ties, and develop standards of conduct. Even though merchants also interacted regularly through business transactions, they did not develop the same sorts of strong communal ties. The very nature of the mercantile profession was to advance self-interest and economic maximization. Diplomats, on the other hand, were driven to perpetuate their emerging profession as a collective community because it greatly facilitated their end goals of communication and compromise. Subsequently, the socialization process led to increased professionalization.

The role of the diplomat was primarily to collect and deliver information for the state. However, many ambassadors did much more. During the first half of the seventeenth century, prior to the Peace of Westphalia, there was still quite a bit of structural weakness in the new states. Most of this weakness was centered at the top as the fate of the state depended on the princes and many of them exercised bad judgment. In many cases, the increase in royal power

had left the monarchs isolated and unaccountable to their subjects. To try to make up for the danger of power centered in the hands of one person, these “imperfect princes,” as Garrett Mattingly describes them, consented to rely on a somewhat ad-hoc group of administrators and servants to represent the state in international relations.¹⁴⁹ The princes, however, were often better served by these servants than they seemed to deserve.

These ambassadors and counselors were motivated to assume responsibility for the kings’ mistakes, and could do so because of their growing relationships with other diplomats and their desire to maintain these relationships. As they increasingly viewed themselves as a collective, they began to cultivate beliefs about how the international system should operate. At first, they accomplished this in a disorganized fashion. There was a multiplication of offices, little coordination among officers, and poor record keeping. Public offices typically came to be seen as personal property, and the system lacked an information hierarchy. Although these kings and princes relied on the duties performed by their servants, they still wanted to control them. One strategy often used was the attempt to divide them in order to rule them. It is thus puzzling that most historical evidence points to the fact that these early diplomats were not easily corruptible, even though the standards of honesty, according to our current sensibilities, were quite low. A major explanation for is that they were not so easily corruptible because the norms associated with their professionalization made self-interest a lesser goal than the desire for cooperation within their exclusive membership. Thus, an international society of shared status, norms, and identity developed, and this contributed to the functioning of international relations. However, a negative side effect of the lack of bureaucracy and of less organized rule was that diplomats from the same country were in many cases competitive with each other, as will be observed in the Westphalia negotiations.

¹⁴⁹ Garrett Mattingly. *Renaissance Diplomacy*. London: Butler & Tanner Ltd., 1955. pp. 223-232.

Diplomacy and Other Transnational Ties

During the seventeenth century, many European states engaging in diplomacy had certain similarities such as religion, institutions, language, or economic relations.¹⁵⁰ Thus, a degree of contextual similarities consolidated in part by the international economic system also enabled diplomatic relations to work. In addition, international rules were necessary to protect these diplomats, and allow them to act with at least some degree of freedom. I argue that the early diplomats themselves defined and constituted their own profession, calling for norms of behavior, negotiation, and representation. They were also responsible for the codification and advent of international law, a legal basis for the protection of their roles in the international system. International law served to protect their actions, and subsequently enhance the depth of international society.

The legal mechanism that protected these international diplomatic networks was the concept of ambassadorial immunity, an issue that embodied an overlap in the sphere of international diplomacy and international law. Hugo Grotius, a diplomat himself, argued that the ambassador must have security in civil suits as well as criminal suits.¹⁵¹ They should be treated the same as if they had never left their homeland. Grotius explained that although justice and equity should entail equal penalties for equal crimes, the law of nations must provide an exception for ambassadors. Their security as an international group enabled the maintenance of a network among states, and was thus more important to the welfare of the international system than their punishments as individuals. Moreover, the interests of the diplomat's home state were typically not the same as his host state's interests, so it would be difficult to insure a fair trial unaffected by ulterior motives. Ultimately, territorial rulers had to accept these tiny pockets of

¹⁵⁰ Butler, Geoffrey G., and Simon Maccoby. *The Development of International Law*. London, New York: Longmans, Green and Co., Ltd., 1928.

¹⁵¹ Hugo Grotius. *Laws of War and Peace*. Birmingham, Ala: Gryphon, 1984.

alien sovereignty within their territory.¹⁵² The immunities from civil proceedings and exemptions from taxes were ways in which the hardships of a diplomatic career could be overcome.

Overall, diplomacy became a distinctly collective endeavor with the development of personal ties and networks among envoys, and the need for efficiency in light of the constant quarreling of their royal masters. These actors not only enabled international cooperation through cultivating a norm of collegiality, but also served in defining their own profession. At such an early stage of diplomatic professionalization, the variables of meeting frequency, training (in this case, on-the-job), status, and social background indicate a relatively medium-strength diplomatic epistemic community.

The diplomatic epistemic community of the mid-seventeenth century does provide a strong case for the role of an epistemic community during a time in which other voices from international society were relatively non-existent.¹⁵³ In that sense, seventeenth century diplomats were remarkable for their uniqueness as the only major non-religious epistemic community in the international arena that actually impacted outcomes, despite the relative weakness of the overall transnational dialogue. In comparison to later periods, however, the epistemic community of the mid-seventeenth century still must be described as no more than medium-strength. The best way to observe the operations of these diplomats in the climate of the times is to examine the crucial case of the Peace of Westphalia.

¹⁵² Mattingly, *Renaissance Diplomacy*, Ch. 27.

¹⁵³ Merchants and Catholic religious figures were the only other major transnational actors. However, merchants were driven by personal self-interest and thus did not have a meaningful collective identity. It could be argued that Catholic religious figures may have had an epistemic community, but that is a topic for another essay.

The Lead-up to the Peace of Westphalia

The background to the Thirty Years' War is of significance as it highlights the power balances and alliances among states at the start of negotiations.¹⁵⁴ The following is only a brief summary of the history of the Thirty Year's War, as all the details and complexities would comprise at least a book in itself. Three major reasons led to the outbreak of all-out war. First, the Holy Roman Empire¹⁵⁵ had been plagued with political and religious tensions between the various Protestant and Catholic states for some time. Second, a conflict within the Empire emerged in 1618 over the imperial constitution of the kingdom of Bohemia. Because of the way these two factors were initially dealt with, a third issue developed concerning the Electors of the Holy Roman Empire. The Emperor Ferdinand (a devout Catholic) took the electorate away from the Protestant Palatinate and gave it to Catholic Bavaria as punishment for the Count Palatine Frederick's acceptance of the crown of Bohemia against the Emperor's wishes, and as a reward for the Duke of Bavaria's military support for the Emperor in this issue. The tenuous pre-1618 balance of power between Catholic and Protestant states had been thrown off, and the issue over Frederick's electoral status would play a continued role in keeping other Protestant states involved in the conflict. Protestants wanted the electorate restored to Frederick while Catholics were not willing to see it taken away from Bavaria. In this way, the relatively localized conflict in Bohemia brought to the fore the growing tensions between the rights of the Emperor and those of the estates who were represented in the Empire's *diet*, or assembly. Moreover, a result of

¹⁵⁴ Much of this background is from, Derek Croxton and Anuschka Tischer, *The Peace of Westphalia: A Historical Dictionary*. Westport: Greenwood Press, 2002, which provides a concise and thorough summary of the Thirty Years' War.

¹⁵⁵ The Holy Roman Empire was, essentially, a loose confederation of literally hundreds of various sovereign states, some as small as a mere town. Its borders encompassed virtually all of the German- and Czech-speaking lands, and also included parts of what is now eastern France, the low countries, and the fringes of northern Italy.

various dynastic and religious connections, countries outside of the Empire were soon drawn in to the growing conflict as well.¹⁵⁶

Coalitions grew among the states that fell within the boundaries of the Empire. The two major ones were the Protestant 'Union' formed in 1608 and the Catholic 'League' established in 1609. The coalitions were unstable because of cross-cutting cleavages, i.e. groups of people supported some political issues and not others. At the same time, the Emperor used the support of his cousin the king of Spain to try to gain more power, and convert Protestant regions to Catholicism through war and, ultimately, the 1629 Edict of Restitution. The religious conflict between Protestant and Catholics, and the tenuous power balances within the Empire were concerns for virtually every country in Europe, so many rulers felt they could intervene with legitimacy. Ultimately, this linked other European wars into a single big war.

Their were many reasons why the king of Spain, Philip IV, supported the Holy Roman Emperor Ferdinand II, and his son and successor Ferdinand III. Like Philip, both were Catholic descendents of his own great-grandfather Charles V. They were all members of the Habsburg family, whose Austrian and Spanish branches had remained closely tied through numerous intermarriages. Spain was simultaneously involved in an ongoing war with the Dutch, whom they considered to be rebels against Philip IV's rightful hereditary rule of the low countries, but the Dutch had been very successful in this war, and the Spanish needed support if they were to prevail. Thus, another motive for the Spanish king in helping the Emperor was to gain support in fighting the Dutch after the conflicts over religious differences and the imperial constitution were settled. The Spanish king's plans were not realized, however, as the Emperor was never able to fully subdue the rebellions in his own territory, and the states within the Empire had little interest in helping Spain in its conflict with the Low Countries.

¹⁵⁶ The estates of the Holy Roman Empire consisted of the *electors* who were the seven princes in charge of choosing each Emperor; the Imperial Princes; and the Imperial Free Cities. They each formed their own college in parliament, and each territory had one vote. Thus, many individuals who controlled more than one territory could vote more than one time. See Croxton, *The Peace of Westphalia: A Historical Dictionary*. 2002. pp. 128-129.

Sweden, ruled by King Gustavus Adolphus, became involved in the Empire's conflict in 1630, but unlike Spain, *opposed* the Emperor for religious, and more importantly, political reasons. Swedish war aims were to limit the Emperor's authority, annex Pomerania, and secure an indemnity to pay off the mercenary soldiers it hired. As a Lutheran state, Sweden's ruler appealed to Protestant factions within the Empire. King Gustavus tried to expand his power in the Baltic Sea by conquering the northernmost Imperial territory, and by supporting the states of the Empire that were opposed to the Emperor.

Both the Swedes and the Dutch were allied with France in an anti-Habsburg coalition. Before 1635, France was not openly involved in the war, but worked behind the scenes to oppose the Hapsburgs, their traditional enemy. Without directly attacking Spain, France intervened in any conflict against Spain, helping other countries (usually monetarily) in its defeat. Ultimately, the French king and his ministers chose *realpolitik* over their own Catholicism, and entered the war openly in 1635 on the side of the Protestant Swedes and Dutch. Thus, the United Provinces (the Dutch), Sweden, and France were allied in trying to defeat Spain and the Holy Roman Emperor.

The main division was thus between the two great Habsburg powers, and their three opponents: France, the Dutch, and Sweden. As the Swedes became successful, the Emperor wanted to form a separate peace with them, in order to deal with his greatest foe, France. However, the strange alliance between Catholic France and pro-Protestant Sweden proved unbreakable despite an understandably large degree of distrust between the two. In order to oppose Spain's support of the Emperor, France had to support Sweden as well as the Protestant states within the Empire. These two countries signed the Treaty of Hamburg, thought of by many as a pre-cursor to the Treaty of Westphalia, to insure their alliance until the end of the war.

The Congress of Westphalia

“You can act without any imaginable scruples.”
(A letter from Mazarin to French Ambassador the Duke de Longueville.)

Introduction

The second half of this chapter deals with the negotiations of the Congress of Westphalia as an example of diplomatic processes and agency. It will be argued here that diplomats exercised some degree of agency, but given their high degree of autonomy the degree of demonstrated agency was only of medium strength. The lack of strong cohesion within the epistemic community also prevented strong examples of collective agency, but there were several episodes of individual agency. Until the lead-up to the negotiations, meetings among diplomats were largely bilateral at the courts of Kings and Princes, and except for informal, on-the-job learning, training was essentially non-existent. These two factors contributed to a medium-strength epistemic community during the mid-seventeenth century.

The main countries involved in the negotiations were France, Sweden, the Emperor, and the various states within the Holy Roman Empire. The Empire, under Ferdinand III, could not separate Sweden and France,¹⁵⁷ so he agreed to a single peace conference, the Congress of Westphalia. In reality, the conference was held in two separate cities 30 miles apart, Münster and Osnabrück, because the papal nuncio, Fabio Chigi, was brought in to preside over the negotiations and would not recognize the existence of the Protestant states. Also, Sweden did not want to risk being less than an equal to France, although in power and precedence France was clearly the superior throughout this time period. France was in Münster (with the Papal and Venetian envoys as mediators) and Sweden was in Osnabrück with delegations of the Empire in both cities, and constant diplomatic consultations between France and Sweden. Swedish diplomat Schering Rosenhane continuously interacted with the French in Münster. Thus, despite

¹⁵⁷ The Treaty of Hamburg was a three year agreement between France and Sweden that they would not conclude a separate peace with the Empire. In addition, France gave Sweden one million livres per year, and in return the Swedes carried the war into the Eastern Hapsburg dominions, and the French continued fighting in the Rhineland.

the fact that the negotiations were separated in this way, there are remarkably few differences in the agreements, and similar wording in the actual documents. The negotiations even ended on the same day. The Spanish were also present, as allies of the Empire, though an agreement with France was not reached until 1659.

When the Dutch, allies of France, arrived at the conferences, they soon discovered that Spain was willing to offer them what they wanted, and a Spanish-Dutch agreement was eventually signed on January 8, 1648. Despite French efforts, even eventually sacrificing points of protocol, the Franco-Dutch alliance was lost.¹⁵⁸ In addition to conceding diplomatic recognition of their former rebels' sovereignty, the Spanish plenipotentiaries pleased the Dutch by treating them as equals. By agreeing to peace with the Emperor, however, the French still managed to isolate Spain. The Emperor strove to remain faithful to his Spanish cousin, Philip IV, but the states in the Empire were against continued fighting with Spain. Thus, the power of the combined states in the Empire over that the Emperor himself contributed significantly to the Peace of Westphalia. All states within the Empire sent delegates, and their potential collective force was a great incentive to negotiate. Their presence at the negotiations was not originally expected, and not intended by the Emperor who initially sent some delegations away.¹⁵⁹ Bussmann and Schilling 1999 He never explicitly forbade them from participating and voting, but he also never made a move to insure their rights at the congress. However, the presence of the states within the Empire was just as important as that of the great powers.

The negotiations took approximately two years (1642-1644) to get underway because of the need to settle preliminary administrative issues, and to exchange proxies. These proxies

¹⁵⁸ The French treated the Dutch representatives as "Excellencies" and were "ordered" by the six-year old Louis XIV not to harm the Franco-Dutch alliance. Osiander p.183.

¹⁵⁹ Because of a losing military campaign on August 29 1645 the Emperor was forced out of desperation to summon the Imperial estates to participate in the peace conference. Significantly, he had to acknowledge that he was not the sole voice of the Empire. See Konrad Repgen, "Negotiating the Peace of Westphalia," in Bussmann, Klaus, and Heinz Schilling. *1648: War and Peace in Europe*, 1999. p. 357.

proved that the ambassadors had the authority to negotiate on behalf of their states. For example, the French proxy stated:

...and generally we give more and absolute power to these same plenipotentiaries or to two of them, absent age, sickness or other obstacles of their colleague, to participate in the negotiation and to permit and to accord all that they judge is necessary to accomplish the general peace; all the way and with the same authority that we... would preserve the right to interrupt the proceedings and impose special execution, and the word of the King.¹⁶⁰

The granting of absolute power in negotiations certainly represented a greater degree of delegated autonomy than in future time periods. However, the proxies can be somewhat misleading because the diplomats were always provided with thorough instructions. Around ten days after the French diplomats arrived, they received detailed instructions as well as several versions of possible peace treaties depending on the circumstances of the continuing war.¹⁶¹

Some delegations of diplomats completed their peace proposals on December 4, 1645, but the French and Swedes delayed since they wanted more representatives from the Empire to arrive to push for more universal acceptance of the legality of the Treaty within the Empire.¹⁶² During the delay, not only did representatives of other states within the Empire arrive, but other major powers as well. Every state of the Continent participated, except for Russia, Poland/Lithuania, and England all of whom nevertheless respected the Treaty's validity.¹⁶³

This brief summary of the arrival of diplomats and the preparation for negotiation paves the way for the bulk of this chapter, the negotiations themselves. The interactions within the international diplomatic community and between diplomats and sovereigns demonstrate the degree of agency diplomats had in promoting international cooperation alongside the considerable constraints brought about by competitiveness between diplomats of the same

¹⁶⁰ Bibliotheque Richelieu, Manuscript Room, MSS Français, Number 4148, Memoires of the negotiations of the general peace in 1648.

¹⁶¹ Derek Croxton, *Peacemaking in Early Modern Europe: Cardinal Mazarin and the Congress of Westphalia, 1643-1648*. London: Associated University Press, 1999. p. 103

¹⁶² As Osiander writes, the participants in the Congress accepted the concept of legality in customary and written law. They had hoped that the Treaty would be a final, and binding agreement. pp. 43-72

¹⁶³ A total of sixteen European states were present.

country. Moreover, the diplomats were not accustomed to such a large-scale multilateral meeting, as they would be in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. More broadly, this was a difficult task because despite all of the efforts at state consolidation, through war and administrative centralization, many of the kingdoms still consisted of a hodgepodge of territories held together by the belief that one man was their common sovereign. War continued through the duration of the negotiations.

The Negotiations

Konrad Reppen writes that there is “no precedent in European history for a process as tortuous as the peace conference in Westphalia.”¹⁶⁴ The five great powers had been holding political peace talks far before the negotiations of Westphalia began, secret diplomacy had taken place between France and Spain, and the desire for a formal peace conference had been publicly discussed since 1634.¹⁶⁵ Without all of this preparation and discussion among the countries at war, the agreement, no matter how tortuous, might never have happened.

The two main issues on the table were the compensation to France and Sweden for their war efforts, and the grievances among the estates of the Empire. The first dominated the negotiations until 1647, and the rest were settled quickly afterwards. At the start of the meeting, all participants agreed that the main goal was peace, and no single country wanted to be the one to prevent this. At the same time, each diplomat was under pressure to secure the best possible deal for his own country, and to appease the preferences of his sovereign.¹⁶⁶ The main French minister, Cardinal Mazarin, wrote to Longueville in January 1644:

¹⁶⁴ Konrad Reppen, “Negotiating the Peace of Westphalia,” in Bussmann, and Schilling. *1648: War and Peace in Europe*. p. 355.

¹⁶⁵ Reppen, Konrad. "Negotiating the Peace of Westphalia." In *1648: War and Peace in Europe*, edited by Klaus and Heinz Schilling Bussmann. Munster: S.N., 1999.

¹⁶⁶ Osiander, Andreas. *The States System of Europe, 1640-1990: Peacemaking and the Conditions of International Stability*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994. p. 21.

The ambassadors must persuade the other creators of the treaty of the reasons for suggesting the sort of obligation that they face in order to repair these breaches in a unique way, and to make and maintain peace according to just conditions.¹⁶⁷

An unprecedented number of some 109 envoys were present at the negotiations, in addition to 66 envoys of the Imperial estates, and 27 others representing various interests. 140 states within the Empire were actually represented because many envoys were asked by other Princes and independent entities to vote for them, having no diplomats of their own.¹⁶⁸ The congress took on its own dynamic over time and addressed problems that were not even on the original agenda, such as the independence of Switzerland.

The diplomats defined the constitutional relationship between the Emperor and the member states. The settlement over religious differences accomplished more toleration than was expected. Each prince was allowed to choose the religion of the territory he ruled, but under a specific restriction: January 1, 1624 would be treated as a pre-war status-quo.¹⁶⁹ All those who had practiced a religion on this day were permitted to immigrate on favorable terms or continue to practice their religion even if their leader had changed his religion after that date.

The relationships were complex, and it was not simply a matter of diplomats carrying out the policies of their sovereigns. State leaders gave diplomats autonomy to act and make decisions. For example, Mazarin wrote to them, "I have told you many things...not with the thought that you do them all, but so that in their diversity you can choose what you believe the most useful."¹⁷⁰ But they often took more than they were given. The diplomats wrote to Mazarin, in the name of their boy-king Louis XIV: "If we have violated our orders, Your Majesty

¹⁶⁷ Bibliotheque Richelieu, Manuscript Room, MSS Français. Number 4144. *Instructions to Longueville*, Section Première.

¹⁶⁸ Figures from Bussmann, and Schilling. *1648: War and Peace in Europe*. p. 356.

¹⁶⁹ "That those in the Confession of Augsburg, and particularly the Inhabitants of Oppenheim, shall be put in possession again of their Churches, and Ecclesiastical Estates, as they were in the Year 1624. As it, shall have the free Exercise of their Religion, as well in publick Churches at the appointed Hours, as in private in their own Houses, or in others chosen for this purpose by their Ministers, or by those of their Neighbours, preaching the Word of God." Article XXVIII, *Treaty of Westphalia*. Munster, October 24, 1648.

¹⁷⁰ Croxton, Derek. *Peacemaking in Early Modern Europe: Cardinal Mazarin and the Congress of Westphalia, 1643-1648*. London: Associated University Press, 1999.p. 40.

will have enough goodness to pardon us for it.”¹⁷¹ Mazarin did not negotiate in writing over these differences with his diplomats, but he trusted them. No matter how absolute the state was, the diplomats could impact decision-making at the Congress, and restrain state authority.

The following analysis will examine the relationship, first, between the French state (Cardinal Mazarin) and French diplomats (Longueville, d’Avaux, and Servien); second, between the Swedish state (Queen Kristina and Axel Oxenstierna) and Swedish diplomats (Johan Oxenstierna and Salvius); third, between the Emperor and the diplomats of the Empire (including the representatives of the Imperial member states); and fourth, the transnational relationships of the diplomats to each other.

France

Defining the French State: Mazarin

To understand the agency of diplomats, it is important to decipher their relationship with the state. Defining the state is a task that must be undertaken for each country and time period individually because of regime change and differences across time and between countries. As will be seen in the next case study, by the late-nineteenth century the state was defined by a multitude of people and opinions because of emerging Cabinet governments and democratic principles. At the time of the negotiations at Westphalia, however, Cardinal Jules Mazarin was essentially the French state. His predecessor as first minister, Cardinal Richelieu, had a minor role at the beginning, and wrote the first main instructions to the diplomats, but died shortly after in 1642.

First minister Mazarin carried on Richelieu’s policies. Louis XIV was still a child of four when Louis XIII died, so Anne of Austria, Louis’s mother, was made Regent. However, she relied on Mazarin, and built a close relationship with him. Some historians describe Mazarin as

¹⁷¹ Ibid. p. 41.

Machiavellian because of his desire to gain more territory at any price. Nevertheless, Mazarin is also described as a moderate and an internationalist because he did not want to impose French power on the rest of Europe.¹⁷² Andrew Lossky writes that Mazarin "...regarded himself as a public servant of this Christian Commonwealth."¹⁷³ It is reasonable to conclude that he was at times a strict realist and at other times an internationalist depending on the extent to which French interests were jeopardized.

There are three main reasons why Mazarin was, in essence, the definition of the French state. First, Anne of Austria followed his suggestions. Ruth Klienman argues, "the established pattern of their collaboration" was simple: "he proposed and she followed."¹⁷⁴ Second, Mazarin had control over the secretaries of state, war, and foreign affairs. Third, the Council always ended up supporting Mazarin, even if they presented opposition at first. For example, Longueville and d'Avaux, the diplomats at the negotiations, were part of a six-person council or *Conseil d'en Haut* that exercised some decision-making authority during Louis's childhood. While they were sitting at Münster for the negotiations, Mazarin wrote to them complaining of the opposition he encountered from the council in France. Two of the dissenters, Prince Gaston and Prince Condé, were eventually made to write letters to the plenipotentiaries indicating their support of the peace process and Mazarin's policies. Thus, even though the council existed, the members were made to agree with Mazarin.

He clearly represented the state on the home front, but restraints on his power did exist through the pressure of public opinion (of the nobility). Just like his handling of the council, he was tough about negotiating and bringing influential members of the nobility to his side. Croxton argues, "France's negotiating position was to a great extent, Mazarin's negotiating position."¹⁷⁵ He paid heed to others, but ultimately got his way. I argue that an important, overlooked restraint

¹⁷² Ibid. pp. 23-24.

¹⁷³ Ibid.

¹⁷⁴ Ibid. p.29

¹⁷⁵ Ibid. p. 33.

on Mazarin's power was not on the home front, but from abroad. The French diplomats received constant instruction from him, but they often defied his orders, and took liberties with their positions of power. As representatives of a rising, powerful state, the French delegates at the Congress gained high ranking that facilitated their ability to get their own way.¹⁷⁶

Mazarin was at base a realist, and was concerned primarily with the welfare and territory of France. The war itself influenced the topic of the negotiations because fighting continued throughout the peace process. Clausewitz argues that military and diplomatic strategies have to be managed by the statesman alone; the leader is both a commander-in-chief, and a statesman. In the seventeenth century, this role was merged in Mazarin, as the contending domestic powers were weak. It is in this role that Mazarin interacted and instructed his diplomats.

The French Delegation: Longueville, d'Avaux, and Servien

Anne of Austria personally chose d'Avaux while Mazarin chose Abel Servien. Mazarin at one point considered being a plenipotentiary himself in Westphalia, but eventually decided against it. D'Avaux and Servien were from the *noblesse de robe*. The Duke of Longueville was chosen to lead the delegation, and he was of royal blood. After Longueville, d'Avaux was ranked higher than Servien, but it was Servien who had the biggest impact on the negotiations. Servien clearly stated where his priorities lay: "I have no other interest before my eyes than that of the State, of the service of the Queen, and that of His Eminence." D'Avaux, on the other hand, was more worried about the fate of Catholicism.

The two diplomats did not get along and started arguing before they even arrived in Münster. As the conference progressed, their disagreements became so strong that it interfered with the negotiations. It is likely that Servien was jealous of d'Avaux's higher status, and this precipitated the disagreements. The two competed to draft letters to the court, as they both sought

¹⁷⁶ France became the most powerful country in Western Europe by 1648, with the largest population and greatest resources. During the Congress of Westphalia, the French state and diplomats still felt insecure in this new position of power, and thus wanted to assert their rank whenever possible.

the support of Mazarin for their differing stances on the negotiations. Mazarin always favored Servien, writing to him that, “If I were to send some special message to one of you without telling the others, it would be sooner to you, for all sorts of reasons, than to the others...” However, d’Avaux retaliated against this, manipulated Mazarin’s sympathies, by going so far as to tender his resignation if he was not going to get his way.

The foreign delegations, however, favored d’Avaux because he could speak German, was vocal in his support of Catholicism, and had a great knowledge of people. This foreign support, especially from the Swedes and Germans, upset Servien. D’Avaux faced the paradoxical situation of being supported internationally, but not domestically, an example of how relationships among diplomats were key, even during this early period.

Longueville himself arrived in Münster on June 30 1645, in large part to encourage Servien and d’Avaux to reach reconciliation. The French government expected that he would side with d’Avaux, but in actuality he decided to remain impartial so as not to tilt the balance against one or the other. His tactic of neutrality resulted in upsetting both subordinate diplomats. Longueville ended up serving as a go-between for the court and the rest of the delegation. He also became the tie-breaker, and whichever side’s policy he supported usually got approved. There were several other staff members of the delegation residing in both Münster and Osnabrück. Some were under the protection of d’Avaux and others answering to Servien. Despite the poor relationship between d’Avaux and Servien, whenever they did manage to agree, they inevitably got their demands, even if Mazarin was against the favored stance.

One factor that brought them together was their call for the precedence of the French state during the negotiations. After many years of its own domestic discord and of the European predominance of Spain, France was somewhat new to its position of power. Therefore the diplomats and Mazarin were quick to take the opportunity to assert their priority. They created a visible display of the prestige of France by bringing an enormous staff and spending money extravagantly. Over 200 people attended to and resided with d’Avaux, and over 119 with

Servien.¹⁷⁷ The staffs consisted of at least five secretaries each, pages, a priest, barbers, a doctor, cleaning women, horse assistants, and more. In addition to the staff, each ambassador had a group of nobles attending on them, eighteen for d' Avaux, and four for Servien. This massive staff represented the prestige of France, and was considered a necessity for people of their rank at the time. They received 100,000 livres per year for their job, but as this included living expenses, and bribes, they always required more money to be sent. A major topic of each letter from 1646 was the lack of funds to provide bribes, and also to manage their large households.

Although the French diplomats were clearly entitled to a high rank in the international system, it sometimes got in the way of their goals for compromise. They wanted to promote the interests of the estates against the Empire, but they could not at the same time treat the estates with the same rank as themselves. When the Emperor insisted that the states within the Empire be given the same regard as the other major nations in attendance, the French diplomats faced a dilemma because they did not want to be seen as showing less regard towards these states than the Emperor himself.¹⁷⁸ Finally, the French delegates grudgingly conceded some points of protocol for the sake of the Peace, as ordered in a letter "written" by the six-year old Louis XIV in 1645.¹⁷⁹

What was the relationship between Mazarin and the diplomats at Westphalia? Mazarin gave them a degree of autonomy, but it was really their initiative that allowed them to impact the outcomes of the negotiations. After all, because they were in the field they had more extensive knowledge of news as it occurred, and developed relationships with the other diplomats as well as shared worldviews. The first minister was aware of this, and accepted the decisions made by the ambassadors as long as the diplomats believed it to be in the interest of France. Mazarin provided full and constant instruction to the diplomats, but they exercised their own agency to

¹⁷⁷ Croxton. *Peacemaking in Early Modern Europe: Cardinal Mazarin and the Congress of Westphalia, 1643-1648*. p.38

¹⁷⁸ Osiander. *The States System of Europe, 1640-1990: Peacemaking and the Conditions of International Stability*. p. 85.

¹⁷⁹ Translated by Osiander. p. 86 from APW II B. ii. 73.

decide how to act. In general, the state provides the degree of structural autonomy for diplomats, but the manner in which they use this decision-making space is up to the diplomats. Mazarin wrote to them:

When I gave you the liberty before the start of the campaign to do [what you wanted] more or less in many things, I considered very carefully into whose hands I committed this power, and that each of you had the zeal and the prudence necessary to know [whether] to hold firm or to diminish our demands, or even to increase them, according to whether the military campaign, which should set the negotiations in motion and regulate them, went well or poorly.¹⁸⁰

Mazarin did have a means of controlling the actions of his diplomats through correspondences, but it was never perfect, especially because of the large delay in sending and receiving letters. By the time the diplomats received Mazarin's reactions to their decisions at the Congress, the results of their actions had already been written up in the royal memo back in Paris.¹⁸¹ If the diplomats strayed too far from the instructions of the state Mazarin could simply dismiss them, as he did with d'Avaux in 1648 for straying too far from his instructions. The quarrels between the two diplomats served as a check on one another. While Mazarin openly acknowledged that he was passing on a great deal of decision-making authority to them, at times he complained that the diplomats seemed to forget the contents of his letters. He did write on one occasion, "the King does not want to reach the point of ruin."¹⁸² For example, Mazarin disliked the first proposition submitted by France to the mediators in December 1644, and as a consequence he drafted his own second proposition at Court and sent it to his plenipotentiaries. This caused embarrassing delays on the French side as they continually communicated back to Mazarin on the decisions that they faced. Nevertheless, this close contact and checking of decisions with Mazarin was the exception and not the norm.

¹⁸⁰ Croxton. *Peacemaking in Early Modern Europe: Cardinal Mazarin and the Congress of Westphalia, 1643-1648*. p.40

¹⁸¹ Lionne wrote on behalf of Mazarin: "We have received your memorandum from the 14th of this month. You will recognize this easily by several items included in the royal memo."

¹⁸² Bibliothèque Richelieu, French Manuscripts, Folio 4144. Instructions to Longueville. January 1644.

Several instances occurred in which the diplomats went directly against Mazarin's orders. One example was over their demand for the possession of Philippsburg in May 1646, when Mazarin had instructed them to compromise as soon as possible. Another time was when the diplomats rallied against a truce with the Italian states, going against Mazarin's position. Not only did Mazarin accept the ways in which they altered his instructions or even went against them, he sought advice from them on how he should design his policy. Ideas from Münster were often re-printed in official memoranda in Paris shortly after they arrived in diplomatic correspondences. For example, the diplomats advised Mazarin that he was wrong in thinking that Bavaria was well disposed towards France. The one instance in which Mazarin ignored the advice of the plenipotentiaries was when he insisted on the exchange of Catalonia for the Spanish Low Countries. This demand was entirely unreasonable, and his intervention was, of course, unsuccessful.

Sweden

Defining the Swedish State: Queen Kristina and Axel Oxenstierna

Queen Kristina, daughter and heir of Gustavus Adolphus, and Chancellor Axel Oxenstierna were the primary decision makers of the Swedish state. Axel Oxenstierna was regent for Kristina during the 12 years between her father's death and her 18th birthday on December 18, 1644. Even though Kristina officially took over the reins at this time, Oxenstierna's power and hold over the upper nobility continued. She disagreed with his policies, and had to fight to get her way. Conflict first arose between the two over whether and whom Kristina should marry; then the disagreements spread to policy decisions, in particular the outcome of the Peace of Westphalia.

The Council of State typically supervised and wrote diplomatic correspondences on behalf of Kristina, but she could bypass it whenever she wanted and did so on occasion. Once

she reached her majority, she was adamant about bringing peace to Europe, and preventing Oxenstierna's camp from delaying it. She wanted the quickest possible peace on good terms for Sweden so instructed her diplomats to "bring the negotiation to a desirable conclusion, making [the terms to be obtained] as good as can be done without breaking the peace, and no longer dawdle with it as hitherto has been done..."¹⁸³ She was implicating Axel in regard to the delay.

The Swedish state strove to gain equal footing with the French at the start of the negotiations, and this was one of the main reasons, besides religion, that the Congress was held in two cities. The diplomatic instructions were to insure that the Swedish delegation spoke directly after the Imperial delegation, and did not give a higher ranking to any other delegates. The aim of Kristina and Axel Oxenstierna in 1641 was "to preserve...the majesty and prestige of the realm and its equal status with other kingdoms."¹⁸⁴ When Swedish concerns were made public, the French retort was that they were clearly the most powerful state, and should have precedence. The disagreement over precedence put a strain on the alliance between France and Sweden, but ultimately it became clear that France would win out.

The Swedish Delegation: Johan Oxenstierna and Salvius

The Swedish plenipotentiaries, Johan Adler Salvius and Johan Oxenstierna, Axel's son, were even more hostile towards each other than the French ambassadors Servien and d'Avaux. Johan Oxenstierna was naturally bound to his father, and shared with him all the information he gathered, including the queen's direct correspondences with the diplomats. Although Salvius was at one point close to Axel Oxenstierna as well, he increasingly became more detached from the Chancellor's authority. He gained influence over the queen, and this enabled him to gain independent authority or autonomy at Westphalia. Kristina relied on Salvius to represent her demands for immediate peace during the final stages of the Congress. Salvius, unlike Johan

¹⁸³ Osiander. *The States System of Europe, 1640-1990: Peacemaking and the Conditions of International Stability*. p. 23 from APW II C. iii. 383 f.

¹⁸⁴ Translated by Ibid. p.83 from APW I. I. 244f/

Oxenstierna, was not of the nobility or the ruling elite. Instead of a military approach, he was a businessman and was interested in the economics of international relations.¹⁸⁵ War hurt many forms of business, and he believed in the long run that Sweden's military was not as strong as it appeared, and it would not be able to protect its territory abroad. Salvius's goal was thus somewhat at odds with both Kristina's bid for a European peace, and Oxenstierna's adamancy about maximizing territorial gains of Sweden.

Chancellor Oxenstierna continued the policies of King Gustavus Adolphus who had been particularly concerned about the security of the long Swedish coastline. They both believed that the only way to protect this coast, rich with natural resources, was to control the opposite shores as well. The chancellor wrote to his son Johan that the other countries were jealous of them, so Sweden must do whatever was required to secure its lands. Salvius, on the other hand, was just as adamant that the results of the negotiation should be based on international consensus, and not Sweden's fear of its jealous neighbors. He argued correctly that financially the Swedish war was possible only with French money, and militarily with German soldiers. Sweden had all along benefited from international consensus, and by abandoning it, would lose its security and stability. The explicit instructions on July 11, 1643 to the diplomats from the Council of State were to pursue Swedish interests as discreetly as possible, all the while putting good diplomacy and maintaining alliances with other states as the first priority.¹⁸⁶ This stance was supported by Salvius, and privately backed by Johan Oxenstierna, even though at this point, both Queen Kristina and Axel Oxenstierna maintained Sweden's controversial occupation of Pomerania, an important region along the German Baltic coast that belonged to the Brandenburg elector, Frederick William, by treaty.

A strong example of the influence of diplomatic society was Johan Oxenstierna's somewhat privately held belief that Sweden should not lay claim to Pomerania because it meant

¹⁸⁵ Ibid. p.25.

¹⁸⁶ APW II C. i. 4

losing friendships and alienating themselves at the negotiation. It was clearly not in his professional interest to disagree with his father and the Queen, but he did admit secretly to the Pomeranian diplomats that he did not support the Swedish state's claim (although at one point he had). Salvius, of course, was much more vociferous about rejecting his state's hard line approach and embarked on a persuasion campaign to convince other diplomats of a compromise solution that would divide up Pomerania giving the eastern half to Frederick William and the western half to Sweden. Together the two Swedish diplomats, despite personal differences, wrote letters to Stockholm dedicating much description to the strong opposition they faced over Sweden's occupation of Pomerania. The state eventually gave ground to their diplomats allowing that Salvius's partition idea could serve as a last resort during the negotiations. The Queen and Chancellor did not seem to grasp that they would be lucky to preserve the western half of Pomerania and still benefit from European consensus over the matter. It took seven months to negotiate.

At the same time, Imperial Ambassador Trauttmansdorff also displayed diplomatic agency of his own, criticizing Elector of Brandenburg Frederick William, and favoring to some extent the Swedish compromise solution. Earlier Trauttmansdorff had warned Swedish Ambassador Rosehane that Sweden would be highly inconsistent to act as though they supported the plight of the Protestant states while at the same time trying to seize their land. However, as the issue continued to sop up time at the congress, Trauttmansdorff altered his line admonishing the elector of Brandenburg for making a big deal about territory he had never really controlled while the Emperor was ceding lands possessed by the Habsburgs for centuries.

Salvius shared policy goals with the French diplomat, d'Avaux, and was quite possibly friends with him. He chose to write letters directly to d'Avaux instead of to the French delegation in general. D'Avaux would sometimes follow his instructions verbatim.¹⁸⁷ Johan Oxenstierna

¹⁸⁷ This was true particularly on the issue of encouraging the various estates of the Empire to send delegates to the negotiations, warning them that they risked losing their liberty and constitutional rights.

had a closer bond with French ambassador Servien, but because of Oxenstierna's disagreeable temperament, Salvius was more popular with the French. They appreciated his refined disposition.

Both Swedish ambassadors were either weak in religious conviction or, as Salvius probably was, agnostic. Osiander writes that a basic consensus was reached at Westphalia in large part because of the decline of religious conviction as a mark of identity.¹⁸⁸ It was around this time that religious symbolism during treaty proceedings was beginning its slow decline.¹⁸⁹ It is important to note, however, that any decline in religious sentiments was largely among the diplomatic community as a distinct international society, and not in the European system as a whole. The Thirty Years' War was fought in large part over religion, and the Peace was made possible only by agreeing to disagree on the issue of religion.

The Empire

The Emperor and the Princes

Ferdinand III, as Emperor, was the titular ruler of the Holy Roman Empire. But it was the Council of Electors that really represented power within the Empire. The Electors were seven of the most powerful and influential rulers amongst the many essentially sovereign states that made up the Empire, and each of the main religions, Catholic, Lutheran, and Reformed, was represented in their number. As their titles suggest, it fell to them to elect the new Emperor when the previous one died. In fact, Ferdinand III was not only Emperor, but as King of Bohemia, he was himself one of the seven electors. This is where his power base lay. In his capacity as Emperor, Ferdinand may have been the recognized sovereign by tradition and election, but his main role was symbolic and he had little real authority in the lands of the other electors. The Emperor symbolized the solidarity of the lands of the Empire and his people's loyalty to it, but he

¹⁸⁸ Osiander. *The States System of Europe, 1640-1990: Peacemaking and the Conditions of International Stability*. p. 30.

¹⁸⁹ Anderson. *The Rise of Modern Diplomacy 1450-1919*. p.47.

did not exercise true executive authority. Osiander argues that the sense of community, manifested through loyalty and structural inviolability, made consensus within the Empire more possible on issues that threatened stability, much more so than in the European system in general.¹⁹⁰

Despite this common allegiance, the princes of the states within the Empire often conducted independent foreign policy with those outside of the Empire, most visibly during the Thirty Years' War. For this reason, it was expected that they would negotiate and act independently at Westphalia in much the same way as had the Italian princes in ages past.¹⁹¹ They sent their own delegates and pursued their own ends, but unlike their Italian counterparts they remained within the boundaries of the imperial constitution. They did not forget their common allegiance to the Empire, nor as Osiander puts it, "the inviolability of the structures or political framework by which the community was defined, and, on the other hand, loyalty to the community and its members and representatives."¹⁹²

Thus, paradoxically, even though the Emperor had not gained the trust and true rule over the people, he had gained their indissoluble loyalty. Osiander argues that the "loyalty principle" also applied in a reciprocal manner from each state to other states in the Empire. Although the estates were not obedient or subservient to the Emperor as in the early middle ages, they wanted to maintain their autonomy alongside their coexistence within the Empire. These horizontal allegiances did not exist among European states outside of the Empire, as they did within the Holy Roman Empire, or as they do today in the European Union. These strongly held norms cannot be predicted by a purely realist worldview, a fact that the French discovered during the course of the negotiations.

¹⁹⁰ Osiander. *The States System of Europe, 1640-1990: Peacemaking and the Conditions of International Stability*. p.31.

¹⁹¹ Most notably during the Italian wars of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.

¹⁹² Osiander. *The States System of Europe, 1640-1990: Peacemaking and the Conditions of International Stability*. p.31.

Diplomats of the Empire

Johan Krane, Trauttmansdorff, and Johannes Maximilian Lamberg were the three ambassadors representing Ferdinand III at the Congress. There were many others from the various member states of the Empire. For example, on the Protestant side, Brandenburg and Saxony were well represented, and a certain Dr. Kaysar was responsible for the interests of the Mecklenburg ducal house. There was some conflict and confusion over protocol involving the Emperor and the states within the Empire. As usual, the Emperor's envoy received full precedence at the congress, and signed the Treaties first. However, the Emperor had to accept the same title, "Holy Majesty", as the French and Swedish monarchs in the written Treaty. This represented a slight demotion for the Emperor in matters of title and precedence.

Just as the Emperor's diplomats were accustomed to receiving precedence in all matters, the diplomats of the member states expected the same. When they encountered the Venetian ambassador and mediator Alvise Contarini in Münster he declared that they were of lesser rank than those of Rome. Indeed, according to the general qualifications of precedence this was true, and Contarini got his way in terms of the order of the proceedings. However, the French diplomats also asserted their claim to ranking in an unprecedented way by insisting on the same title for their sovereign as that held by the Emperor.

Diplomacy among the representatives of the member states was conducted alongside the larger diplomatic negotiations at Westphalia. The princes' diplomats sent letters to each other to find out who would support various proposals and who would not before they ever reached the table in Westphalia. Overwhelmingly, decisions did not weaken the solidarity of the Empire as a whole. For example, in a meeting with d'Avaux, Dr. Kaysar emphasized that the French intention to insure the liberty and rights of the protestant states through an active presence in the Empire was not what the member states of the Empire wanted. Rather, the point of the negotiation was to find "ways of removing the foreign troops from the soil of the Empire; for in

this consisted above all the freedom of the estates.”¹⁹³ Thus, the representatives of the states within the Empire would prefer to give up some religious and political advantage rather than face the possible break-up of the Empire because of a foreign presence (i.e. the French).

As the congress progressed, the French learnt the extent to which diplomats of the Empire would not compromise the solidarity of the Empire. Subsequently, they learned that this steadfastness applied not only to the Empire, but also among the Imperial diplomats themselves. Unlike the Italian princes, those of the Imperial states were not willing to have outside intervention. Longueville did not find the ambassadors from the states within the Empire very intelligent, and thought they were confused by some of the proceedings in the conference. He nevertheless found them friendly and frank, and the French delegation worked to accommodate their preferences for solidarity. This is another example of the shaping of the diplomatic community as a process over time as these basic pre-conditions had to be appreciated by all before compromises could be made. In addition, this information could not be included in state instructions because it was an unexpected discovery revealed through diplomatic interactions over time. The fact that the King of Spain was also the Duke of Burgundy complicated matters, because in this capacity he was a member of the Imperial Diet entitled to the military protection of the Empire. Only the diplomats could realize that any proposal they offered must not exacerbate the Empire’s ties to Spain.

The Epistemic Community of Diplomats

Now that the relationship of the diplomats to their states and the degree of agency they displayed has been established, the question remains: what about the relationship of the diplomats to each other? As mentioned above, diplomats had many informal occasions to meet, and often came to understandings around the dinner table. Another important method was through private

¹⁹³ Translated by Ibid. p. 37. A letter from the Imperial ambassadors to Ferdinand III. 16 Feb. 1645, APW II A. ii. 189f.

letters sent from one diplomat to another, such as when Salvius was making an individual bid for the division of Pomerania. These methods were often just as effective as the formal negotiations both directly as a means of persuasion, and indirectly as a means of promoting a sense of collegiality among the transnational corps. Any kind of closer acquaintance or specific attention to each other's preferences oiled the machine of the negotiating process. In particular, informal methods of persuasion, combined with gift giving and flattery, produced results. In retrospect, however, the level of cohesion of the diplomatic corps was not as great as it would be in future multilateral conferences.¹⁹⁴

The formal methods of negotiation at the Congress followed strict procedural guidelines that often resulted in very little face-to-face persuasion. At the preliminary meeting in Hamburg in 1641 to determine the procedures of the Congress, a "triangle model" was agreed upon.¹⁹⁵ According to the model, adversaries were not to speak directly to each other, but through an intermediary who would relay the position of each party back and forth. The French and Spanish thus never met at the same table, and France's interactions with the Emperor, except thrice, were through the papal nuncio Chigi and Ambassador Contarini of Venice. At one period (from early autumn 1646 to spring of 1647) the Dutch served as mediators between France and Spain, turning the triangle model into a rectangular model with even less face-to-face interaction. Because the Swedes preferred not to have a mediator, they negotiated directly with the envoys of the Emperor and the Imperial member states. The meetings between the Spanish and the Dutch also did not follow the triangle model; these diplomats spoke directly to one another.

¹⁹⁴ It was also not the lowest, as will be seen in Chapter Five.

¹⁹⁵ The following description of procedure is from Repgen. "Negotiating the Peace of Westphalia." pp. 357-359.

Diplomatic Agency

There is ample evidence to suggest that the settlement of the Thirty Years' War and the Congress of Westphalia was not a result of purely power-based reasoning or efficiency. The examples of diplomatic influence in the preceding analysis are numerous. The main reason why collective, non-realist goals were accomplished was largely because of what occurred during the negotiations, and this was based largely on the role of the diplomats. First, the negotiations covered more than was originally necessary for the resolution of the war as they gradually began to take on a dynamic of their own. Second, diplomats were given autonomy to act, and occasionally exercised agency beyond their room for maneuver to go against state instructions. Third, the final Treaty advanced the collective good as well as individual interests of the states involved. Many scholars point to the Peace of Westphalia as the first kind of official document advancing the idea of international society. As Watson argues, "Diplomacy was becoming more collective."¹⁹⁶ Naturally, a sense of society among the diplomats resulted in a society among the states, albeit at an elite level.

The Treaty of Westphalia itself contains numerous examples of diplomatic initiative. While the majority of its articles deal with territorial claims and debts, several of them are about the collective welfare of the signatory states. One example is Article XLI in which the rule of law is upheld post-facto. It states that the criminal sentences pronounced during the war about non-religious matters were declared subject to review and judgment in a proper court. "The former judgments may be confirmed, amended, or quite erased, in case of Nullity."¹⁹⁷ Another example is Article XLIII, which declared that all non-royalty who served in the war would be restored to honor without prejudice. "From the highest to the lowest, without any distinction or exception, with their Wives, Estates, shall be restored by all Partys in the State of Life, Honour,

¹⁹⁶ Watson. *Diplomacy: The Dialogue between States*. p.103

¹⁹⁷ Article XLI. Treaty of Westphalia.

Renown, Liberty of Conscience.” These are examples of provisions that went beyond the call of the states, and reflected a collective diplomatic interest in international society.

However, this period, more than any other studied in this work, was clearly dominated by realist concerns in an international environment of absolutism and zero-sum gain. There is considerable doubt as to whether statements made by sovereigns in favor of advancing the collective good were genuine rather than just posturing. Even Queen Kristina, the strongest advocate of European peace and cooperation, did not push strongly for the collective goal until she had managed to secure the territorial goals of Sweden. Sovereigns were clear in all their instructions and correspondence with the diplomats that they needed to maximize the interests their state. Even Richelieu’s idea for a cooperative system-wide security was surely not the real French goal. At the start of the negotiations, the French instructions referred to Christian princes instead of Christendom, stated that it was natural for these princes to have different interests, and justified war in the name of territorial interests or balance of power.¹⁹⁸ The flexibility and agency that diplomats took were not great compared to future congresses, but these levels increased throughout the course of the negotiation as they came to understand the position of other states, and as they established a *rapport* with the other diplomats.

Realism as an Alternative Explanation

Was the result of the negotiation different from a realist prediction? The argument advanced here in light of the evidence is that diplomatic agency impacted the outcomes of international cooperation during the mid-seventeenth century, and in particular during the Congress of Westphalia. How does this argument hold up to the null hypothesis that diplomats are only transmission belts for states, and that states only seek to maximize power? Evan Luard,

¹⁹⁸ Osiander. *The States System of Europe, 1640-1990: Peacemaking and the Conditions of International Stability*. p. 43. The term “balance of power” was not explicitly stated (instead, ‘aid the weaker against the stronger’) as the concept had not yet come into use, nor was there enough empirical proof available to generalize about its impact on international security. Interestingly, the diplomat Salvius thought about balance of power in more theoretical terms, and wrote about it to Queen Kristina.

a scholar of the period, defines seventeenth-century power as the size of population, the organization of population, the size of army and navy, financial resources, military technology (but adapted by all quickly), generalship (leadership of military generals), and the ability of the state to mobilize forces for war.¹⁹⁹ He argues that, "Since warfare was the principal means by which the competition among states was conducted, the development of the state's military power was one of the principal ambitions of the rulers of the day."²⁰⁰

This definition of power specific to the seventeenth century is not so different from how realists define power for any period.²⁰¹ Neo-realists define power as the ability of undifferentiated sovereign units to survive in a self-help world. This is a stricter definition of power that would not include such factors as the organization of population or generalship. Classical realists have a looser definition of power, and consider diplomacy and world government as an ideal, though unattainable, means of overcoming pure material competition.²⁰² Neo-classical realists consider perceptions of power as important as well.²⁰³

If power is defined in terms of Luard's qualifications, it is basically a form of base materialism that makes one state more powerful than another.²⁰⁴ "A war-like environment encouraged the belief that a successful foreign policy could be conducted only by governments which could back it with effective armed power."²⁰⁵ David J. Hill also argues that the negotiators of the Peace of Westphalia were concerned only with maximizing national interest and ambition.²⁰⁶ From the data in the table below, it is evident that France and Spain overwhelmingly

¹⁹⁹ Luard. *The Balance of Power: The System of International Relations, 1648-1815*.

²⁰⁰ Ibid. p.41

²⁰¹ See Waltz. *Theory of International Politics*. and Mearsheimer, John. "Back to the Future: Instability after the Cold War." *International Security* 15, no. 4 (1990): 5-56.

²⁰² See Morgenthau, Hans. *Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*. New York: Knopf, 1978.

²⁰³ See Jervis. *Perception and Misperception in International Politics*. Rose, Gideon. "Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy." *World Politics* 51, no. 1 (1998): 144-72.

²⁰⁴ Wendt refers to this as "rump materialism." Wendt, Alexander. *Social Theories of International Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.

²⁰⁵ Luard. *The Balance of Power: The System of International Relations, 1648-1815*. p. 40

²⁰⁶ Hill, David J. *A History of European Diplomacy*. Vol. II. London: Longmans, 1906. pp. 569-607.

had the largest armies. Yet they were not ultimately set on continued warfare to maximize territorial and material gains.

Table 1. Approximate size of Armies in 1648²⁰⁷

<i>Countries</i>	<i>1648</i>
Austria	30-40,000
France	120,000
Great Britain	65,000
Prussia	8,000
Spain	150,000
Sweden	70,000
United Provinces	50,000

The data includes mercenary and auxiliary forces. Also see: J. Childs, *Armies and Warfare in Europe, 1648-1789* and Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*.

A realist explanation of the outcome of the Congress of Westphalia is based on the relationship between a country's military power indicated here, and its gains made at the Congress. According to the theory, (1) more powerful countries will gain while weaker countries lose, (2) states will try to balance against other powerful states, and (3) states will act as unitary actors. First, in terms of power-based outcomes the realist outcome is quite accurate for this time period compared to others (as will be seen in the following chapter). Second, balance of power occurred. Third, against realist predictions states were not unitary actors. The diplomats were not simply following state instructions, and this fact is very important because they, not the sovereigns, were present at the negotiations. By neglecting the process, realist theory misses the agency of diplomats, and the likelihood that cooperation would have failed without them. The following analysis explains these three factors further.

The first part of realist theory is the competition to maximize power or territory. The winners of territory were France and Sweden, and the losers were Spain and the Empire. France

²⁰⁷ Luard. *The Balance of Power: The System of International Relations, 1648-1815*. p. 37.

and Spain had the largest armies so a realist explanation would find it in their best interest to continue fighting for more gains during the course of the negotiations. In fact, they did keep fighting until 1659. At the same time, their greater power should have enabled them to push for more territory through the negotiations. Indeed, France, by this point the most powerful country in Europe, gained the titles to the bishoprics of Metz, Toul, and Verdun, the city of Breisach, and ten Alsatian cities. Spain, although it had long been the greatest military power on the continent, had to recognize Dutch independence after eighty years of difficult fighting. Sweden was strengthened militarily by 1648 and became a great power in the eyes of others. The Congress left Sweden in control of most of the Baltic, including even most of that sea's southernmost ports. Ferdinand III lost virtually all real political power in his capacity as Emperor, and the Empire itself lost territory to France and Sweden.

The second part of realist theory is that states will try to balance against other threatening powers. This explains why Sweden gained and Spain lost. States can find it in their best interest to ally with others for greater security as they did in the seventeenth century. As de Callières writes, "There is indeed no prince so powerful that he can afford to neglect the assistance offered by a good alliance in resisting the forces of hostile power which are prompted by jealousy of his prosperity to unite in a hostile coalition."²⁰⁸ No sovereign could risk allowing his enemy to have a stronger military through an alliance without himself striving to form an alliance. Thus, Mazarin and Kristina held steadfast to their "strange alliance" of Catholic and Protestant states, and Philip IV continued to support his Habsburg relative of the Empire. A power-based argument, however, is too simplistic in its stipulation that these alliances were built on immediate short-term self-interest.²⁰⁹ As was observed from the proceedings at Westphalia, a great deal of effort on the part of diplomats went into the maintenance of these alliances. Self-interest alone

²⁰⁸ Quote of Callières from Ibid. p. 256.

²⁰⁹ Ibid. p. 269.

does not immediately create alliances. Also, with so many conflicting allegiances, it is often difficult to calculate which alliances actually maximize self-interest.

Some of the material outcomes of the Congress can be understood by the realist argument, especially during this period of strong absolutism and a zero-sum environment. However, the differences in outcomes from the realist prediction are crucial. The third part of realist theory, that states are unitary actors, is proven false in this case study. The biggest lapse in the realist argument is the neglect of the role of the diplomats who were alone responsible for the settlement itself. As the foregoing evidence makes abundantly clear, the diplomats were not simply transmission belts for their states. In fact they did not always obey the instructions of their sovereigns, and they discovered entirely new collective initiatives that impacted outcomes. On many occasions, the fate of the outcomes rested on the talent, initiative, popularity, and independence of a particular diplomat. As the Congress proceeded, the diplomats reached new understandings that were unexpected and unforeseen by the sovereigns. Cooperation would most likely not have been accomplished at all if not for the work of diplomats. Therefore, by ignoring this process, the realist null hypothesis fails to capture the beginning of an important trend in the role of diplomats as a community with agency distinct from the structure of the international system.

What about bargaining theory? Would it have predicted the outcomes at Westphalia? In this case, bargaining theory predicts the same outcomes as realist theory because the worldviews of the leaders involved were essentially absolutist. Each wanted to maximize the power of his or her own country, thus increasing self-interest. Mazarin was concerned with only France's welfare and territory. Similarly, Kristina's and Axel Oxenstierna's chief preference was "to preserve...the majesty and prestige of the realm and its equal status with other kingdoms."²¹⁰ Chancellor Oxenstierna's main priority was the security of the long Swedish coastline, and the need to control the opposite shores at the same time. They both also wanted to maintain

²¹⁰ Translated by Osiander p.83 from APW I. I. 244f

Sweden's controversial occupation of Pomerania. Thus, they associated more power and land as the key to protecting Sweden's interests. While the Treaty did not completely betray these initial preferences, numerous compromises among the diplomats meant that the leaders were not able to have all of their preferences fulfilled. For example, Mazarin wanted an immediate compromise over Philippsburg, and the French diplomats persisted in demanding Philippsburg until they were successful. Axel Oxenstierna and Queen Kristina wanted control over Pomerania, and the diplomats supported a partition strategy, which they ultimately succeeded in advancing. These are just two examples from the preceding analysis that bargaining theory would predict. To the extent that diplomats exercise agency, it was because of the shared norms and professionalism that characterized their epistemic community at the time.

The Aftermath of Westphalia

The Treaty of Westphalia launched an era in which multilateral agreements and international congresses became more common practice among states. Subsequent meetings referred back to the Westphalian model until it became institutionalized as a style of international negotiation. The mid-seventeenth century, culminating in the Treaty of Westphalia, provides a good window into the diplomatic role of early modern international relations. Prior to it, states typically made bilateral treaties that had no formal means of enforcement or revision. The Treaty was eventually not sufficient to maintain peace and the integrity of all territorial boundaries, but a precedent was set for genuine efforts at multilateralism, continuity, and self-perpetuation of treaties of international cooperation.

The negotiations accomplished a greater degree of cooperation than had existed before. It brought an end to the war in the Holy Roman Empire fought because of long-lasting religious divisions, and created a new order in Europe with greater symbolic significance because of the unprecedented level of multinational cooperation. A version of Richelieu's idealistic scheme for a collective security arrangement, written before his death in 1642, was adopted in the final

Treaty. If any party's religion was infringed upon, and the matter could not be settled within three years, "each and any party to the present transaction [the Treaty of Westphalia] shall be obliged to join forces and counsel with the injured party and to take up arms to oppose the contravention..."²¹¹ The signatories of the Treaty most likely had no intention of following through with such an arrangement either going into or coming out of the negotiations, but its significance as a "great leap" in *ideas* about cooperation lived on. The Peace of Westphalia became a standard for future diplomacy and negotiations, and international security alliances became commonplace.

The Thirty Years' War and its resolution played a strong role in unifying the territories of states, and in concentrating the political power of their central institutions. After the Treaty of Westphalia, the office of Holy Roman Emperor was politically powerless.²¹² Since individual rulers within and outside of the Empire could impose religious doctrine on their territory, the negotiations meant acceptance of autonomous power of sovereigns even though in actuality territorial boundaries were very weak – at least until further centralization in the eighteenth century.²¹³ Within each kingdom, there were still many sub-territories, and each had its own bureaucracy, system of estates, tradition, and sometimes even language and culture.²¹⁴

Paradoxically, because the aggressive competition of the seventeenth century resulted in a degree of state consolidation, the eventual accomplishment of peace was facilitated as power was more clearly identifiable. The absolutist princes had a stronger hold than before on the collection of territories in their kingdoms through external war and internal bureaucratic centralization. They thus had the ability to grant plenipotentiary status to their diplomatic

²¹¹ The Treaty of Westphalia. Article 17.5-6

²¹² Knutsen, Torbjørn L. *A History of International Relations Theory*. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1997.

²¹³ Many scholars of international relations subscribe to the notion that the Treaty of Westphalia was a watershed event for the concept of sovereignty. The congress, however, was not about sovereignty in a formal and legal sense, but as Osiander argues, about autonomy. See p. 78 of *The States System of Europe*. The Spanish-Dutch treaty, negotiated alongside the Treaty of Westphalia, did stipulate legal sovereignty in terms of Dutch independence from Spain, but this was not an issue involving the Emperor.

²¹⁴ Luard. *The Balance of Power: The System of International Relations, 1648-1815*.

representatives. It would be difficult to give full plenipotentiary power away if rulers did not have it to give in the first place. In a sharp break with the middle-ages, as only sovereigns were able to send and receive diplomats starting from around the Treaty of Westphalia.²¹⁵

As this process of state building continued, princes began to see themselves as “the personification of states”, rather than as representatives of a ruling family.²¹⁶ Louis XIV declared himself actually to be the state. Personal status was only important if it was tied to the status, and thus visible power, of the state.²¹⁷ Thus, diplomats had a better concept of whom they represented, and this was more often states. However, as princes became more synonymous with the state, diplomats became increasingly recognized as individuals with status and prestige of *their own*. In the next century, diplomatic procedure and precedence demonstrated respect for the reputation and power of the diplomat himself, and not just the state he represented.

Although the Treaty of Westphalia was not to be the agreement to end all European wars, nor does it demonstrate the complete acceptance of the concept of territorial sovereignty, it does provide a good case study of the first “professional” diplomatic process. Ultimately, the collective security arrangement became simply an agreement to be good neighbors, to show goodwill whenever possible, and for the French and Swedes to guarantee the imperial constitution. Nevertheless, the process and production of the Treaty shows that interaction and professionalization of diplomats over time was an important part of reaching agreement. Thus, power and state interests were not the only concerns. In fact, attention to diplomats is essential to understand outcomes. Westphalia pushed diplomacy forward into the modern era, and towards the degree of professionalism that it was to accomplish in future centuries.

²¹⁵ Anderson. *The Rise of Modern Diplomacy 1450-1919*, p. 42. Before around the mid-seventeenth century, non-sovereign or quasi-sovereign authorities could send representatives to negotiations in Europe.

²¹⁶ Luard. *The Balance of Power: The System of International Relations, 1648-1815*, p. 31.

²¹⁷ *Ibid.* Ch. 5 *Status*

Chapter Four

The Late Nineteenth Century and the Congress of Berlin

Climate of the Times

The late nineteenth century was a time of relative peace, alliance building, and technological advancement. First, no wars were fought among Western European powers since the Crimean War, which was settled by the 1856 Treaty of Paris, and no wars were fought among the Great Powers²¹⁸ from the Franco-Prussian War in 1871 to World War I in 1914. Germany and Italy had finally reached a unified stability.²¹⁹ Second, there was an urgent need for diplomats to continue supporting previously created alliances, as well as build new ones.²²⁰ Professional diplomats played a substantial role in giving governmental legitimacy to the creation of over 400 international non-governmental organizations, and nearly 3,000 international gatherings.²²¹ However, the massive growth in the number of international organizations since the 1860s had still not attained the status of mainstream diplomacy.²²² Third, advances in technology brought about new ways of communications such as the telegraph, telephone, newspaper, and radio, and faster ways of transportation such as the steamboat and railway.

Early democratization and growing nationalism also characterize the climate of the times. Some components of democracy, developed over the centuries for a variety of reasons, started to emerge in Western Europe, and later spread East and South. The nineteenth century witnessed

²¹⁸ France, Britain, Italy, Austria-Hungary, Russia, and Germany.

²¹⁹ Bismarck brought together the German States in 1862. In 1866, Germany defeated Austria, putting a long time rivalry to an end and asserting German control. The Austrian Habsburgs fled to Hungary creating the Austria-Hungary state. When Bismarck gave support to a Hohenzollern prince to take the throne in Spain, France declared war on Germany. This resulted in even further German consolidation.

²²⁰ Shifts in long-held alliances would have disastrous consequences. Bismarck tried to prevent this by insisting on compromise between the Russian and Austrian leaders who were increasingly on shaky ground. Eventually the alliances were severed in the aftermath of the Congress of Berlin, and this led to World War I.

²²¹ G.P. Speeckaert, "Un siècle d'Expositions Universelles, leur influences sur les congrès internationaux", in *Bulletin ONG* (Brussels, Oct. 1951), p. 270.

²²² Anderson, *The Rise of Modern Diplomacy 1450-1919*, p. 105.

the transition of power from royal courts to cabinets, especially in Britain and Germany.²²³ Cabinet members commonly sought information from diplomats who were the most familiar with local politics in a region. The actions of diplomats and statesmen were occasionally checked by democratically elected parliaments, and often differing opinions among the elite delayed policy decisions. In most countries, political and military power remained legally in the hands of sovereign rulers, but power was shared among other elites and statesmen. Many countries in Europe had adopted a kind of nationalism based on imperialism, and borders were thus more strictly guarded. In Eastern Europe, panslavism, the idea that all Slavs should be united, encouraged a kind of nationalism in countries that had a large Orthodox Christian population. A side effect of nationalism was that it pushed governments towards creating a voice for the people. Popular participation was spreading and public opinion mattered more, even though foreign affairs were still governed by a small, elite few.

Despite the ability to communicate rapidly, and the increasingly rule-bound, bureaucratized nature of the profession, diplomats did not have a diminished role. The sheer quantity of telegraphs, typically around five per day, and long letters, several per week, meant that diplomats were not only constantly meeting with their colleagues and foreign sovereigns on a daily basis, they were also writing about it. The *Layard Papers* comprise the correspondences from the Ambassador in Constantinople to the Foreign Secretary in London during the Eastern Crisis, and are an example of the sheer quantity and substance of the work of a single diplomat at the time.²²⁴ More generally, diplomatic responsibility was supplemented in many areas as it was an increasingly complex world of popular opinion, party differences, territorial integrity, wide-flung empires, and trade. The role of sovereigns decreased with the rise in power of statesmen so the definition of the state and its interests was even more open to interpretation.

²²³ In the late nineteenth century, Britain was a constitutional monarchy with a functioning parliament and Cabinet, but power was still heavily weighted towards the upper class. France had embarked upon its third experiment in democracy, the Third Republic. Like Britain, Germany had a parliament and Cabinet, and the Social Democratic party in Germany was gaining some momentum.

²²⁴ A.H. Layard, *Layard Papers. Turkey 1878*. MSS 39144-49. British Library.

A significant amount of the foreign policy dialogue in the late nineteenth century was focused on the fate of the Ottoman Empire, which was nearing its final demise. There were questions over how it would be divided up, who would exert influence, and where the boundaries would be. The future of the Turkish people was crucial in playing the Great Powers off one another, and adding an extra layer of turbulence. This chapter examines the Eastern Crisis 1875-78, dealing with the relationship of the Great Powers to the Balkan Peninsula, and the final culmination of the crisis at the Congress of Berlin in 1878.

The first half of this chapter will discuss the qualities of the diplomatic profession and the extent to which diplomats formed an epistemic community with the ability to exercise collective agency. It will include a brief background of the relationships among states and the circumstances surrounding the Eastern Crisis. The second half of the chapter will look in detail at the Congress of Berlin as an actual example of how diplomats of the late nineteenth century contributed to international cooperation. Finally, some generalizations will be drawn about the transnational diplomatic corps at the time.

The Society of Diplomats

The centralized modern state had complex bureaucracies that impacted the structure of foreign services in Europe. Diplomats were governed by many more rules involving recruitment, training, wages, promotion, and retirement as a result of the general bureaucratization of the state. Much of the bureaucratization and professionalization that would overwhelmingly take over the diplomatic profession in the twentieth century had its origins much earlier. By the end of the eighteenth century, nearly every state in Europe had a special governmental division for the management of foreign policy and diplomacy. Alongside this, there also emerged a tension between the centralized governments and their Foreign Offices. The latter were granted decision-making authority to act on behalf of the states in foreign matters.

Yet, despite this newfound structure, there remained political space or structural autonomy for diplomats to act. Of all the state agencies, bureaucratization transformed the Foreign Service last, and had not yet reached the highest echelons of the diplomatic corps. In Austria, for example, there was less red tape in the Foreign Office than in any other governmental department.²²⁵ While residing abroad, ambassadors could take much of the decision-making into their own hands. With the decline of the absolute involvement of sovereigns, there was even some ambiguity about who in government was actually entitled to instruct and manage the diplomatic corps. Some sovereigns preferred to instruct diplomats personally, while others trusted the authority of their statesmen or cabinet members. The trend was for this important responsibility to fall increasingly into the hands of the Foreign Secretary.

The late nineteenth century can be characterized as a time in which diplomats had structural autonomy from the state, high professionalism, and a growing but still weak diplomatic bureaucracy. Moreover, given this structural autonomy diplomats exercised agency. For the first time, diplomats considered themselves more important than their instructions, and acted based on this commonly held norm that was in many ways unique to the period. As evidence of this, Lord Granville wrote to Mr. Gladstone about the Constantinople conference, "I hear that Layard is to be sent...I think [he] will be faithful to instructions, if the latter are of the right sort."²²⁶ In the seventeenth century, it was intended that diplomats were the conveyors of state instructions, though this did not always happen in practice, but in the late nineteenth century many believed that a diplomat's expertise was worth more than his instructions. In most cases, diplomats acted first, sent a telegraph informing the Foreign Secretary of what had occurred, and then received a response of approval.²²⁷ The use of the telegraph also meant that the instructions were short, and

²²⁵ Clark, Chester Wells. *Franz Joseph and Bismarck: The Diplomacy of Austria before the War of 1866*, *Harvard Historical Studies*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1934. p. 491.

²²⁶ Lord Granville to Mr. Gladstone March 18, 1877. *The Political Correspondence of Mr. Gladstone and Lord Granville 1876-1886*. 2 vols. Vol. 1, *Gladstone and Granville*. Oxford University Press, 1962. p. 34.

²²⁷ Layard, A.H. "Confidential Print. Turkey. July 31-August 1877. MSS 39145." In *Layard Papers*, *British Library*, 1877. The Earl of Derby to Mr. Layard.

it was up to the ambassador to discover for himself the right course of action if circumstances should not go according to plan. In the mid-nineteenth century, British Foreign Secretary Lord John Russell stated that the invention of the telegraph meant that the ambassador had to supply a lot of his own instructions to supplement those of the Foreign Secretary.²²⁸

In the seventeenth century diplomats exercised some agency with little bureaucracy; in the late-nineteenth century they exercised a great deal of agency despite growing bureaucracy. The level of bureaucratization provided the level of autonomy for diplomats in the late nineteenth century. By contrast, in the past, it was the sovereign exclusively who determined structural autonomy.

New Structures: Bureaucratization, Professionalization, and Training

In the seventeenth century, diplomats were responsible for their own professionalization. In the late nineteenth century, diplomats benefited from a legacy of two centuries of professionalization when they began their careers in the Foreign Service. Nevertheless, further professionalization occurred rapidly throughout the nineteenth century, largely pushed forward by encroaching state bureaucratization. Compared to the fledgling states of the seventeenth century, the modern state was highly bureaucratized, complex, and centralized. Consequently, the Foreign Service was much more rule-bound, hierarchical, and meritocratic. In a small handful of countries, the existing diplomatic corps was pared down to diminish inflated staffs that were largely comprised of nobility and patronage appointments.²²⁹ M.S. Anderson argues, “More and more governments now demanded diplomatic services systematically and even rigidly organized, in which efficiency carried more weight and merit could expect to be rewarded more effectively.”²³⁰ The selection and promotion procedures, however, were still highly subjective.

²²⁸ Marshall, Peter. *Positive Diplomacy*. London: MacMillan Press, 1997. p. 145.

²²⁹ Anderson. *The Rise of Modern Diplomacy 1450-1919*. p. 111.

²³⁰ *Ibid.* p. 123.

Much of the bureaucratic element was brought about by Napoleon who was influenced by previous French kings, and decided that the only way to control the state was through bureaucratization. In the early nineteenth century, Napoleon combined bureaucratization with personal control of foreign affairs, especially of diplomats. He did not trust his Foreign Minister, and ordered his diplomats to communicate with himself directly. He hand-picked diplomats for appointments, preferred not to train professional diplomats, and double-checked their instructions before they were sent out.²³¹ Early on, Napoleon's attitude towards France's foreign affairs was similar to the absolutist monarchs and cardinals of the seventeenth century. Later, Napoleon initiated a system of meritocratic recruitment and training, but it was not really institutionalized as a working part of the system until the 1930s. However, by 1812, 95% of the secretarial corps and two out of three diplomats were professionally trained.²³²

Napoleon's early nineteenth century creation of a strongly hierarchical and bureaucratic diplomatic service became a legacy for the future. The hierarchy was based on prestige so that everyone strove for advancement. He created the *Legion d'Honneur* to encourage diplomats with financial compensation and prestige. As he said, "it is with baubles that men are led."²³³ The hierarchy was arranged like a pyramid, positions were permanent, and families of diplomats were well taken care of. Napoleon understood the benefits of stability and job security in promoting a collegial environment where working relationships and shared culture promote greater functionality. Ultimately, he walked the middle ground between the Weberian ideal of separating administration from politics and monarchical favoritism. Comte de Walwaski, France's foreign minister in the mid-nineteenth century, was critical in putting Napoleon's hierarchy into operation. After 1858, the Foreign Service was divided into three categories of secretaries with a

²³¹ Whitcomb, Edward A. *Napoleon's Diplomatic Service*. Durham: Duke University Press, 1979. p. 149

²³² Ibid. p. 152.

²³³ Ibid. p. 150.

salary and promotion scale to match. No one could be promoted without first serving as unpaid attaché.²³⁴

Over the course of the nineteenth century, other countries followed and adopted the French model. The British Foreign Service underwent reforms in the 1860s and 1870s. Like in France, competitive examinations were instituted in order to gain entry into the civil service, bureaucratically-led professionalization occurred, and there was increasing departmentalism in the Foreign Office.²³⁵ Recruits were in many European countries required to have either a *licence en droit* or a university degree. Naturally patronage remained, but, more changes were to come, and it was eventually phased out, following France's lead. The British adopted the same bureaucratic gradations instituted by Walwaski, with corresponding pay and promotion. The gradual move towards the Weberian ideal experienced a lull during Salisbury's control of the Foreign Office beginning in April 1878. He insisted on doing a large portion of the dispatch writing himself and had the junior diplomats take care of the copying, ciphering, deciphering, and record keeping.²³⁶ After 1898 when Salisbury's leadership of the Foreign Office came to an end, the diplomatic business became more efficient and modern in Britain. Secretaries increasingly used typewriters, and thus a thorough and legible record of diplomatic activity could be kept for future generations of diplomats. It took many years for Queen Victoria to accept typewritten documents and letters because "she wouldn't read print,"²³⁷ an example of how the creation of technology nearly always lags behind the use of it. She finally agreed to receive typewritten copies, and "the circulation of dispatches in MS" came to an end. It was not really until the early twentieth century that typewriters became a visible element of the diplomatic profession. Even in

²³⁴ Hamilton, and Langhorne. *The Practice of Diplomacy: Its Evolution, Theory and Administration*. p. 108

²³⁵ Penson, Dame Lillian. *Foreign Affairs under the Third Marquis of Salisbury, The Creighton Lecture in History 1960*. London: The Athlone Press, 1962.

²³⁶ There was a noticeable decline in interception and deciphering of diplomatic correspondences in the second half of the nineteenth century in Britain where the use of the diplomatic bag became more common. In France, Russia, and the Habsburg Empire deciphering was even more widespread, and each had their *cabinet noirs*. See Anderson. *The Rise of Modern Diplomacy 1450-1919*. pp. 116-7.

²³⁷ Penson. *Foreign Affairs under the Third Marquis of Salisbury*.

today's EU, email is not ingrained as a mode of communication, although the use of the fax is more widespread.

Germany's diplomatic corps was a step ahead with its reforms because of Napoleon's victories over Germany in the early nineteenth century. Before German unification, many of the small German states managed to maintain diplomatic envoys abroad, and some continued to maintain them even after unification. However, the main Foreign Ministry was set up in Berlin during the early nineteenth century then moved to Wilhelmstrasse 76 in 1819. The Germans set up an examination system for entry into the Foreign Service. Those applying had to have at least three years of university, and had to have worked for their provincial governments for at least a year and a half.²³⁸ Once the basic requirements were fulfilled, potential diplomats went through a year of unpaid work as an attaché, then several exams on history, law, commerce, and French.

Social Background: Collegiality and a Gilded Lifestyle

In hindsight, the nineteenth century is labeled as "the golden age of the career diplomat."²³⁹ Diplomats were selected from the competent and well-trained men of their countries. As always, the main task of the chosen few was to represent their countries abroad, and deal with rival interests. At the same time, they had a common heritage and unity as citizens of Europe. They had similar training, background, and worldviews. With increasing imperialism, and the rapid improvement of technological, military, and economic development in Europe, they were even more prone to recognizing their commonalities.

Despite the bureaucratization of state functions, diplomacy remained a bastion of nepotism, favoritism, and aristocracy in many ways. It had evolved into an exclusive occupation because of the standards of education which could only be provided by higher social classes, low pay, irregularities of the exam system, and the reservation of the highest diplomatic posts for

²³⁸ Hamilton, and Langhorne. *The Practice of Diplomacy: Its Evolution, Theory and Administration*. p. 98.

²³⁹ Ibid. pp. 90-91.

special appointments. Society, in turn, regarded the *corps diplomatique* with much respect, and commissioned many beautiful, regal buildings to reflect the prestige and status of the diplomats during this time. Society and government relied on the diplomats as experts in the field and in international relations. Many of the ideal qualities expressed by de Callières and others in the seventeenth century were actualized in the nineteenth century. Most importantly, the people who possessed these qualities were more easily identified through a rigorous selection and training process. At a minimum, Western European governments created the infrastructure for meritocratic selection of diplomats.

Professional Status

Diplomats had a “collective lofty cause” and exclusivity that contributed to identity formation as a transnational *corps diplomatique*.²⁴⁰ They believed that they were entitled to respect and dignity within society, and special rights to protect the functions of their job. M.S. Anderson writes:

A consciousness of belonging to a coherent professional group was both expressed and strengthened by the appearance, from the mid-nineteenth century onwards, of guides and yearbooks which for the first time listed the diplomats and foreign office officials in the serve of most of the European states. This also gave the general public for the first time some information, though in a summary and superficial way, about the men who carried out their country’s foreign policy.²⁴¹

However, just like in the past, there was an element of distrust and suspicion because some members of society considered diplomats to be tainted by their overseas experiences, and not quite in touch with the culture and values of their home state. It was often the case that diplomats began to sympathize with circumstances in foreign countries because they were residents there, and had built relationships with the local sovereigns and leaders who were often charismatic and earnest when they met with foreign ambassadors. The Turkish Sultan invited A.H. Layard,

²⁴⁰ Lauren, Paul Gordon. *Diplomats and Bureaucrats: The First Institutional Responses to Twentieth-Century Diplomacy in France and Germany*. Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1976. p. 3

²⁴¹ Anderson. *The Rise of Modern Diplomacy 1450-1919*. p. 114.

British diplomat in Constantinople, to visit him whenever he felt like it, and Layard enjoyed many private dinners and walks through the Sultan's gardens, consequently developing a closer understanding of the sovereign's personal aims.

Although vestiges of suspicion remained, these diplomats deserved societal respect as they had more talent and skill than their predecessors, and were much more willing to go out on a limb. Frequently, one diplomat would send out a circular to all the other diplomats or foreign ministers at once so that all could equally participate in the transnational dialogue. At the same time, it was equally common for secret diplomacy to occur between only two countries, and for the other great powers to hear word of a private meeting after the negotiations were already over. Diplomatic method was a mixed-bag and the remaining degree of non-bureaucratization enabled diplomats to take initiative, and to act quickly when they saw the opportunity.

There were benefits to the increasingly bureaucratic Foreign Service over the previous courtiers and royal favorites. They were less expensive, had a fixed salary, were trained experts, and were hired on a contractual basis. Diplomatic archives and libraries also became much more organized and thorough, thus serving as a resource and record of foreign activities.²⁴² Thus, diplomats were more constant and trustworthy. In turn, they viewed their status as a perk. Their shared notion of prestige led to the strengthening of norm formation, and contributed to the exclusivity of the transnational corps. For this reason, many aspiring diplomats competed for the chance to be an attaché, even without pay.²⁴³

Professional Norms and Meeting Frequency

Shared norms, worldviews, and identity facilitated diplomatic agency. These norms governed the nature of the profession and bound the diplomats together. In other words, not only were their norms of protocol and precedence, but also norms of collegiality, which made possible

²⁴² Ibid. pp. 114-5.

²⁴³ These lowest ranking diplomats were finally paid in Britain in 1904. Hamilton, and Langhorne. *The Practice of Diplomacy: Its Evolution, Theory and Administration*. p. 108.

a cohesive corps that spanned across state boundaries. Diplomats were more likely to take risks and initiative because they believed in their expertise and that of their colleagues. Paul Gordon Lauren argues that instead of selling their labor like a commodity, they believed themselves to be the embodiment of the state abroad. At the same time, they were distinct from the state through their unique training, background, and desire to exercise agency. New norms were supplemented and sometimes replaced old ones.

The concept of *corps diplomatique* extended transnationally to colleagues from other countries. Lauren argues, “At times, members of the *corps diplomatique* even considered themselves to be members of a cosmopolitan, culturally homogenous, European family.”²⁴⁴ Diplomats who resided in foreign cities for long periods of time felt indistinguishable from a transnational aristocratic class who regarded attention to national distinctions as plebeian. As evidence of this, it was typical for them to have foreign wives. Anderson writes, “The aristocracies which ruled so much of Europe could still see themselves even in 1914 as in some sense parts of a social order which transcended national boundaries.”²⁴⁵ One important contributing factor to this was that in-fighting, jealousies, and competition among diplomats from the same country decreased. This is in contrast to the mid-seventeenth century when French diplomats d’Avaux and Servien, and Swedish diplomats Oxenstierna and Salvius were competitive with each other and rarely got along at the Congress of Westphalia. Rather, during the late nineteenth century, cooperation among diplomats at home facilitated cooperation with their foreign counterparts. A second important factor is that the numbers of resident ambassadors grew, thus there was much more opportunity for building and maintaining relationships whether there was an immediate crisis or not.

Third, the emergence of an elite “European family” of diplomats can be attributed to a growing sense of shared culture, and the fact that the foreign ministries had independence from

²⁴⁴ Lauren. *Diplomats and Bureaucrats: The First Institutional Responses to Twentieth-Century Diplomacy in France and Germany*. p. 28.

²⁴⁵ Anderson. *The Rise of Modern Diplomacy 1450-1919*. p. 121.

the general bureaucracy of the state, especially in France and Germany. For example, in France, visiting diplomats from other countries had a habit of leisurely socializing for hours in the Quai d'Orsay, what became known as “*le thé de cinq heures*” or the ‘five o’clock tea’. The diplomats would not start working until midday, and basically behaved like an aristocratic class. During their long teas, they would exchange words that conveyed information, and reinforced their “common spirit, doctrine, and manners.”²⁴⁶ The family of diplomats benefited from many luxuries, and thus no one was in a hurry to reform the system they had inherited. The remnants of patronage, and the feeling that diplomats were the personal agents of monarchs persisted.

Besides the norms that bound diplomats together transnationally, norms of protocol and procedure continued to have importance when great issues were concerned. Before a Congress was held, important choices were made about whom the participants would be, where it would be held, what the issues would be, and who would mediate. Diplomats carefully considered decisions about location, as in the seventeenth century. Throughout the nineteenth century a norm emerged that the highest ranking delegate of the host country would be the mediator. Thus, the negotiations to resolve the Eastern Crisis were held in Berlin, and Chancellor Bismarck was the mediator. Many major cities such as Vienna, Berlin, and Paris had their chance to sponsor congresses, and each congress brought prestige to the country as well as risk. When diplomats chose Berlin as the location for the Congress of Berlin it highlighted the fact that Germany was of great significance to the balance of power in Europe, and it also meant that Bismarck would be heavily responsible for the future of international security in Europe. Conferences in smaller towns kept distractions to a minimum, and allowed diplomats to spend more time getting to know each other.²⁴⁷

In preparation for congresses, diplomats also developed a propensity for reaching understandings with each other even before the first meeting. Naturally, no one wanted to leave

²⁴⁶ Lauren. *Diplomats and Bureaucrats: The First Institutional Responses to Twentieth-Century Diplomacy in France and Germany*.

²⁴⁷ Hamilton, and Langhorne. *The Practice of Diplomacy: Its Evolution, Theory and Administration*. p. 96

the Congress without a signed Treaty, and this encouraged a lot of secret diplomacy to take place ahead of time. As travel became easier, statesmen increasingly attended congresses alongside diplomats. However, it is clear that most of the work was left to the diplomats during this period. At the Congress of Berlin it is notable that Bismarck, British Prime Minister Disraeli, and Chancellor Gorchakov were all advanced in years, and in ill-health.²⁴⁸

Diplomats were also subject to more formal rules ever since the 1815 Congress of Vienna, which established international rules of protocol. The purpose was to avoid the extensive debate over precedence that had occurred in the past, and to facilitate the start of the real negotiations. First, the special committee at Vienna decided that there would be three classes of states, and diplomatic agents would be ranked according to the class of the state they represented. If there was a tie in the precedence of some diplomats then rank would be determined based on the seniority of the resident ambassador in the capital where the conference would take place. Second, the Vienna committee decided upon official, universal categories for diplomatic rank. The highest ranks were ambassadors, nuncios, and legates; the middle ranks were envoys, ministers plenipotentiary, or agents of sovereigns; and the lowest ranks were the *charges d'affaires* of ministers or foreign secretaries.²⁴⁹ In 1818, foreign ministries added the new category of “ministers-resident”, ranked just after ministers plenipotentiary. The most senior resident ambassador received this title. By 1876, each great power had exchanged resident ambassadors with each of the others.

In terms of formal rules for conference procedure, the 1821 Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle produced the agreement that instead of producing multiple copies of the treaty with different

²⁴⁸ Disraeli wrote to his Queen that he witnessed Gorchakov leaning on Bismarck as they were walking with Bismarck's dog. Bismarck was overcome with a coughing fit, and fell causing the weak Gorchakov to fall on top of him. Bismarck's dog started attacking Gorchakov out of concern for his master underneath, and Bismarck had to immediately save his friend from the dog; only, after Bismarck himself had recovered from his attack of rheumatism. Pearson, Hesketh. *Dizzy: A Life of Benjamin Disraeli*. London: Penguin Books, 2001. p. 248.

²⁴⁹ Hamilton, and Langhorne. *The Practice of Diplomacy: Its Evolution, Theory and Administration*. p. 105.

orders of signatures (*alternat*), the states would sign in alphabetical order based on the French spelling of the country's name.²⁵⁰ The common language was still French, although Disraeli broke this precedent for the first time by speaking English during the Congress of Berlin. Bismarck had predicted the language problem prior to the Congress writing that, "The tension would be increased by the use of the French language, in which Gortchakov and Decazes are undoubtedly superior to the English Minister and the others."²⁵¹ Diplomats and statesmen used French throughout the nineteenth century as the language of diplomacy, especially in multilateral settings. The British, however, increasingly broke the norm and spoke in English to assert their status. The growth of the United States and its increased interaction with European countries helped to push English into popularity in diplomatic circles until it was officially recognized at the Paris Peace Conferences.

As mentioned, new norms occasionally replaced or moderated old ones. The norm of gift giving or bribery experienced a decline, and British diplomats were actually forbidden to receive presents from foreign governments starting from 1834.²⁵² The practice of the home state granting gifts to diplomats upon successful completion of a mission also diminished. Lavish dinners and entertainment continued to be an important part of diplomatic socializing, but hosting "dinners" was no longer considered an essential talent of diplomats.

Technology

Internationally, the advancement of science and technology had a major impact on the mode of diplomatic interactions, though it did not restrain them. First and foremost, the invention of the telegraph, and the installation of underwater cables made it possible for states and diplomats to communicate as often as desired. In 1815 European leaders created the Universal

²⁵⁰ Ibid.

²⁵¹ Letter from Bismarck to Bülow August 14, 1876. Dugdale, E.T.S. "The Bismarck Period." In *German Diplomatic Documents 1871-1914*. New York, 1928. p. 24. (Location: European University Institute)

²⁵² Anderson, *The Rise of Modern Diplomacy 1450-1919*. p. 126.

Telegraph Union and in 1874 the General Postal Union emerged. The day-to-day operation of diplomats was transformed. Diplomats were in contact with each other and their home states much more than in the seventeenth century. Gladstone wrote to Granville once, "I had stupidly forgotten that you were in London or I should have reminded you that there are at least six fast trains a day each way between us with a good telegraph five minutes walk from our door."²⁵³ Such was the ease of communications.

Because of this, it was possible for sovereigns to control diplomats more closely if they had the time and will to do so. With this increased ability of state leaders to communicate with their diplomatic representatives, did diplomats lose the agency they had in the past? Most unquestionably, the answer is no. Despite the technology, diplomats still managed to hold onto their ability to facilitate international outcomes through independent decision-making. Before, diplomats were more hesitant to take bold steps without some communication with their sovereign. Late nineteenth century diplomats were freer to think in terms of creative possibilities because they could always send off a telegram at the last minute informing the state of their plans. Moreover, sovereigns and statesmen felt they could trust diplomats given their high status and abilities. During the Eastern Crisis, for example, most of the substantive communications were from the diplomats to the sovereigns or among diplomats in different locations.

Second, journalistic media advanced to the point where an event in the afternoon on one side of the world was reported to the other side of the world the morning of the same day.²⁵⁴ Print was faster and cheaper, and censorship was gradually removed. This eliminated one facet of diplomatic discourse, the rapid conveyance of general news. It also bolstered another facet, public opinion.

²⁵³ Mr. Gladstone to Lord Granville Aug. 20 1876 *The Political Correspondence of Mr. Gladstone and Lord Granville 1876-1886*. p. 1.

²⁵⁴ Hastings Eells, *Europe Since 1500*. "Recent Progress in Science," New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1933.

An important and necessary norm of the time was the etiquette of communication. Since diplomats could communicate through face-to-face contact, letters, and telegraphs, it was important for them to collectively discover which form of communication was appropriate given the circumstances. Colleagues would be gravely insulted if they received a telegraph when the import of the information required a personal, face-to-face meeting.

Diplomats used correspondence through the telegraph, but letter-writing was still a major means of communication for less urgent and lengthy descriptions. It was the first time that the constant demand for information from sovereigns and state leaders *could* actually be supplied in a timely fashion by diplomats. However, there was a gap between the ability to supply the information, and the quantity and quality of what the diplomats actually supplied. For example, British Ambassador at Constantinople Lord Elliott in his letters to Prime Minister Disraeli greatly underemphasized the degree of Bulgarian atrocities that were occurring, and this information led Disraeli to base his strong anti-Russian policy advocacy on false information.²⁵⁵ Nevertheless, in unprecedented ways diplomats and foreign ministries used technology. When Austrian, Russian, and German diplomats sent out the Berlin Memorandum to the other Great Powers, they requested that the states respond by telegraph.²⁵⁶ What would have taken weeks or even months in the past was settled in days. However, the abruptness and method of this request spurned Disraeli and the British administration, and they subsequently rejected it. The use of telegraph instead of a personal meeting added insult to injury.

Nineteenth century diplomats and state leaders often sent telegraphs in code, and marked them “Secret” in case other countries intercepted the communications. For example, Queen Victoria sent a ciphered telegram to Disraeli saying, “Have the greatest suspicions of Russian

²⁵⁵ Clayton, G.D. *Britain and the Eastern Question: Missolonghi to Gallipoli*. London: Lion Library, 1971. Part V.

²⁵⁶ Harris, David. *Britain and the Bulgarian Horrors of 1876*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1939. p. 25.

proposals and trust nothing will be accepted which could divide us from Austria.”²⁵⁷ Overseas correspondences were also subject to some risk because during a war, telegraph lines could be closed down or closely controlled by anyone with access to them. During the Eastern Crisis, the Ambassador in Constantinople had to get special permission to send out important telegrams, and all telegraphs were restricted in language.

In general, diplomats took full advantage of the telegraphic invention. It was secure, efficient, and enabled diplomats to communicate much more frequently, and often four or five times per day. Indeed, leaders expected more out of their professionalized corps of diplomats, and often instructed them to send daily summaries of proceedings by letter. The French diplomat, Waddington, at the Congress of Berlin sent letters back virtually every day to one of the few important statesmen not at the Congress, but only received a response from Monsieur Dufoure once or twice. The telegrams sent to Paris during the Congress of Berlin contained details of precedence, what each diplomat said and in what order, opinions on how France should act, and an extensive summary of the conclusion of the conference.

Diplomacy and International Society

Hamilton and Langhorne argue that the professionalization and role of diplomats relied on the state system they served, and in particular whether or not governments and societies viewed themselves as part of the concert of Europe.²⁵⁸ The “tug-of-war” between European identity and national identity meant that diplomats ultimately had to reconcile individual state interest for power with the common European interest for peace. The opposing pulls were stronger than in the seventeenth century. Recognition of the good of all states in international society was an

²⁵⁷ *The Letters of Queen Victoria (Second Series) a Selection from Her Majesty's Correspondence and Journal between the Years 1862-1878*. Edited by George Earle Buckle. 3 vols. Vol. 2. London: His Majesty the King, 1926. p. 622

²⁵⁸ Hamilton, and Langhorne. *The Practice of Diplomacy: Its Evolution, Theory and Administration*. p. 90

established, idealistic worldview that had not existed so much in earlier times. Disraeli said to Parliament in his first speech as Britain's Prime Minister,

That policy is a policy of peace - not peace at any price,²⁵⁹ not a peace sought for the mere interest of England, but a policy of peace from the conviction that such a policy is for the general interests of the world. We don't believe that that policy is likely to be secured by a selfish isolation on the part of this country, but on the contrary, we believe it may be secured by sympathy with other countries, not merely in their prosperous fortunes, but even in their anxieties and troubles.²⁶⁰

Nearly all the European leaders at the time, including Turkey's, expressed the desire to protect the common good of international society. At the time of the Congress of Westphalia, the only form of effective international society was among the elite diplomats, and in this context only Queen Kristina openly spoke of the common good. In the late nineteenth century, by contrast, the idea of an international society of states had spread beyond the diplomats to the statesmen and to society in general.

There is usually, however, a discrepancy between rhetoric and action. Among statesmen and the public alike, there was much debate over whether to support "the general interests of the world" or to only consider the interests of one's own country. For example, despite the strategic and historic practice of supporting Turkey's independence, British popular opinion vociferously called for interference in Turkish affairs to stop the Bulgarian atrocities. The theoretical and practical import of the idea was often debated in Britain's House of Lords. On June 3, 1878 the Earl of Redesdale spoke about Russia's advance into Turkey, but not in terms of power and money. He said, "Now, it appears to me that this is a matter of such intense importance, not merely in reference to the Treaty of San Stefano, but in regard to International Law, and all former Treaties, and the demand is, in itself, so preposterous, that not this country only, but every

²⁵⁹ 'Peace at any price' was what Gladstone, leader of the Liberal party in Britain, and Lord Derby, Secretary of State, fought for.

²⁶⁰ Dunlop, Charles. *Beaconsfield Brilliants: Being Choice Selections from the Speeches and Works of the Late Benjamin Disraeli, Earl of Beaconsfield*. London: Bates, Henty and Co., 1881(?). p. 8.

civilized country in the world, ought to protest against it.”²⁶¹ He spoke of the importance of safeguarding international society through the protection and respect of international law.

Without it, the state system would be no different from earlier periods of absolutism and zero-sum gain.

The spreading idea of international society meant that diplomats’ goals were easier to accomplish. Diplomats had always existed to reach cooperation and understanding among states even when their sovereigns vehemently opposed one another and a solution seemed impossible. In the late nineteenth century, more people believed that there was always some possibility of compromise, and war should be regarded as a last resort. The belief gave diplomats more time and support in their endeavors.

The late nineteenth century provides ample evidence of growing international norms of cooperation, strong diplomatic discourse, and at the same time, a world still engaged in competition to maximize power. The two and a half centuries that passed from the mid-seventeenth century to the late nineteenth century witnessed gradual and incremental changes in the practice of diplomacy. The Congress of Vienna, Congress of Paris, and conferences in London were the major diplomatic meetings to take place since Westphalia, and each contributed something vital to the advancement and modernization of the processes of negotiation, treaty agreement, and peace. However, it is important to remember that diplomacy by conference was still thought to be an unusual means of achieving international cooperation. Instead, constant streams of meetings, informal discussions, and letters were more popular. One of the major events of diplomatic and international relations at the time was the Eastern Crisis that resulted in every form of diplomacy concurrently exercised to avert a war among the Great Powers.

²⁶¹ *Hansard's Parliamentary Debates*. Vol. CCXL, 16 May, 1878-20 June 1878. London: Cornelius Buck, 1878. pp. 721-22.

Lead up to the Congress of Berlin 1875-78

The six great powers of Europe (Great Britain, Germany, Russia, Austria, France, and Italy) all had interests in the Balkan Peninsula. Diplomats and statesmen laid much of the groundwork for the Congress of Berlin before hand.²⁶² Access to the Dardanelles, the Aegean Sea, and the Black Sea were of utmost importance to trade and security.



Europe after the Congress of Berlin 1878²⁶³

²⁶² For a good, quick survey of the events leading to the Congress of Berlin see Taylor, A.J.P. *The Struggle for Mastery in Europe 1848-1918*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1954. pp. 228-254 or Clayton. *Britain and the Eastern Question: Missolonghi to Gallipoli*.

²⁶³ Thomas Percy, W. W. Norton & Company.
<http://www.wwnorton.com/college/history/ralph/resource/32europe.htm>

The 1856 Treaty of Paris was an agreement among the Powers that guaranteed none would interfere with the integrity and independence of Turkey, and the Black Sea Clauses guaranteed neutrality of the sea. Alongside this, the Tripartite Treaty of Britain, France, and Austria stated that they would unite in the event of Russian revisionism. This “Crimean coalition” dissuaded Russian policy makers who did not want to come up against the force of three Great Powers at once. The hope was to safeguard the precarious balance on the Peninsula, and prevent any one power from gaining too much dominance, or a monopoly on the access to the seas.

The stipulations of the Treaty of Paris were short lived, and subject to numerous changes in the following years. However, the big breaking point that precipitated a true Eastern Crisis was when the Christian Serbs of Herzegovina, followed by those of Bosnia, revolted against the Muslim Turkish administration in 1875. They were tired of the maladministration and corruption of the government, and were held together by their distinct Pan Slavic heritage, a mixture of western nationalism and Orthodox mysticism. They also felt that the Pan Slavic Russians would come to their aid. This reality heightened tensions between Russia and Austria because if Russia gained more influence in the Balkans, Austria would no longer hold a balance with Russia. As citizens from Montenegro and Serbia rushed to support the uprising, the main diplomatic representative of Austria, Andr assy, wrote the famous “Andr assy Note” of December 1875 asking the Turkish government for reforms, and suggesting the means to accomplish this.

The Andr assy Note was written with the support of Germany’s Bismarck who was trying mightily to suppress hostilities between Austria and Russia. All the Great Powers accepted the Andr assy Note, but the British were reluctant because they thought it violated the spirit of the Treaty of Paris – independence of Turkey. To the Turks, British reluctance meant that they could count on them for supporting their autonomy in running internal affairs. Since ultimately Turkey did not heed the stipulations of the Andr assy Note, Gorchakov of Russia and Andr assy of Austria, with the backing of Bismarck, tried once more to encourage Turkey to reform, this time with the

Berlin Memorandum of May 1876. British Prime Minister Disraeli, and Foreign Minister Derby rejected it outright, and sent a fleet to Besika Bay as a show of support for Turkey. Once more the British had been left out, and felt they were being treated like a secondary power.

The British move to Besika Bay was to be undermined, however, when revolts broke out in Bulgaria. The Turks responded to this surprise revolt by sending in the non-typical Bashi-bazouks who were ferocious fighters. They tried to crush the revolt by murdering and abusing thousands of innocent people, many of them Christians.

These were let loose on an almost totally unarmed Christian population, of which only the smallest fraction was implicated in the attempted insurrection. Some fifteen thousand Bulgarian men, women, and children were massacred, with all attendant circumstances of atrocity. Over seventy villages, two hundred schools, and ten monasteries were destroyed.²⁶⁴

The “Bulgarian atrocities” led public opinion in England to question their government’s support of Turkey.

The Berlin Memorandum was another ineffective attempt to force Turkey to reform its government. Moreover, the government could no longer really claim control over the situation in Herzegovina, Bosnia, and Bulgaria, even if Turkish leaders desired these reforms. In December of 1876, the final major attempt to reach a solution was the Constantinople Conference. All the Great Powers attended, but it was ultimately adjourned the next month without reaching a clear compromise. Sultan Abdul Hamid agreed to a new constitution on 23 December, but nothing further. Part of the reason may have been the perception that Britain would still protect Turkish autonomy from outside intervention. When no substantive changes were made in the Turkish administration, Russian ambassador Ignatiev, with the support of all the Great Powers, sent the London Protocol of March 1877 to the Sultan who rejected it immediately. Finally, Tsar Alexander declared war on Turkey on 24 April, claiming to act on behalf of Europe. Public opinion and nationalist sentiments of his Slavic population pushed him to this decision.

²⁶⁴ Shannon, R.T. *Gladstone and the Bulgarian Agitation 1876*. Second ed. Sussex: The Harvester Press, 1975. p. 22.

The end of the war left Russia triumphant, Turkey entirely at a loss, Austria uncertain whether to take a bribe from Russia or form an alliance with England, and Britain not wanting to make the slightest concession to its imperial interests. Austria and Russia were the main countries who sought to balance, but the turn of events made this difficult for the Austrians as Russia's Treaty of San Stefano created a "Big Bulgaria" that would be entirely Slavic. The Treaty of San Stefano of 3 March 1878 would effectively give the Russian Tsar complete control over the Balkan area, and create a Slavic "Big Bulgaria". Naturally, the English, French, Austrians, and Italians strongly objected to this revision to the earlier treaties because they could not afford to lose access to the seas for trade purposes. As the original signatories to the previous treaties, they could not stand for Russia running roughshod over international organization. Moreover, by this time all the countries involved had locked themselves into various secret alliances and treaties to protect their own interests and uphold the status quo balance of power.

The Congress of Berlin

"After all, known treaties are the least significant work of diplomatists. What is written down in them may some day be revealed; but secret agreements and tacit understandings made by the agents of Governments may be without end..." (Francis Neilson, Member of Parliament 1910-15)

A.J.P. Taylor sums up the historical significance of the Congress of Berlin: "One of the few indisputable truths about the Eastern question is that the Ottoman Empire could not be partitioned to the satisfaction of all the Great Powers involved."²⁶⁵ Thus, it was a challenging feat of diplomatic initiative. Because of many pre-existing alliances, treaties, and secret obligations among states, the circumstances surrounding the Congress of Berlin were complicated. Each diplomat or statesman had to remember the context in which he spoke, and make crucial decisions about which alliances to foster and which to sever. Ultimately, thirty-six years after the Congress of Berlin, the break-down of this diplomatic balancing act would result in World

²⁶⁵ Taylor, *The Struggle for Mastery in Europe 1848-1918*. p. 235.

War I. The Congress of Berlin was a crucial turning point in international relations and the alliance system.

Table 1: Alliances and Treaties in Effect at the Congress of Berlin regarding the Eastern Question

Alliance/Treaty	Participating States	Date	Secret? ²⁶⁶	Aim
Treaty of Paris	Six Great Powers	March, 1856	No	Integrity of Turkey
Cyprus Convention	Britain, Turkey	June 4, 1878	Yes	Protection of British rights in the Balkans
Tripartite Agreement	Austria, France, Britain	April, 1856	No	Combine efforts to stop potential Russian revisionism
Salisbury-Shuvalov Meeting	Britain, Russia	May, 1878	No	Russian concessions on the Treaty of San Stefano
Andrássy Note Berlin Memorandum London Protocol	Austria, Russia, Germany	1875-77	Yes	Trying to get Turkey to reform its administration
Reichstadt Agreement	Austria, Russia	July 8, 1876	Yes	Non-intervention in connection with the Serbo-Turkish war.
Budapest Conventions	Austria, Russia	March 18, 1877	Yes	Austrian neutrality & right to occupy Bosnia & Herzegovina in the event of a Russo-Turkish war
Anglo-Austrian Treaty	Austria, Britain	June 6, 1878	Yes	Mutual support for fate of Bosnia and Bulgaria

The *entente* founded in 1873 between the German, Russian, and Austrian Empires, basically a conservative “Holy Alliance”, reinstated Austro-Russian diplomacy over the Turkish question and isolated France among other things.²⁶⁷ The subsequent Andrassy Note, Berlin Memorandum, and London Protocol reflected efforts to uphold this *entente* and the Three Emperors’ League. Andrassy and Gorchakov, the Austrian and Russian diplomats respectively, agreed neither to interfere in the domestic politics of Turkey nor to help them to quell the rebellion, but to only be involved in gradual change in Balkan affairs.²⁶⁸ Then, the same leaders met to conclude the Reichstadt Agreement in which Russia renounced any plans to occupy Constantinople, march troops into Serbia, form a “Big Bulgaria” or land on the right bank of the

²⁶⁶ A “secret” alliance or treaty means that it was negotiated among some Powers and not others. Austria, Russia, and Germany agreed to the Andrassy Note, Berlin Memorandum, and London Protocol before submitting them to Great Britain, Italy, and France for their approval. Some treaties were intentionally kept secret for a crucial period of time.

²⁶⁷ For a concise analysis of this alliance see: Wrigley, Chris, ed. *Struggles for Supremacy: Diplomatic Essays Be A.J.P. Taylor*. Adlershot: Ashgate, 2000. Chapter Five.

²⁶⁸ Office, Historical Section of the Foreign. *Foreign Policy of Austria-Hungary*. 9 vols. Vol. 1, *Foreign Office Historical Handbooks*. London: H.M. Stationery Office, 1920. p. 73.

Danube. However, this alliance could not hold up to the counter-pressure of the Russian government's embarrassment from its many concessions, obligations to the Panslavic people of the Ottoman Empire,²⁶⁹ and a likely desire for more control on the Balkan peninsula. The alliance was destined to fail given the mutual, persistent ambitions of the Austro-Hungarian and Russian leaders in the Balkans.

The Negotiations

Diplomacy at the Congress of Berlin carried on the traditions of centuries of negotiations, yet it was unique for its increased organization, professionalism, and presence of major political actors. From the start, Bismarck, the mediator at the Congress, made clear the parameters and order of the issues to be discussed. The only questions permitted to be addressed related to the stipulations of the Treaty of San Stefano and the Treaty of Paris, and these would be discussed in order of importance. Thus, Bismarck ignored the British bid to force the Russian army out of the vicinity of Constantinople, and the first issue on the agenda was Bulgaria.

Originally, there was general agreement among the great powers in planning the negotiations that all countries would send diplomats as plenipotentiaries to Berlin. However, for one reason or another each country informed the others of their plans to send along their leading statesman as well, and before long the British, having the largest stake in the proceedings, designated both their Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary to attend. This decision prompted the Earl of Granville to argue in Parliament, "...without the slightest disrespect to either of the noble Lords, I think that could be as well done by trained diplomatists of great experience as by two of the ablest men in England who have not the slightest experience in matters of the kind."²⁷⁰ He tried to convince the others that Lord Derby, the recently resigned Foreign Secretary, believed

²⁶⁹ In hindsight, the Russian leaders regretted this move fueled by popular opinion, and wished they had acted according to geo-strategic interests alone. This is an example of how states may want to behave according to realist principals, but are often persuaded by other concerns.

²⁷⁰ *Hansard's Parliamentary Debates*. p. 1057.

that even though other countries had departed from their original intention to send diplomats, there was no reason for Britain to do the same.

After some debate, Granville's arguments were gracefully set aside, and Prime Minister Disraeli (Earl of Beaconsfield) decided he would let stand his decision to attend the Congress as first plenipotentiary. In addition, Lord Salisbury, the new Foreign Secretary, would attend as second plenipotentiary. Thus, the Congress of Berlin was a meeting of statesmen, diplomats, and a few in-between. "With Beaconsfield and Salisbury, Gorchakov and Shuvalov, Andrassy and Haymerle, Bismarck and Bülow, Waddington and Corti, all present at Berlin, there was practically no statesman of the first rank absent from the European council chamber, and their decisions would obviously bind Europe in a peculiarly solemn way."²⁷¹ In fact, many states were left without anyone of high authority to govern them at home during the negotiations of the Congress of Berlin.

Table 2: Plenipotentiaries and State Leaders during the Congress of Berlin

Country	State Monarchs	Plenipotentiaries (in order of rank)
Germany	King William I	Otto von Bismarck (Chancellor) Prince Bismarck de Bülow (Foreign Secretary) Prince Hohenlohe-Schillingsfürst (Ambassador in Paris)
Austria-Hungary	Emperor Francis Joseph	Count Andrassy (Foreign Secretary) Count Károlyi (Ambassador in Berlin) Baron de Haymerle (Ambassador in Rome)
France	President Mac-Mahon	M.W.H. Waddington (Foreign Secretary) Comte de Saint-Vallier (Ambassador in Berlin) M.F.H. Desprez (Political Ambassador)
Britain	Queen Victoria	Disraeli, Earl of Beaconsfield (Prime Minister) Marquess of Salisbury (Foreign Secretary) Lord Odo Russell (Ambassador in Berlin)
Italy	Benedetto Cairoli	Comte Corti (Foreign Secretary) Comte de Launay (Ambassador in Berlin)
Russia	Tsar Alexander II	Prince Gorchakov (Foreign Secretary & Chancellor) Comte Shuvalov (Ambassador in London) M.P. d'Oubril (Ambassador in Berlin)
Turkey	Sultan Abdul Hamid	Carathéodory Pasha (Minister of Public Works) Mehemed Ali Pasha (Army Commander) Sadoullah Bey (Ambassador in Berlin)

²⁷¹ Seton-Watson, R.W. *Disraeli, Gladstone and the Eastern Question: A Study in Diplomacy and Party Politics*. London: Macmillan and Co., Limited, 1935. p. 433

The main argument advanced here is that the diplomats were the real power behind the negotiations demonstrating the value of autonomy, agency, and long-held diplomatic relationships to the outcome of cooperation. Resident Ambassadors in Berlin, Odo Russell, Sadoullah Bey, M.P. d'Oubril, Comte de Launay, Comte de Saint-Vallier, and Count Károlyi had already established a rapport with one another and the German diplomats and held solid relationships by virtue of residing in the German capital together for some time.

The statesmen in attendance were not only hindered by their 'slightest experience in matters of the kind', they were also weakened by old age and ill health, and were uninformed of the details of the issues. Gorchakov was confined to a wheelchair, Bismarck was plagued by rheumatism, sleeplessness, and was hard of hearing, there was doubt over whether Disraeli could survive the journey to and from Berlin,²⁷² and Andrassy was coughing up blood²⁷³. Bismarck and Disraeli were ignorant of French, and Gorchakov could not follow the English language. When Disraeli used English at the Congress Gorchakov was at a loss. "Neither statesman was willing to give himself away, a series of comic misunderstandings ensued, glossed over by common consent."²⁷⁴ These statesmen, however, did make a contribution, though in decidedly undiplomatic ways, as will be seen.

The following analysis is organized according to country, (Germany, Britain, Austria-Hungary, Russia, and France) but the evidence throughout demonstrates the strong degree to which diplomats were primarily responsible for the outcomes, that they were each part of a shared transnational community, and that in many cases they did not adhere to their governments' beliefs about what defined the interests of the state. The first half of this chapter dealt with the general

²⁷² At first, the Queen did not even want him to attend the Congress for fear of his old age, and poor health, but her son convinced her to let him go describing him as "not only *the right* man to represent us at the Congress, but the *only man* who can go, as he will show Russia and the other Powers that we were really in earnest...". See (translators), Mrs. J. Pudney and Lord Sudley. "Further Letters of Queen Victoria from the Archives of the House of Brandenburg-Prussia." London, 1938. p. 230.

²⁷³ He resigned shortly after his return to Austria, though he later regained his health and popularity during the 1880s.

²⁷⁴ Seton-Watson. *Disraeli, Gladstone and the Eastern Question: A Study in Diplomacy and Party Politics*. p. 438.

structural autonomy and make-up of the diplomatic corps, while this section provides the evidence for what diplomats actually accomplished with their diplomatic powers by looking at the specific example of the Congress of Berlin. After the country-by-country analysis, I will draw conclusions about the agency of the diplomatic epistemic community during the late nineteenth century, and how the empirical evidence compares to alternative explanations.

Germany

Germany was the host country for the Congress of Berlin and thus, according to protocol, provided mediation for the negotiations. Chancellor Otto von Bismarck, leading statesman and former diplomat, took the job, but not without a strong dose of skepticism and dread. He wrote in a letter, “Just because we are the only really disinterested Power...we should have to bear the responsibility for the almost certain failure of the Congress...every one of our decisions would bear the appearance of a deliberate choice between our more and less intimate friends.”²⁷⁵ It was an honor and a risk for a German to play the part of neutral arbiter. This role meant that the German state had grown in prestige and power in Europe, and if everything went well, would receive even more international acclaim. If the negotiations were a failure, as Bismarck at first expected, the heavy burden of blame would rest entirely on Germany’s, or more appropriately, Bismarck’s shoulders.

Although a statesman at the time, Bismarck was trained as a diplomat, and this explains much about his procedures, choices, and behavior at the Congress. He had served as the representative for Prussia in both Russia and France for over a decade, and was well versed about the potential obstacles to reaching compromise beyond simply the issues themselves. Disraeli put it concisely when he described Bismarck’s procedure as, “All questions are publicly introduced

²⁷⁵ Letter from Prince Bismarck to Bülow, Foreign Minister, August 14th 1876. Dugdale. "The Bismarck Period." p. 23

and privately settled.”²⁷⁶ Each point of negotiation had to be written in advance and distributed to the plenipotentiaries, then formally presented by the author before the others were permitted to respond. For the first time, the secretariat of a conference comprised more than one nationality, French and German, and from then on mixed secretariats became commonplace. As mentioned earlier, Bismarck was also responsible for the order of the proceedings, from most to least important issues, and the parameters of the discussion. Bismarck’s choices as mediator were based on his knowledge of diplomatic procedure, potential obstacles to compromise, and a desire for the congress to be a success. Indeed, by avoiding more controversial and tangential questions, and by following a strict procedure, Bismarck concluded the negotiations successfully after only one month.

While Bismarck’s most important role was as “honest broker,”²⁷⁷ it is critical to remember that he was also a representative of Germany. Because of the presence of Bismarck, Bülow, Hohenlohe, and their diplomatic staff, to an extent Germany was also participating in the negotiations. As a statesman Bismarck was known as the “Iron Chancellor”, and he was the center of power in Germany. Two decades before, Kaiser Wilhelm I had declared that Bismarck was more indispensable to Germany’s future than he himself was. The sovereign’s participation in the Congress of Berlin was even further curtailed by an assassination attempt on his life a fortnight before the first meeting. Bismarck had long cultivated alliances of varying degrees with the other great powers, and however much he wanted to remain neutral, it was inevitable that there would be winners and losers at the Congress, and he would play a role in determining this. In particular, the Three Emperors’ League of Bismarck, Gorchakov, and Andrassy was of great importance to him, and it was this alliance that was the most threatened at the Congress. Both the Russians and the Austrians had a lot at stake in terms of who would have more influence over the

²⁷⁶ Seton-Watson. *Disraeli, Gladstone and the Eastern Question: A Study in Diplomacy and Party Politics*. pp. 433-436

²⁷⁷ Albrecht-Carrié, René. *A Diplomatic History of Europe since the Congress of Vienna*. Revised Edition ed. New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1973. p. 176.

Balkan Peninsula, and by extension Germany's rank among European powers was contingent upon the outcome.

Bismarck inevitably tended to side more with Andrassy than with Gorchakov. However, it was not simply a matter of German self-interest. The three most important considerations for Bismarck at the Congress were (1) a desire for cooperation among European powers, (2) his strong diplomatic relationships with Andrassy and Disraeli, and (3) the need to resolve the Russian Tsar's decision to act unilaterally and militarily in the Balkans. In terms of the first, Turkish diplomat Caratheodory Pasha wrote that Bismarck regarded the people of Turkey as "outside of the circle of civilized Europe, and that the consequences it could have on the relationships of the Great Powers of Europe must not be of interest in any eventuality."²⁷⁸ Bismarck did not really care about the fate of the Bulgarians, but he was concerned with the relationships among the great powers and the common good of peace. Also, he wanted to be successful as a mediator.

Second, Bismarck had strong beliefs about who his friends were. While swearing to do anything in his power to support Andrassy and keep him in office, he called Gorchakov a senile imbecile lacking in tact.²⁷⁹ Third, in part because of the failed relationship between Bismarck and Gorchakov, and also because of Russia's military advance, Bismarck did not sympathize much with the Russian delegation. Joseph Fuller writes, "At the Congress of Berlin he saw to it that Austria received the compensation promised by Russia in advance -- the tenure of Bosnia and Herzegovina -- while allowing Russia's gains to be reduced to a minimum.... The 'honest broker' took a slight commission from one of his clients in advance."²⁸⁰ The following sections will continue to emphasize the importance of Bismarck's influence and of his relationships at the Congress.

²⁷⁸ Sumner, B.H. *Russia and the Balkans 1870-80*. London: Archon Books, 1962. p. 511. Translated by me, from French.

²⁷⁹ The importance of Bismarck's relationship to Andrassy will be discussed further.

²⁸⁰ Fuller, Joseph Vincent. *Bismarck's Diplomacy at Its Zenith*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1922. p. 7 (text and footnote)

Britain

The British State: Disraeli, the Cabinet & Public Opinion

Britain provides the strongest example of a state in which power was spread uncertainly among the ruling elite triggered in large part by the sovereign's declining role. Prime Minister Disraeli complained towards the end of 1877 that there were twelve members in the cabinet, and seven different viewpoints ranging from 'peace at any price' to immediate aggression.²⁸¹ Queen Victoria, who became more vociferous and opinionated than previously in light of the growing crisis in the Balkans, held one of the most extreme view points. Her letter-writing increased as she kept up a constant correspondence with those involved in the Eastern Question.²⁸² In particular, she wrote to Disraeli, supporting his actions and opinions, and to Foreign Secretary Lord Derby admonishing him for his *laissez-faire* approach to the East. In a letter to Derby she writes:

The Queen has never felt satisfied at *our inaction*, which has brought about, what the Queen *feels*, and so do many others, a *painful humiliation* for this country, which no action *now can remedy*; for it *ought* to have been taken *long ago* -- and we *ought* to have acted up to our repeated declarations with regard to Constantinople.²⁸³

She took a strong stand, and supported an aggressive policy to stop the Russian army gaining control over Turkey because she did not want Britain to be seen as a weak state in the eyes of others. Yet, despite her legal claim to power her actual control was declining. She held a close relationship with Disraeli and he persuaded her to support nearly everything he advocated.²⁸⁴

²⁸¹ Penson. *Foreign Affairs under the Third Marquis of Salisbury*. p. 2.

²⁸² *The Letters of Queen Victoria (Second Series) a Selection from Her Majesty's Correspondence and Journal between the Years 1862-1878*.

²⁸³ Queen Victoria to the Earl of Derby 10 Feb. 1878. Ibid.

²⁸⁴ To characterize the relationship between Queen Victoria and Disraeli: The Queen wrote to Lord Rowton when Disraeli died, "Never had I so kind and devoted a Minister and very few such devoted friends. His affectionate sympathy, his wise counsel -- *all* were invaluable to me even out of office....the bitterness and suffering are not the less severe." Blake, Robert. *Gladstone, Disraeli, and Queen Victoria, The Centenary Romanes Lecture, Delivered before the University of Oxford on 10 November 1992*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992. pp. 3-4. Disraeli wrote to her during the lead up to the Congress, "He feels there is no devotion that your Majesty does not deserve, and he only wishes he had youth and energy to be the

Though sharing an aggressive, conservative stance with the Queen, Disraeli tended to tame her more extreme opinions. The Prime Minister firmly believed in the territorial integrity of Turkey, and that Britain should be neutral towards Turkey's behavior in the interest of supporting its autonomy, even if this meant eventually going to war to protect it.

Disraeli's stance was extreme in comparison to the Liberals, such as Granville, Derby, and Gladstone who wanted peace and compromise. Derby was eventually pushed into retirement in May 1878 for his policy line, but Granville and Gladstone (most notably) formed a strong opposition.²⁸⁵ It was because of the lively debate among widely divergent voices that public opinion came to matter greatly in determining British foreign policy. Gladstone was instrumental in informing the British people of the atrocities in Bulgaria, and thus rallying public opinion against the Turkish government. This contrasted to the Queen and Disraeli's vehement anti-Russian stance. However, the Conservative delegation at Berlin had to pay attention to public opinion in light of the Bulgarian atrocities, and the fact that these atrocities had riled-up public opinion against Disraeli's policies. The Conservative position of British neutrality and support for Turkish autonomy was thus heavily compromised. When Disraeli realized the weakness of his position, he looked for another conservative who could subtly push Britain's policy away from neutrality.

Salisbury

Lord Salisbury, a moderate conservative, was appointed to the office of Foreign Secretary at the end of May, to replace Derby, and he was the diplomat who most impacted the outcomes at

fitting champion of such an inspiring Mistress as your Majesty. ... He lives only for Her, and works only for Her, and without Her all is lost." Pearson. *Dizzy: A Life of Benjamin Disraeli*. p. 246.

²⁸⁵ Despite their strongly and heatedly opposed stances, Gladstone recognized Disraeli's contribution at Berlin. On May 9th, 1881, less than a month after Disraeli's death, Gladstone is reported as saying to parliament, "The career of Lord Beaconsfield was in many respects the most remarkable and the most surprising in our Parliamentary history, and especially he dwelt on his connection with the last measure of Parliamentary reform, and the magnitude of the part he played in the great transactions of Berlin." See Dunlop. *Beaconsfield Brilliance: Being Choice Selections from the Speeches and Works of the Late Benjamin Disraeli, Earl of Beaconsfield*. p. 2.

the Congress of Berlin. Although he officially held a political, as opposed to diplomatic, post at the time, he was new to it (just over two months) and he was a diplomat by training and experience. He had formerly served as the British plenipotentiary at the 1877 Constantinople Conference, and was thus highly qualified and informed on the Eastern Crisis. Upon his appointment, however, he had not established himself as Foreign Secretary, and there was some question about what stance he would take and whether he was the right man for the job. Salisbury immediately proved himself. On the night of his appointment, as reported by Lady Gwendolen Cecil (his daughter), Salisbury stayed up till three in the morning writing the famous April 1 Circular.²⁸⁶ This was a great example of diplomatic initiative for he was not instructed, and it transformed Britain's reputation on the Eastern Question from a position of uncertainty to one of strength literally over night.

Salisbury's April 1 Circular strongly rejected Russia's Treaty of San Stefano, advocated a compromise and cooperative solution among the great powers, and heavily influenced the Treaty of Berlin itself.²⁸⁷ Although Salisbury, like Disraeli, was a Conservative, they held different opinions about Britain's foreign policy. Salisbury's main priorities were (1) a cooperative agreement among the great powers, (2) maintaining a close relationship with Bismarck, and (3) recognizing the relative weakness of Britain's land army. Britain's army had one hundred thousand troops, Russia's had one and a half million, and Germany (all together) had over a million.²⁸⁸ Disraeli's main priority, by contrast, was to demonstrate the power and firm resolve of Britain by enforcing his country's interests in the Balkans, which he believed rested on Turkish autonomy. In other words, he brought Britain dangerously close to war.

Salisbury espoused a realist worldview, but with a twist. He wrote, "Diplomacy which does not rest on force is the most feeble and futile of weapons, and except for bare self-defense,

²⁸⁶ Seton-Watson. *Disraeli, Gladstone and the Eastern Question: A Study in Diplomacy and Party Politics*. p. 379.

²⁸⁷ For a transcript of the April 1 Circular see: Temperley, Harold, and Dame Lillian Penson. *Foundations of British Foreign Policy from Pitt (1792) to Salisbury (1902)*. Cambridge: CUP, 1938. pp. 372-80.

²⁸⁸ Steele, David. *Lord Salisbury: A Political Biography*. London: UCL Press, 1999. p. 106

we have not the force.”²⁸⁹ The twist was that his actions and accomplishments did not reflect his statement. In the negotiations, he did not emphasize Britain’s premier naval force, economic wealth, and social stability. A diplomat by profession, he could not abandon his diplomatic tools, and he followed the path of firm, patient diplomacy. Rather than power, he talked about compromise, and instead of Turkish autonomy, he supported Christian rights. His actions reflected his belief in diplomatic compromise, and his membership in the transnational corps. His diplomat colleagues would be let down if he abandoned the common goal he supported in Constantinople to advocate Disraeli’s line of *Realpolitik*.

Salisbury was of strategic necessity for Disraeli who knew that his policy of Turkish integrity was not going to work in light of British and international public opinion about the Bulgarian atrocities, and the cost of losing all ties to Russia. Disraeli relied on Salisbury’s more moderate reputation to subtly change Britain’s policy. He often said that it was Salisbury who “pulled the laboring oar,”²⁹⁰ and indeed, Salisbury was able to negotiate and win practically all of British demands at the Congress. However, in the end, Salisbury’s work did not reflect Disraeli’s demands, but Gladstone’s. As Seton-Watson argues, “...where he differed from the Liberal statesman was not so much in opinion, as in emphasis, in mentality, in tactics, in sense of proportion, in his view of what should be said and what suppressed.”²⁹¹ In sum, Salisbury held different priorities from Disraeli (much to the relief of his European colleagues), successfully acted upon them, and thus is largely responsible for the accomplishments at Berlin. Bismarck, although a great fan of Disraeli, expressed his joy at the arrival of Salisbury who would not lead Britain to war.

As a study in comparison, Disraeli, thoroughly not a diplomat, influenced the outcomes at Berlin from an entirely different approach. He can be credited with achieving the broad

²⁸⁹ Ibid. p. 108.

²⁹⁰ Seton-Watson. *Disraeli, Gladstone and the Eastern Question: A Study in Diplomacy and Party Politics*. p. 435

²⁹¹ Ibid. p. 379.

brushstrokes, mainly, making sure that Russia did not control access to the Mediterranean. At a banquet, he told Count Corti of Italy in confidence of his intention to withdraw if Russia did not back down from maintaining its “Big Bulgaria.” Disraeli knew Corti would be the least likely to keep the information to himself, and before too long Bismarck found out. Bismarck immediately invited Disraeli to a private dinner saying, “Am I to understand it is an ultimatum?” Disraeli replied, “You are”. The British Prime Minister had already asked his assistant to prepare a train for him that would leave the following morning if he did not get his way. Upon conclusion of his dinner with Bismarck, however, Disraeli sent a telegraph to the Queen stating that Russia was prepared to surrender.²⁹² Instead of encouraging compromise, Disraeli offered “all or nothing”. It was then up to Salisbury to work out in what manner, and under what conditions this would occur.

Austria-Hungary

The State: the Emperor, Andrassy, and Public Opinion

There were factions in the Austro-Hungarian government about what policy they should have in the Balkans, but the main divide was between the *Realpolitik* camp and Andrassy’s more idealistic worldview. Emperor Francis Joseph and other realists in the government believed that nationalism did not matter, and their main aim was to acquire more land. Andrassy, a diplomat and statesman, was up against opposition in Vienna, but he *did* have the support of public opinion. Like Metternich in the past, he believed that Austria’s stable position rested on the integrity of Turkey. Although this was the same policy as the Conservative British faction, Austrian interests were different. Andrassy advocated that Turkey needed to keep up the status quo, and put down extreme nationalism. If not, then the smaller Balkan states would combine forces with the support of Russia and leave Austria the “sick man” in Europe.²⁹³ He supported a

²⁹² Pearson. *Dizzy: A Life of Benjamin Disraeli*. p. 249.

²⁹³ Taylor. *The Struggle for Mastery in Europe 1848-1918*. p. 231

reasonable peace as much as he opposed a dangerous one,²⁹⁴ and did not want to seek territorial aggrandizement for Austria unless it was a necessity to safeguard Austrian security. He was, however, more idealistic and optimistic than Bismarck who was the embodiment of inflexible power tempered by intelligent reflection. Andrassy saw his fellow man as basically good, and liked to fight for the noble cause.

Francis Joseph had failed in the past, and was more open minded to Andrassy's more careful approach. The area in which the Emperor, the Austrian government, and Andrassy did concur was with regard to increased Austrian influence in the Balkans. Andrassy's motive was a little different. It was to simultaneously protect his own country's interests as well as the Serbians. Andrassy's son later writes, "This Congress did not create any opposition between Serbia and Austria-Hungary, but on the contrary, by increasing the power of Austria-Hungary in the vicinity of Serbia, it protected Serbian interests simultaneously."²⁹⁵ Over time Francis Joseph held loyalty and trust towards Andrassy, even when his policies ran against the Emperor's conservatism. As an expert negotiator, Andrassy got away with representing his own view, rather than the government's at the Congress of Berlin. His actions at the Congress, however, pushed the boundaries of his room to maneuver, and the Emperor and his supporters made Andrassy retire after the Congress of Berlin. He did not share their realist goals.

Andrassy was also a controversial member of the Austrian leadership because of his political past. Even Gorchakov and Bismarck considered him a rebel because he had engaged in a war against his previous sovereign, and had even been sentenced to death by him.²⁹⁶ As a politician-diplomat, he had no scruples about advocating opposing views from his government and sovereign. He first joined the service to support the Hungarian part of the hyphenated

²⁹⁴ Andrassy, Julius. *Bismarck, Andrassy, and Their Successors*. London: T. Fisher Unwin Ltd, 1927. p. 15.

²⁹⁵ Andrassy, Julius. *Diplomacy and the War*. Translated by J. Holroyd Reece. London: John Bale, Sons & Danielsson, Ltd., 1921. p. 12.

²⁹⁶ Andrassy. *Bismarck, Andrassy, and Their Successors*. p. 19. This sovereign had ended the independence of the Magyars.

(Austro-Hungarian) Empire. Andrassy also stood apart from Gorchakov and Bismarck because he was a strong supporter of parliamentarism, while the other two were in favor of absolutism. Despite these differences, his skill as a diplomat enabled him to foster closer relationships with his two colleagues than they had with each other.

Andrassy: Politician and Diplomat

Count Andrassy had a great role before, during, and after the Congress of Berlin. He was a Magyar aristocrat who headed the Ballhausplatz, the Austrian Foreign Ministry, from 1871 to 1879, and he was a soldier prior to this.²⁹⁷ Like the Russian diplomat, Shuvalov, he was a charming and bright negotiator. He was lively and bold, though secretive and many of his contemporaries found him to be somewhat exotic. He lived the life of Hungarian nobility, at least superficially, and he was a strong supporter of “secret diplomacy.”

Andrassy, like his Russian, British, and German counterparts, was very ill, but he was more able than his foreign counterparts. Importantly, he was supported by the most responsible, professional, and well-informed team at the Congress. Count Károlyi, Ambassador at Berlin, was an expert of seventeen years, and Baron Haymerle, Ambassador in Rome, was very knowledgeable, though more bureaucratic. Károlyi had a close relationship with the British Ambassador Lord Odo Russell; the two diplomats and their spouses spent many evenings together enjoying the soirées at the Austrian embassy in Berlin.

Andrassy’s goal was not to bring Russia humiliation nor did he want to conquer new lands for Austria, as many members of his government preferred.²⁹⁸ Austria was already the home to five major national groups (12 million Germans, 10 million Magyars, 23 million Slavs, 3.5 million Rumanian, and 750,000 Italians²⁹⁹), so Andrassy believed that it would be difficult to

²⁹⁷ Mason, John W. *The Dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Empire 1867-1918*. Second ed, *Seminar Studies in History*. London: Longman, 1997. p. 54.

²⁹⁸ Andrassy. *Diplomacy and the War*.

²⁹⁹ Mason. *The Dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Empire 1867-1918*. p. xiii.

control more foreign nationalities. His goal was to gain strong economic ties with the Balkan peoples, as well as to protect their right to sovereignty. The younger Count Andrassy writes of his father, "The leading principle of Andrassy's policy was that the [Austrian] Monarchy should use its powers for the protection of the liberty of the separate nations, and especially against the avarice or paternal attitude of the Czars, as well as the possibility of revenge on the part of the Sultan."³⁰⁰ The Andrassy Note was of critical importance in the escalation of attention among the great powers to the events in the East. Unlike the Emperor, Andrassy recognized the importance of nationalism in the Balkans, and its power in instigating conflict and crisis.

As a diplomat, Andrassy was not very serious or interested in the protocol of foreign correspondence, preferring others to write for him, and even told jokes while reading important letters.³⁰¹ This was yet another reason for the Austrian government and his colleagues to be suspicious of his diplomatic ideas, further separating the politician-diplomat from the state. However, his close relationship to Bismarck more than made up for this. Andrassy wrote to Count Károlyi, already in Berlin, that he wished to arrive in the capital early to reach some preliminary understandings with Bismarck. Coincidentally, on that very day Bismarck also expressed the same desire to Andrassy.³⁰²

Bismarck and Andrassy

Bismarck had respect for Andrassy's straight-forward, intelligent manner that contrasted sharply with the Russian diplomat Gorchakov's petty, conceited, and gossipy personality. Gorchakov had a closer relationship to Andrassy because he was jealous of Bismarck and his glamorous diplomatic career. In fact, the tie between the Russian and Austrian was so cozy that

³⁰⁰ Andrassy. *Diplomacy and the War*. pp. 12-13.

³⁰¹ Rupp, George Hoover. *A Wavering Friendship: Russia and Austria 1876-1878*. Philadelphia: Porcupine Press, 1976. Appendix I.

³⁰² Harris, David. *A Diplomatic History of the Balkan Crisis of 1875-1878: The First Year, Hoover War Library Publications -- No. 11*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1936. p. 291.

Bismarck considered forming an alliance with the English in 1878 to balance against the other two.³⁰³

Andrássy was fair, perfectly informed, and acutely aware of Bismarck's viewpoints. He attempted to incorporate Bismarck's interests as much as possible while dealing with the Eastern Question. The German Chancellor pledged the same in return saying that Germany needed to have a reliable and capable man to manage affairs in Vienna. While Gorchakov sent many irritating diplomatic notes and proposals, forcing Bismarck to decline on many occasions, Andrássy used his communication with Bismarck sparingly. Bismarck and Andrássy were also naturally inclined towards one another as they had similar personalities and worldviews.³⁰⁴ They were guided by their consciences, upheld their convictions, were strongly patriotic, and took their duties seriously. They were not afraid to disagree with their colleagues or sovereigns, and readily faced unpopularity to stand up for their opinions. They were both unselfish, to the point where they would pursue peace over the fame of military victory. Above all, they were hardworking, thorough, and daring.

In sum, Andrássy was the plenipotentiary at the Congress of Berlin whose position most straddled the line between statesman and diplomat. He differed from his government's realist approach because of his belief in the importance of nationalism, the common good, and peace, and his desire to not seek territorial aggrandizement. As a statesman he stood apart from the mainstream views of his government and sovereign; as a diplomat, he was able to get away with this because of his negotiating talent and relationships to his colleagues in the *corps diplomatique*.

³⁰³ Andrássy. *Bismarck, Andrássy, and Their Successors*. p. 20.

³⁰⁴ *Ibid.* For a good comparison of the personalities of Bismarck and Andrássy. pp. 40-53.

Russia

The State

Like Britain and Austria, the upper echelons of the Russian state were also plagued with ambiguity and uncertain division of power. The chief ministers were divided on policy, there was a climate of “ministerial anarchy”, and there was internal competition for power. The Tsar officially held the reins of power, but he lacked information and advice because his chief ministers were so divided.³⁰⁵ Consequently, he had to abandon his original desire to act as his own foreign minister in the issues of the Eastern Crisis. Much of this governmental instability can be attributed to Gorchakov’s neglect, and preoccupation with besting Shuvalov. The Tsar had little control over his divided government, but was persuaded by Ignatiev who was in support of extreme Pan-Slavism, a policy that Austria could not live with. Gorchakov, like Andrassy, was also a politician-diplomat, though far less talented. He combined an odd mixture of diplomatic flourishes, courtly manners, and ignorance of details.

Gorchakov and Shuvalov

After the British delegates and Bismarck, the Russian delegates were naturally the center of attention at the Congress of Berlin because the primary goal of the Congress was to reconcile Russia’s stance with that of Britain and Austria and review the Treaty of San Stefano. At home, Ignatiev tended to get in the way of this as he was a strong supporter of Pan-Slav extremism, and had the loyalty of the Tsar.³⁰⁶ In Berlin, Gorchakov was much more moderate in his stance, but could not take part in all of the meetings because of his failing health, old age, and his vision-clouding desire to end his career in personal glory.

³⁰⁵ Mendlicott, W.N. *The Congress of Berlin and After: A Diplomatic History of the near Eastern Settlement 1878-1880*. London: Frank Cass & Co. Ltd., 1963. p. 143.

³⁰⁶ *Historical Section of the Foreign Office, the Congress of Berlin*. Vol. 167, *Handbooks*. London, February 1919. p. 24.

The Russian delegates, Gorchakov and Shuvalov were rivals and plagued by friction in their relationship to one another. The Tsar wanted Shuvalov to be the first plenipotentiary, but eventually gave the position to Gorchakov who was more experienced and the other's senior. Gorchakov was eighty at the time of the conference, and was the plenipotentiary chiefly involved in the Treaty of San Stefano. He reflected the old-school training of the eighteenth century displaying courtly manners, elegance, and gracious, verbose phrasing during his speeches. He wanted to end his career with a big bang, and hoped to have enough glory to rival Bismarck. Like Disraeli to some extent, his vanity was much invested in the outcomes of the negotiations at Berlin.³⁰⁷ His goals were to make Russia a winner in the negotiations and to gain the spotlight for himself at the expense of his colleagues Shuvalov and Bismarck.³⁰⁸ Like Andr ssy, he strongly supported the alliance among the Three Emperors as a path to resolving the Eastern crisis, but saw this as a route to his personal goals. Bismarck, unlike Andr ssy and Gorchakov, viewed the Three Emperors League as a means of pushing the Eastern question into the shadows.³⁰⁹

Gorchakov's usual eloquence was tainted by tactlessness towards Bismarck because of his personal jealousy, and this continuously drove Bismarck closer to Andr ssy. His policies and continued clumsiness towards Bismarck contributed greatly to the weakening of diplomatic ties between Germany and Russia.

Shuvalov, on the other hand, was far less of an obstacle for compromise during the negotiations than Gorchakov. The other diplomats found him to be flexible and charming, hardworking and bright. He also had the support of the Tsar. The French plenipotentiary, Waddington wrote in his correspondences to the French Foreign Office that Count Shuvalov had

³⁰⁷ Andrassy. *Bismarck, Andrassy, and Their Successors*. p. 17.

³⁰⁸ Seton-Watson. *Disraeli, Gladstone and the Eastern Question: A Study in Diplomacy and Party Politics*. pp. 440-441

³⁰⁹ Andrassy. *Bismarck, Andrassy, and Their Successors*. p. 18.

a personal rapport with the British Plenipotentiaries, and spoke to them with familiarity.³¹⁰

Shuvalov was genuinely working for peace because he was well aware that Russia was not prepared to enter another war, and an alliance with Britain was beneficial and possible. He took risks with his career, but wanted to impress the Tsar, and aimed to become Russian Chancellor someday.

The two Russian plenipotentiaries often and unnecessarily got in each other's way.³¹¹ Andrassy's records indicate that at one of the meetings, he was taken aside first by Gorchakov, then by Shuvalov and each informed him that though the other held the opposite stance, they would support Austria's occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.³¹² The record of the Russian diplomats provides an example of how diplomatic relationships can encounter problems. Though Shuvalov participated effectively and intelligently, Gorchakov could neither gain entrance into the community of diplomats at Berlin nor get along with his own envoy. B.H. Sumner writes of Gorchakov:

Like Disraeli, he left most of the real work to his second in command, was hazy as to particular points at issue, and was lamentable with maps. His experts soon found that he could not be trusted with anything secret.... he brought along an extremely confidential map showing the limits of the Russian concessions in Asia and spread it out before the curious eyes of Odo Russell, until Shuvalov succeeded in removing it.³¹³ Sumner 1962

From then on, the secret maps were kept away from him. Even more threatening to the negotiations was that Gorchakov seemed to keep forgetting the concessions stipulated in the Anglo-Russian agreement. Naturally, this further encouraged the antagonism between the two primary Russian representatives, and at one point Shuvalov threatened to resign if Gorchakov was not replaced.

³¹⁰ Count Waddington's Telegram of June 18, 1878. *Memoires et documents, Bulgarie, 1878-1891*, Archives des affaires étrangères, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Paris.

³¹¹ The third plenipotentiary, M. d'Oubril, served to bridge the gap between his two rival colleagues.

³¹² *Historical Section of the Foreign Office, the Congress of Berlin*. Ft p. 28.

³¹³ Sumner. *Russia and the Balkans 1870-80*. p. 501.

France

Besides Italy, France had the smallest role at the Congress because of its problems domestically. Unlike the other European powers, the French did not send their top representative, but a novice. “[Disraeli] talked of Waddington as an able and moderate man, with great self confidence, quite ignorant of Foreign Affairs, and likely to take unexpected steps.”³¹⁴ France accepted the invitation to participate in the Congress of Berlin, but its role was far diminished compared to the last great conference, the Treaty of Paris in 1856. The French had just suffered defeat at the hands of the Germans, and now only a few years later, found themselves nervously attending a conference in Berlin. The French goal was to mediate since, like the Germans, they were relatively neutral and disinterested, being occupied with affairs at home. The chance at mediation could elevate France in the eyes of the other great powers despite a recent defeat in the Franco-Prussian war.

William Henry Waddington became Foreign Minister on December 14, 1877, he did not have training as a diplomat, and had not yet acquired a great deal of experience at the time he attended the Congress. However, he prepared well for it, knew the issues at stake, and distinguished himself while in Berlin. He was of English birth and French education, but completed his university years in England.

The second plenipotentiary was M. de St. Vallier who was charming, hardworking and well versed in diplomatic negotiation. He was a good friend and colleague of Waddington, and kept up his duties despite battling an incurable illness. St. Vallier was a well planned choice on the part of the French because of his previous opposition to the Napoleonic war policy in 1870. He had also served as the diplomatic representative of France during Germany’s occupation. Because St. Vallier was the resident diplomat at Berlin he was able to arrange for Waddington to meet with high government officials despite the fact that the latter was unknown in diplomatic

³¹⁴ Lord Granville to Mr. Gladstone Dec 20, 1877. *The Political Correspondence of Mr. Gladstone and Lord Granville 1876-1886*. pp. 62-63.

and political circles. Waddington writes, "M. Minister and Dear President, I arrived in Berlin on the 10th of this month and since the day before yesterday, thanks to the work taken by Mr. the Count of St. Vallier, I immediately gained a rapport with the high personnel of the German government."³¹⁵ The third plenipotentiary, Desprez, was a standard French bureaucrat.

As a relatively objective participant in the Congress and first-time witness of diplomacy in action, Waddington noticed the way in which the unofficial meetings took on significant importance. In the interim after the first meeting, he writes to the Quay d'Orsay that the plenipotentiaries were busy in the interim before the second meeting. Since many more arrived in Berlin late, and needed to be informed of what had occurred thus far, many reports and conversations were exchanged second-hand. Waddington reports that each diplomat tried to describe the negotiations that had occurred in a way most favorable to making allies of the newcomers.³¹⁶ He also notes that it was clear that each country's representative arrived with his own particular ideas, and he saw it as necessary for the French envoy to help the others realize their potential reconciliation. The French plenipotentiaries had the esteem and confidence of the other participants for their neutrality and eagerness to aid in achieving a European compromise. The period from June 19 to 24 1878 was particularly difficult for those attending as they had reached deadlock, but when a breakthrough was finally made it was attributed to the French, and they were recognized for their role in this.

The first letter of instruction that Waddington received from the Foreign Office was on July 12 1878, nearly at the end of the Congress, in which he was praised for upholding a double goal. These were the affirmation of France's rank in Europe as mediator over the difficult questions raised at the Congress, and also the protection of the national interest.³¹⁷ The view of

³¹⁵ étrangères, Archives des affaires. "Memoires Et Documents, Bulgarie." In *Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Paris, 1878-1891*. Translation of: "Monsieur le Ministre et Cher Président, Je suis arrive a Berlin le 10 de ce mois et dès le lendemain, grace aux dispositions prises par Mr Le Cte de St. Vallier, j'ai pu immédiatement entrer en rapports avec le haut personnel du Gouvernement Allemand." June 14, 1878.

³¹⁶ Ibid. Letter. June 18, 1878.

³¹⁷ Ibid. July 11.

the French state was that the main importance of the Congress was the durability of the transaction, and the support of the principles and values of France. Thus, Waddington's instructions consisted mostly of his general diplomatic duty and the honor of France, rather than explicit positions on the various issues. Despite its relatively small role, the French perspective provides evidences for the workings of the transnational corps, and the widely held support of the common good in Western Europe.

Epistemic Community of Diplomats

The transnational relationships and the wealth of diplomatic experience at the Congress were strong and effective, mostly positive, and as important to the outcome as the issues themselves. What remains somewhat less evident in the official transcript of the meetings are the numerous occasions in which diplomats relied on their personal relationships and membership in their epistemic community. The fate of the Congress rested as heavily (if not more heavily) on the internal dynamic of the epistemic community as it did on Bismarck's abilities as mediator.

The strict procedure instituted by Bismarck meant that few topics could be discussed outside of the immediate stipulations of the Congress. He was quick to introduce topics, listen to speakers, and move on to the next issue, even at the protest of those present. When the British requested that the Russian troops be moved away from the vicinity of Constantinople because of the potential risk they presented to the Turks and the future of the Congress, Bismarck declared that the issue was outside the agenda of the Congress. Despite protests from the British, and the Turkish plenipotentiaries who had the most to lose, Bismarck quickly stated, "the point is closed".³¹⁸ The requirement of distributing all motions in writing in advance also tended to constrain creative solutions at the official negotiation table. It is thus important to examine the

³¹⁸ *Correspondence Relating to the Congress of Berlin, with the Protocols of the Congress*. Vol. 83ii, *Accounts and Papers 1878, Turkey*. No. 39. London: Harrison and Sons, 1878. Protocols.

unofficial discourse at Berlin, which reflects strength and dynamic of the diplomatic epistemic community.

The Berlin Corps

Dinners, lunches, and soirées were an important component of the congress. Notably, Salisbury was less in the limelight at the Congress because he did most of his negotiating in private.³¹⁹ “The most appreciated feature of the congress was the sumptuous buffet, just off the conference hall. It was Radowitz’s idea, originally frowned upon by Bismarck; and he justly plumed himself on it.”³²⁰ Four days went by between the first and second meetings so that the diplomats could get to know each other, attend many dinners, and engage in “secret” preliminary talks. In the first ten days, there were only three meetings to the disappointment of Bismarck who wanted to get the negotiations over with as quickly as possible.

The buffet remained the center of many preliminary negotiations and information gathering. The representatives of the Balkan states as well as others whose interests were affected anxiously loitered around the food to see if they might be able to sit in on some of the meetings that concerned their fate. Diplomats from Greece, Roumania, Serbia, Montenegro, representatives of French holders of Ottoman bonds, English holders of Ottoman bonds, business men with strong railway interests at stake, journalists, a dozen representatives of Eastern churches, some Constantinople Greeks, and a Bosnian rebel leader all waited at the buffet outside the doors to the Congress.³²¹ However, the interactions of most importance were those of the diplomats. They had already accomplished a great deal prior to the meeting, as well as making headways in the month that followed. The unofficial time outside of the meetings—at the buffet, during private dinners, and visits to each other’s embassies—accomplished tacit understandings, and strengthened a lasting sense of community and common ties.

³¹⁹ Taylor, Robert. *Lord Salisbury*. London: British Political Biography, 1975. p. 63.

³²⁰ Sumner. *Russia and the Balkans 1870-80*. p. 512.

³²¹ *Ibid.* pp. 512-513

The greater importance of the success of this conference did not go unnoticed. The German Crown Princess writes to Queen Victoria, "It has been a capital thing that the Foreign Ministers of different nations have made each other's acquaintance, it will make written communication a very different thing in future!"³²² The Congress thus held a dual purpose, providing extended opportunities for diplomats, political-diplomats, and statesmen to interact, and enabling compromise on the Eastern Question.

The Wider Corps

It is important to emphasize also that alongside the negotiations in Berlin, diplomats in other countries continued their correspondences, and were critical in the actual implementation and spread of information. The letters, telegraphs, and meetings continued in Constantinople and other major cities before, after, and even simultaneously with the Congress of Berlin. For Austria, Count Zichy, the Austrian Ambassador at Constantinople, and Count Beust, Austrian Ambassador in London contributed much.³²³ Count Beust unilaterally offered to sign a Convention with Britain for common action. After much discussion in London, he was authorized to do so, and it was signed two months later on June 6, 1878.

The private papers of A.H. Layard demonstrate the extent that a diplomat, not invited to the Congress, played a crucial role. While in Constantinople, he acted in the interests of Britain and the Congress of Berlin. He maintained constant contact with the Foreign Office both under Derby and Salisbury, coordinated a whole host of British diplomats stationed all over the Ottoman Empire, and implemented the stipulations of the Treaty of Berlin. He writes to Salisbury just before the start of the negotiations:

³²² German Crown Princess to Queen Victoria 13 July 1878. *The Letters of Queen Victoria (Second Series) a Selection from Her Majesty's Correspondence and Journal between the Years 1862-1878.* p. 628.

³²³ *Historical Section of the Foreign Office, the Congress of Berlin.* p. 25.

I have had a very satisfactory interview with the Sultan today. He begged me to thank you warmly for all that you and Lord Beaconsfield are doing for him, and to say that he attaches the greatest importance to Batoum not passing into the hands of the Russians, and trusts that you will be able to prevent it.³²⁴

During the Congress he writes:

Porte complains that Congress has decided that Austria shall occupy and administer Bosnia and Herzegovina, without adding the reservation that, according to condition of Turkish Plenipotentiaries, it had been previously agreed that an understanding as to conditions should be come to between her and Turkey.³²⁵

Then, after the Congress he writes:

Representatives of the Great Powers met today at this Embassy, and appointed Commission to visit Rhodope and neighboring districts, in pursuance of resolution of Congress. Commission will leave on Saturday for Philippopolis. I have named Consul-General, French and German Consuls, Austrian Military Attaché, Russian Second Secretary, and Italian Second Dragoman are the other members.³²⁶

The importance of the relationships he built and maintained in Turkey cannot be underscored enough. Each of the telegraphs quoted here show how this diplomatic network anticipated and prevented possible disaster, and possible reasons for the goals of the Treaty to be undermined. As a resident ambassador, Layard had many secret, trustworthy sources, and knew the main governmental players personally. He met with the Sultan as a friend and colleague and had a permanent invitation to come to the palace whenever he felt like it or had information to pass on. He was clearly the British citizen with the most expertise on the affairs of Turkey because of his years of residence there. When Salisbury responded to Layard's communications he often wrote something akin to, "You should remonstrate in the manner which seems to you likely to be most effectual."³²⁷ Diplomats in the wider epistemic community exercised agency, and the information they provided from personal interviews was even more revealing than letters sent directly to and from sovereigns. Upon speaking with the Sultan about his problems with

³²⁴ Layard, A.H. "Confidential Print. Turkey. 20 April-15 Aug 1878. MSS 39149." In *Layard Papers*, 1878. Telegraphic. July 1, 1878 Layard to Salisbury

³²⁵ Ibid. Telegraphic, July 11, 1878 Layard to Salisbury.

³²⁶ Ibid. Telegraphic Therapia, July 17, 1878. Layard to Salisbury

³²⁷ Layard, A.H. "Confidential Print. Turkey 17 March-5 June 1878. MSS 39148." In *Layard Papers*, 1878. Marquis of Salisbury first telegraph to Layard, April 2, 1878.

Russia, Layard writes to Lord Derby, "He spoke with such determination, but in a tone of sorrow and almost despair which was very touching."³²⁸

In sum, the epistemic community of diplomats went beyond simply the relationships of diplomats at the Congress to each other. All of the diplomats present had met each other on previous occasions and operated based on acquired knowledge and respect. Particularly important were the unofficial meetings at the Congress of Berlin, which could have only been the result of a pre-existing epistemic community. All of the terms discussed in Berlin, whether officially or unofficially, necessitated the follow-through work performed by the resident diplomats overseas.

Diplomatic Agency

The case study of the Congress of Berlin, from the diplomats' perspective, provides an example of how the process of diplomacy was carried out and what impact diplomatic agency and community had on the outcomes. Although the bureaucratic structure of the diplomatic profession at the time was looser at the higher levels compared to the lower levels, encroaching bureaucratization is evident in the proceedings at Berlin. Whereas in the mid-seventeenth century, the main outlet of diplomatic agency was through individual initiative, during the late nineteenth century agency was accomplished more through collective action. Each diplomat found himself embedded in a wider diplomatic network held together by further interaction, and strongly institutionalized norms and protocol.

As evidence of this, many sovereigns and statesmen held realist worldviews, yet the outcomes reflected the good of international society more generally. Although many countries were still largely monarchical, isolationist, and nationalist, the climate of the times was not so

³²⁸ Layard, A.H. "Confidential Print. Turkey. Apr.-June 1877 MSS 39144." In *Layard Papers, British Library, 1877*. Telegraphic. Mr. Layard to the Earl of Derby, April 24, 1877

absolutist as the mid-seventeenth century. Sovereigns and statesmen are often quoted as saying that they wanted peace above all and the resolution of conflict in the interest of the common good of Europe. Layard writes to Derby, for example, “His Imperial Majesty answered, with great earnestness, that he was prepared to make every sacrifice in the interests of peace consistent with the dignity and independence of his country.”³²⁹ Disraeli, as mentioned before, shared the same opinion. Whether the state leaders genuinely believed what they so eloquently expressed, or whether it was simply rhetoric can only be guessed, but the diplomats they employed and worked with in most cases did hold an actual belief in the European good. The worldview in support of the common good was much more prevalent than previously, and foretold its proper arrival as a collectively held international norm in today’s environment.

Realism as an Alternative Explanation

Was the result of the negotiation different from a realist prediction? To maintain consistency with the seventeenth century case study, the test variables for the realist prediction are: (1) more powerful countries will gain while weaker countries lose, (2) states will try to balance against other powerful states, and (3) states will act as unitary actors. A.J.P. Taylor, a realist in this regard, argues that the late-nineteenth century was the height of anarchy among sovereign states, and that each sovereign leader believed that the best results for Europe would be accomplished if each acted in his own interest with complete liberty from the others. Taylor underplays the importance of the Congress of Berlin arguing that there was no solidarity or common belief among the Great Powers. In other words, states sought to balance, and this was not a difficult task, especially since France fell from predominance after the Franco-Prussian war.³³⁰ However, Taylor’s realist analysis neglects to examine the impact of the diplomatic

³²⁹ Ibid. Layard to Derby, April 25, 1877.

³³⁰ Wrigley, ed. *Struggles for Supremacy: Diplomatic Essays Be A.J.P. Taylor*. Chapter Five.

processes that were examined in this chapter. The outcome was not simply a matter of relative power and states acting unilaterally.

To deal with the realist analysis on its own terms, I address the first variable of relative power. The winners, according to the theory, are the most powerful states. At the Congress of Berlin, Austria and Britain were the winners while Russia and Turkey were the losers. While the general division of winners and losers does reflect relative power, since Austria and Britain had the most powerful militaries, the outcomes were not a result of purely *Realpolitik* reasoning. Moreover, the processes themselves also show that safeguarding power was not the only concern of Austrian and British diplomats, but a genuine desire for the common good.

First, Andr ssy remained faithful to his alliance with the German and Russian leaders throughout the Eastern crisis, and did not threaten war to protect Austrian interests during Russia's advance towards Constantinople. Second, at the Congress, he could have demanded territory for Austria, but he sought economic and political ties, as well as to uphold the idea of sovereignty. Britain, as the most powerful country in Europe at the time also could have entered into a war to secure British interests, particularly since British fleets were waiting for commands in the Marmara. The Turkish army was weak, and the Russian army exhausted by its war efforts for nearly a year. However, the Conservative British government was forced out of its foreign policy of isolation, and decided instead on a European compromise. Popular opinion pushed them, and diplomatic talent enabled them to accomplish this compromise.

The second major realist prediction is that states will try to balance. This prediction does not hold up to scrutiny, particularly when diplomatic relationships are taken into consideration. First, Andrassy's diplomatic skills encouraged Bismarck to side with him instead of Gorchakov even though Austria was regarded as more militarily powerful than Russia. There is often more than one way for states to balance, and Bismarck could have favored either Austria or Russia. During the negotiations, however, the overwhelming goal was to insure European peace as well as Turkish sovereignty and independence, the appeasement of British popular opinion against the

Bulgarian atrocities, and Russian support of pan-Slavism. Thus it was largely diplomatic relationships and a shared worldview that impacted the European position, not the desire to balance. Second, the European Great Powers had already reached a stable balance after the French defeat at the Franco-Prussian war, and the French did not seek revenge on Germany. Thus, despite changes in power and perceived threat, European statesmen and diplomats wanted to keep the status quo. The Eastern Crisis developed during this period of peace, but none of the Western European powers tried to balance against Russian encroachment in the Balkans even though Russia's actions would upset this balance. Rather, their diplomats engaged in negotiations and sought a solution that would benefit the common good of Europe.

In sum, the diplomatic collective, based on a shared worldview of the common European good, had an impact on outcomes. Closely related to this is the third realist variable that states will act as unitary actors. Balance of power was preserved, but not because each state worked for its own independent interest. Diplomatic relationships, procedure, protocol, and transnationalism were important in allowing this to happen.

Bargaining Theory as an Alternative Explanation

This case-study demonstrates throughout the ways in which diplomats did not adhere to state preferences, but a short overview of the evidence is useful here. According to bargaining theory, national governments or states will determine outcomes of international cooperation based on ranked preferences, which will remain stable throughout the negotiations. Disraeli and Queen Victoria, representing the national interests of Britain, firmly believed in the territorial integrity of Turkey. Britain's first preference was to be neutral towards Turkey's behavior in the interest of supporting its autonomy. Its second preference was to go to war with Russia to preserve Turkey's autonomy. Britain was the most powerful, so bargaining theory would predict that one of Britain's top two preferences would be adopted. The outcome, however, was a cooperative agreement among great powers, with no possibility of war. Throughout the negotiation,

Disraeli's preferences were forced to change as domestic and international public opinion expressed anti-Turkish instead of anti-Russian hatred as news spread of the Bulgarian atrocities. Disraeli tried to use Salisbury as a scape-goat to subtly change British preferences, but Salisbury exercised agency against Disraeli's preferences and in favor of the consensus in the diplomatic epistemic community and the Liberal faction at home.

From the Austro-Hungarian perspective, Emperor Francis Joseph and other realists in the government believed that nationalism and the territorial integrity of Turkey did not matter; their main preference was to acquire more land. By contrast, Andrassy's preference won out, and he favored the goal of keeping the status quo while putting down extreme nationalism in Turkey. The Russian Tsar's main preference, guided by Ignatiev, was to support extreme Pan-Slavism. This was not a policy that Austria could agree to, and ultimately Shuvalov, the Russian diplomat, impacted outcomes by siding with his colleagues in their quest for peace at any price. Unlike, the Russian state, his preference was for creating an alliance with Britain, not striving for a Russian victory at the Congress.

In comparison to the seventeenth century, diplomats had more collective agency than previously. Outcomes of international cooperation were not simply the result of relative power or stable national preferences, but a widely shared worldview of the common European good backed up by a stronger epistemic community of diplomats.

The Aftermath of Berlin

The Congress of Berlin enabled Austria, England, and Germany to confront Russia. All were aware of the danger that Russia would pursue a program of isolation, and this was great incentive for the Congress to get underway.³³¹ Russian troops had been positioned in the neighborhood of Constantinople for three months. There were twenty meetings total over the course of one month, June 13 to July 13 1878, though most of the negotiations actually took place

³³¹ Harris. *The Berlin Memorandum*.

beforehand. The results of the Congress were the aversion of large-scale war, the creation of Bulgaria, redrawing of the boundaries in the Balkans, and Austria's increased power. TurkTaylor1975ey was clearly the loser in all of this.

Besides the actual events, the Congress of Berlin, like Westphalia, created important precedence for future diplomatic negotiations. As Mangrove writes, "At Berlin in 1878 the chief states of Europe solidified the conference system by respecting precedents, improving procedure, and solving international problems by collective negotiation."³³² Lacking at this meeting, however, was the creation of an international organization that could provide channels through which the "energy for change could be fueled, controlled, and spent."³³³Mangone1954 The historical scholarship is divided on whether the Congress of Berlin actually accomplished anything or not. It was the eventual breaking of the diplomatic understandings accomplished at Berlin that precipitated the lead up to World War I. Relations were particularly strained between Germany and Russia after the Congress because of Bismarck's decision to side with the Austrians against his longtime ally. It was only in hindsight, however, that the Russians blamed Bismarck for not supporting him, even though at the time they did not question his role as the "honest broker".

Overall, diplomacy of the late nineteenth century had evolved into a much tighter network than in the seventeenth century. Increased bureaucratization enhanced professionalism, and the growing widespread belief in international norms and the common good further increased the cohesion of the diplomatic epistemic community. In action, these diplomats were markedly different from their statesman and sovereign counterparts. At the same time, the line between diplomat and statesman became fuzzy as more and more of the latter tried their hand at diplomacy, albeit as amateurs. Membership in the epistemic community still provided a distinguishing line. Diplomats had much autonomy from the state, but they acted beyond this,

³³² Mangone. *A Short History of International Organization*. p. 56.

³³³ Ibid. p. 57.

and were successful in reaching cooperative outcomes because of their shared relationships and worldviews. It is highly doubtful that a resolution would have been accomplished had the Congress of Berlin been only a summit meeting amongst state leaders. The diplomats, both in and outside of Berlin, made cooperation possible.

Chapter Five

The Early Twentieth Century and The Treaty of Versailles

Climate of the Times

Before the outbreak of war in 1914, Europeans felt confident about their position in the world. They were at the center of scientific and technological progress, trade, and industry. There existed a widespread worldview that peace and prosperity went hand-in-hand with liberalism and European culture, but that war was a legitimate means of accomplishing foreign policy if peaceful means were impossible. Thus, leaders of European states built up their modern military arsenal with the belief that defensive peace and modern weapons would prevent a long war from occurring. They took for granted that wars would be quick, strong, and effective.

With the eventual breakdown of the diplomatic compromises reached at the Congress of Berlin, the countries of Europe, and eventually the United States, entered the Great War of 1914. Prior to the outbreak of war, institutional modernization and professionalization of diplomats continued, but out of necessity these efforts were put aside from 1914 to 1918 in favor of more pressing war matters. As war spread across Europe, diplomats were greatly occupied with helping foreigners who relied on their embassies abroad for assistance. By the end of the war, diplomats expected to emerge from the sidelines and resume their old role of international mediation, and they were more prepared for this than ever before. To their surprise, this was not to be, and the power gained by statesmen during the war in the realm of foreign policy remained largely in the hands of statesmen.

The Supreme War Council, which was comprised of the Allied leaders, continued its existence during the post-war negotiations in another guise, the Supreme Peace Council or Council of Ten. This chapter will show that diplomatic professionalization continued, but growing autonomy did not, and that the status of diplomats fell to its lowest point since their emergence as plenipotentiaries of kings. The result was that the strength of the diplomatic

epistemic community reached a low-point, and as a consequence, their agency as individuals and as a collective was relatively weak.

It was in the aftermath of World War I that European statesmen and society in general perceived “old diplomacy” – referring to the gilded age of the late nineteenth century – as no longer effective, and believed major changes were necessary to prevent future outbreaks on the scale of the Great War of 1914.³³⁴ As a result of this perceived failure and pointed blame, diplomacy after the war was labeled “new diplomacy”, and all of European society hoped that this “newness” would prevent such a war from ever happening again. At the time, “new diplomacy” was intended to refer to a transition from secret to open diplomacy, or the ability for the public to more closely scrutinize the actions taken by plenipotentiaries behind closed doors. In practice, new diplomacy meant that the statesmen took over the role of professional diplomats. Assigning a label, “new diplomacy”, is distinct from actually following through with reforms. In reference to this period, Hamilton and Langhorne write:

The political leaders of the inter-war years too often confused the execution with the making of foreign policy, espoused the principles of the new diplomacy while adopting its techniques to pursue objectives worthy of the old, and through an excess of zeal and want of foresight plunged the world into a war which completed the destruction of the European states system.³³⁵

When the statesmen took over diplomatic functions they could not best the work of professional diplomats. Instead of new diplomacy as open diplomacy, new diplomacy meant “summitry”, defined as direct conferences of statesmen or political leaders, as opposed to negotiation by professional diplomats. Secret diplomacy persisted except the processes of negotiation and cooperation were now in the hands of amateurs.

New means of transportation by rail and steamboat allowed statesmen and foreign ministers to participate in international conferences on an ad hoc basis since the nineteenth century, but summitry really took off during World War I. Politicians ignored the lessons of

³³⁴ Hamilton, and Langhorne. *The Practice of Diplomacy: Its Evolution, Theory and Administration*. p.136.

³³⁵ Ibid. p. 168.

history: direct negotiations by state leaders are rarely successful, and involve a great deal of risk.³³⁶ Nevertheless, at this time statesmen and foreign ministers had legitimacy because of a widespread societal belief that the outbreak of war was evidence itself that international relations by diplomats did not work.³³⁷ The status of diplomats had fallen. Europeans believed that the primary holders of power, the statesmen, had to meet face-to-face to insure outcomes of international cooperation in a democratic and open fashion.

Despite the draw-backs of summitry and amateur diplomacy, face-to-face meetings were easier to organize because of the distinct emergence of a small group of great powers with the relegation of smaller powers to a position of non-influence in international relations. For example, Sweden, which was a European super-power from the seventeenth to the nineteenth century, became a smaller power that preferred not to participate in international disputes. In effect, summitry meant the coordination of only four or five individuals participating in important international decisions.

The World War I period is an important case in the evolution of diplomatic relationships and protocol because it highlights this new direction towards summitry evident in the early twentieth century. In many ways, it represents a low-point in diplomatic agency, and it certainly was a low-point in the level of autonomy and status for the *corps diplomatique*. The fact that the major European countries were more often democracies than in the past shows that democracy, as an indicator of whether diplomats have agency is less important. During this period of *increased* levels of democracy in Europe, diplomats had even *less* autonomy. Another unexpected conclusion, alluded to in the previous chapter, is that the level of technology is also not a significant indicator of whether diplomats have agency. Rather, technology, such as the telegraph or telephone, simply changes the *means* with which diplomacy is practiced, but does not impact the substance. If anything, the telegraph gave diplomats more autonomy to act as instructions

³³⁶ Magalhaes. *The Pure Concept of Diplomacy*.

p. 48. He argues against the efficacy of direct negotiations across history.

³³⁷ Zweig, Stefan. *The World of Yesterday, an Autobiography*. New York: The Viking Press, 1943. p. 223.

were dramatically shortened. Thus, the two variables that stand out in this case are status and, by association, autonomy. The low presence of these factors means that diplomats were restricted by the rules of the game, and as an epistemic community. The story of the negotiations leading to the Treaty of Versailles, and the predominant role of statesmen shows the failure and ineffectiveness of a process in which the *corps diplomatique* largely observed from the sidelines.

The next section provides evidence that the diplomatic epistemic community during the early twentieth century was strong by virtue of social background, training, and meeting frequency, and by extension their shared norms and identity. However, this evidence also shows that their status and autonomy were severely curtailed, and as a result, diplomatic agency was almost non-existent. This analysis is followed by a brief discussion of the lead up to World War I, and the alliance system going into the Paris Peace Conference. The second half of the chapter is dedicated to the negotiations that produced the 1919 Treaty of Versailles, particularly focusing on the division between statesmen and diplomats, and the lack of procedural organization of the conference. I argue here that neo-realist and bargaining theories cannot predict why cooperation failed, but by considering this case as a counter-factual example of diplomatic agency, it is clear why state leaders could not succeed in the way that diplomats had at Westphalia in 1648 and Berlin in 1878.

The Society of Diplomats

European statesmen, led by the guiding principals of United States President Woodrow Wilson, emphasized the need for new openness in diplomatic processes, and national self-determination instead of balance of power. European diplomats, by contrast, continued to focus on the selection, composition, and training of a professional corps that would work effectively and efficiently to conduct international relations through organizational procedure, negotiation, and compromise. The idea of the “professional diplomat” had become such an institution in Europe that government officials emphasized less its emerging role, and more the ways that it

could be ameliorated through reform. In all Western European countries, efforts were made to rethink the diplomatic bureaucracy and propose reforms to the selection process, pay structure, and promotion decisions of the Foreign Service to make it more meritocratic and reflective of society.

However, simultaneous with the professionalization and reforms of the diplomatic corps was the great loss in status and heavy restrictions on autonomy, factors that were largely exogenously driven at this time. Gordon A. Craig writes of the British Foreign Service:

...in the sphere of diplomacy proper, functions formerly reserved to the professional diplomats were farmed out to other departments of the government, while important tasks of negotiation were taken over by political leaders whose new-found enthusiasm for foreign affairs was generally unguided either by training or experience. In consequence, postwar British diplomacy came to be characterized by dangerous defects of coordination, as well as by a high degree of amateurishness, imprecision, and feckless opportunism. These faults of technique were directly related to the inadequacies of British policy in the interbellum period, a period which, it need hardly be added is in little danger of being regarded by future historians as one in which British statesmanship distinguished itself.³³⁸

Craig's distrust of politicians echoes the sentiments of many before, most prominently, Phillipe de Commines, a professional diplomat of the middle ages, who warned that direct negotiation among monarchs always made any situation worse, and enhanced bitterness between the parties where friendship may have persisted.³³⁹ The figurative suffocation of the diplomatic corps was coupled with an attitude among some members of the *corps diplomatique* that they actually *should* step aside during times of war to let exigencies of grand strategy take precedence. When increasingly non-diplomatic representatives began to take over their role during World War I, for the most part they did not protest. However, after the war, during the negotiations of the Treaty of Versailles diplomats expected to resume their traditional role of mediation and negotiation, the role they had worked hard to acquire up to 1914 through their own professionalization.

The post-war period was also in many ways a continuation of pre-war diplomacy, particularly in terms of the development of a transnational *corps diplomatique*. M.S. Anderson

³³⁸ Craig, Gordon A., and Felix Gilbert. *The Diplomats: 1919-1939*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1953. p. 17.

³³⁹ Magalhaes. *The Pure Concept of Diplomacy*. pp. 33-4.

argues, “The nineteenth and twentieth centuries saw the continuation of trends already clearly visible – a consolidation of the network of diplomatic links between the European states and a further growth and elaboration of foreign offices.”³⁴⁰ In addition, there was a definite move towards involvement of non-diplomatic actors in traditional diplomatic roles ever since the Congress of Berlin. The emerging phenomenon of the politician-diplomat, observed at the Berlin Congress, was precipitated during World War I. Indeed, many elite decision makers heralded the end of the gilded age of the career diplomat. The glamorous, high-powered lifestyle diplomats were known for in the past was now referred to as laziness.

What these profits of doom failed to recognize, however, is that the diplomats’ demise lay only in their treatment by statesmen and society and not through any failing in the profession itself. In fact, the inklings of professionalism and transnationalism observed in the seventeenth century and partially achieved by the nineteenth century had nearly reached fruition in the early twentieth century. After three centuries of gradual evolution, many diplomats were selected and promoted based on merit, received extensive education prior to selection and training on-the-job, had a regularized system of pay, and were increasingly specialized. The statesmen who sought to phase out the professional diplomat were incomparably less prepared for the tasks than those they sought to replace. Alongside greater bureaucratization and standardization, norms of ceremonial and precedence experienced a decline. The time expended on pomp and processions, and the anxiety associated with these practices decreased, but did not disappear from major events.

To what extent was professional diplomacy in the early twentieth century a meritocratic ideal? Did the qualities of a diplomat expressed by de Callières in the seventeenth century still hold weight? How widespread were the transnational professional norms of protocol and precedence and how did they change? Addressing these questions alongside the issue of state encroachment on diplomatic autonomy will help establish the strength of the epistemic community in the early twentieth century.

³⁴⁰ Anderson, *The Rise of Modern Diplomacy 1450-1919*, p. 103.

Bureaucratization and Professionalization

Bismarck was one of the most powerful leaders of the Foreign Service, and despite establishing a more professionalized and bureaucratic system preferred to keep the reins of control in his own hands. With the fall of Bismarck in 1890 and the rise of William II to power in Germany, German diplomats gained greater independence. They followed Bismarck's instructions in the late nineteenth century, but only occasionally followed William's instructions who would rule sporadically. Lamar Cecil argues that under Bismarck, diplomats were obedient because of their respect and admiration for him, but under William II, they were obedient as servants of the state.³⁴¹

Bismarck was not unlike Napoleon in terms of his relationship with the diplomatic corps, and his role in its professionalization. With a weak leadership, and loosening of the procedural and structural safeguards created earlier, there was a decline in professionalization. It was so noticeable that people outside of the government apparatus criticized the changes in the corps. Professionalization, however, does not go hand-in-hand with autonomy. After 1890, the diplomatic corps reverted to a style of operation similar to that of 1871, but throughout this rise and fall of professionalization, diplomats lacked autonomy. As Cecil describes it:

Those who serve the state as bureaucrats possess an influence on policy only when the circumstances in which they hold their offices enable them to express their opinions freely and to have some measure of independence on acting on those ideas.... From 1871 to 1914, the German diplomatic service did not function under such conditions, for throughout the period its members both in Berlin and in the field were, with few exceptions, not trusted lieutenants but rather orderlies of superior figures who allowed them little independence and who often dismissed their opinions as irrelevant or useless.³⁴²

³⁴¹ Cecil, Lamar. *The German Diplomatic Service, 1871-1914*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976. p. 322.

³⁴² Ibid. p. 320.

Professionalization had opposing impacts on diplomats. It held diplomats to stricter rules to follow thereby decreasing their autonomy, but also gave them more legitimacy as an important governmental arm which tended to increase their role abroad.

There were two major changes to the bureaucracy of the foreign services in Europe. First, reforms were introduced and seriously pursued as a means of making the diplomatic corps more meritocratic and open to a wider circle of potential applicants. Second, and somewhat as a consequence of this, the foreign office as the home-base for diplomats, started to more firmly assert a separation from the mainstream civil service. While bureaucratization in the early to mid-nineteenth century gave more power to the foreign office as the foreign policy arm of the state, bureaucratization in the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries increasingly separated the foreign office from the state and state bureaucracy bringing it closer to the diplomatic service. Thus, in contrast to the late nineteenth century, the foreign office during the early twentieth century was less a part of the definition of the state, and more a part of the foreign or diplomatic service. This meant that diplomats had a stronger bureaucratic apparatus at home to support their work abroad.

The foreign services in Europe, for the most part, increased only slightly in size during the turn of the century. There was a marked acceleration in this increase starting from around 1904. For example in France, there were 70 diplomats in 1814, 90 in 1870, and 170 by 1914.³⁴³ In Britain, there were still fewer than 150 career diplomats by 1914. Some countries, like Holland, Denmark, and Sweden and the Swiss cantons did not want to participate in international conflicts, and had decreasing numbers of diplomats. There were only 20 Danish diplomats in 1914.³⁴⁴ In comparison to today, foreign services were very small except for the notable exception of a growth in overseas missions, especially in Asia and Africa. At the same time, there was massive growth in other sectors of the bureaucratic structure of the state, so the

³⁴³ Anderson. *The Rise of Modern Diplomacy 1450-1919*. p. 110.

³⁴⁴ Steiner, Zara S. *The Foreign Office and Foreign Policy, 1898-1914*. London: The Ashfield Press, 1969. p. 174.

diplomatic corps was relatively small among government institutions. International business, competition, and alliances meant that the realm of foreign policy was greater, so despite the small size of the corps diplomats had more work to do. As women were allowed to enter the work force as secretaries, diplomats of lower ranks were free to do more of the substantive work, and many more of them had decision-making authority to deal with many new issues. The leisure of the ‘five o’clock tea’ was no longer a part of the office culture, as in the late nineteenth century.

Naturally, bureaucratization and professionalization progressed at slightly different paces across countries. In Britain in the early twentieth century, diplomats were still paid less than was necessary to support their lifestyles. Until 1908, diplomats from Great Britain, Austria-Hungary, Germany, Russia, and Italy were required to have a personal income to support their lives as diplomats. After 1908, the requirement was abolished in Germany (although this reform was ultimately ignored), but everywhere, diplomats still needed to supply a portion of their funds. In fact, German diplomats were paid more than other bureaucrats, but less than their counterparts in foreign countries. The chart below shows the various gradations in salary according to rank in Britain. It is interesting to note that only the British Ambassador in Berlin could live entirely off of his government paycheck as the events of World War I approached.³⁴⁵

Table 1 Salary according to rank for British Diplomats

Attachés (two years)	£0
Third Secretaries	£150
Second Secretaries	£200
First Secretaries	£300
Counsellors	£500-£1,000
Paris Embassy	£11,500
Berlin Embassy	£8,000
Rome Embassy	£7,000

The early twentieth century is distinctive from the late nineteenth century for the much more focused efforts at bureaucratic reform. The diplomatic profession was regarded as fully

³⁴⁵ Ibid. p. 175.

formalized, and it was now possible to turn a critical eye to its practices. Reformers suggested that the elite *corps* should be more open to those talented individuals below the upper echelons of society. In 1905-6 reforms were passed in the British diplomatic service stipulating that there would be a new division of labor between intellectual and mechanical types of work, and more of the responsibility of the Permanent Under-Secretary would be shared with junior clerks.³⁴⁶ Another important effort for reform was abolishment of the property qualification. Of course, in a round-about way this rule would eventually lead to the requirement that diplomats earn higher salaries so that they could survive on government support alone.

On September 29, 1916 the British Foreign Office submitted a plan to the Treasury for improving salaries.³⁴⁷ However, the two British bureaucracies had opposing goals. The leaders of the Foreign Office strove to maintain their degree of independence from the central bureaucracy, while the Treasury, along with the British government, sought to encourage further integration of the FO with the Civil Service. The Treasury department rejected the reform proposal. It would have to be convinced of the need to augment all Civil Service salaries, and not simply those of diplomats. Thus, in the early twentieth century one observes the continuing competitive relationship between the diplomats and the Foreign Office, as well as a newer phenomenon of competition of the FO with the rest of the British bureaucracy. The Foreign Office had developed a degree of specialization in foreign affairs that distinguished it from the main Civil Service. The diplomats, however, needed to be paid even more than the members of the Foreign Office to sustain a more costly life abroad, and the necessary entertaining that went along with it.

Many other reforms were submitted and debated. In Britain, there were reforms of the lower ranks, promotion procedures, the role of secretaries, the grading of archivists, general reorganization, and reforms governing the relationship between the Foreign Office and the

³⁴⁶ Maisel, Ephraim. *The Foreign Office and Foreign Policy, 1919-1926*. Brighton, UK: Sussex Academic Press, 1994. p. 12.

³⁴⁷ *Ibid.* p. 14.

Foreign Service. These reforms were aimed at creating a more meritocratic system and dealing with the rapidly increasing work-load while still operating within a constricted budget. The MacDonnell Commission was particularly important in terms of reforms in the immediate pre-war period. This Commission was one of several, and it impacted recruiting procedures through a detailed statistical analysis of the education and social background of applicants. The conclusion was that an open examination was insufficient to test applicants, and a better plan would be to make the diplomatic service a sub-division of the civil service, and fall under the same testing system. In addition, it recommended that officers from various offices should be allowed interchangeability, the flexibility to transfer to other offices. The commission again recommended the abolishment of the property qualification along with the system of unpaid attachés, thus allowing potential diplomats who were not independently wealthy to have a chance at the Foreign Service. As Raymond A. Jones argues, “What was envisaged was a future with wider opportunities for fewer but more able diplomats.”³⁴⁸ Soon the war overtook these plans for reforms, and the suggestions of the MacDonnell Commission were left aside until after the war.

The French government’s approach to improving the Foreign Service was an exception because the status of diplomats had not declined as much as in other European countries. There was far less suspicion of diplomatic activities particularly because the events at the Paris Peace Conference convinced the French of the importance of maintaining the Entente alliance through a more professional Quai d’Orsay. After 1919, there were practically no bureaucratic reforms pursued in France, but according to a 1920 Chamber of Deputies report there was an expressed desire to strengthen the role of diplomats, and continue to improve their quality and training.³⁴⁹ There was a clear need for concrete reform in terms of diplomatic salaries as the declining value of the *franc* meant that efforts at meritocratic recruiting were still hampered by the wealth prerequisite. Substantial efforts at reform did not occur in France until 1932.

³⁴⁸ Jones, Raymond A. *The British Diplomatic Service 1815-1914*. Waterloo, Ontario: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1983. p. 171.

³⁴⁹ Craig, and Gilbert. *The Diplomats: 1919-1939*. p. 50.

There was one exception, which was the creation of the post of permanent Secretary General, occupied by Philippe Berthelot, whose role it was to coordinate all levels of diplomacy, and operations within the Quai d'Orsay. Besides the obviously centralizing nature of this new post, the aim was to make the Foreign Service less susceptible to changes in political leadership, and to maintain the traditions of diplomacy. Thus, like in Britain, the French Diplomatic Service and Quai d'Orsay had a greater degree of separation from politics, bringing the foreign office and diplomatic corps closer together. The authority of the new Secretary General would balance the power of the Premier who typically held the post of Minister of Foreign Affairs.³⁵⁰ Despite the closer definition of the Foreign Office with the diplomats, the autonomy of French diplomats during the negotiations themselves was just as severely curtailed as diplomats from other European countries. Even before the outbreak of war the autonomy of diplomats was decreasing while alongside this, professionalization continued. Thus, the early twentieth century marks a separation of the twin trajectories of professionalization and autonomy.

Social Background and Training

Diplomats were increasingly drawn from the commoners while the number of those from the aristocracy experienced a decline. In Britain from 1860 to 1914, the percentage of aristocrats fell from 52 percent to less than 40 percent, and the percentage of commoners rose from 43 percent to more than 60 percent.³⁵¹ The principal of democratic representation in the political elite meant that the composition of the corps more closely reflected the composition of the general population. However, in all Western European countries the level of democratic selection and promotion of the diplomatic corps tended to reflect the level of democracy in each country, which was not very high compared to today's standards.³⁵² Many children of diplomats were drawn to the profession as were children of parents in the military to political sectors. In

³⁵⁰ Ibid. p. 51.

³⁵¹ Jones. *The British Diplomatic Service 1815-1914*, p. 139.

³⁵² Anderson. *The Rise of Modern Diplomacy 1450-1919*, p. 121.

Germany, where there was a large aristocratic class; 10 percent more of the diplomatic service was drawn from the nobility than in Britain.³⁵³ Only Third Republic France had fewer aristocratic diplomats than in Britain. Around 45 percent of French diplomats were nobles between 1870 and 1914.

It is thus clear that the diplomatic service was still largely drawn from wealthier classes. Ironically, the more successful a diplomat became, the more he depleted his own wealth as it became increasingly necessary to provide entertainment and maintain a lifestyle comparable to his position. Cecil argues, “The burden of entertainment worsened after the turn of the century, and Foreign Office officials noted that the mounting taste for luxury of the *belle époque* as well as the increased cost of living in metropolitan centers was out-pricing the means of even wealthy diplomats.”³⁵⁴ In a kind of copy-cat effect, the more one country’s diplomat displayed a luxurious life-style, the more the other countries’ diplomats had to follow suit.

Education was also a good indicator of social status among early twentieth century British diplomats. The great majority of diplomats attended Eton, and around 57 percent of diplomats received a university education. Most went to Oxford or Cambridge, just as their American counterparts were largely drawn from Harvard University, and French diplomats were from the *Ecole Libre des Sciences Politiques*. Of the 192 new French diplomats between 1907 and 1927, 153 were educated at *Ecole Libre*.³⁵⁵ The propensity to select diplomats from the same university led to a natural collegiality in the diplomatic corps. However, a university education was still not a requirement for the entrance examinations, which focused on foreign language fluency. Prospective diplomats would travel to Germany and France for a year or two to acquire their language skills. Upon their return, instead of attending university, British diplomats would take an examination preparation course at Scoone’s crammer.³⁵⁶

³⁵³ Cecil. *The German Diplomatic Service, 1871-1914*.

³⁵⁴ Ibid. p. 49.

³⁵⁵ Sharp, Walter. *French Civil Service: Bureaucracy in Transition*. New York, 1931. p. 12.

³⁵⁶ Jones. *The British Diplomatic Service 1815-1914*. p. 143.

These qualifying exams across European countries had age restrictions, usually somewhere between 18 and 25, and covered numerous subjects and skills. For example, dictations, translations, oral, and written exams in foreign languages, as well as geography, history, orthography, and précis writing were commonly tested in Britain for a position as an unpaid attaché. A further exam was required for promotion to a paid attaché position. The second exam tested the language, religion, and culture of the country where the new attaché would serve, the commercial and political foreign policy of that country, and general international law.³⁵⁷ In fact, the exam was so difficult that applicant scores were exceptionally poor. In Germany as well diplomats had to pass numerous requirements for entrance and promotion in the diplomatic service. Mainly, they had to be at least 25 years of age, and a German citizen. Connections were still a useful factor, as well as a legacy of family members in the corps. From 1871 to 1914 in Germany there were 24 diplomat fathers with 29 diplomat sons, and some families boasted three generations in the corps.³⁵⁸ Lamar Cecil concludes, “As a result, the imperial diplomatic corps was an assemblage of men of real ability in some cases, of little other than luminous lineage in others.”³⁵⁹

Despite the wealth requirement, in Britain, the selection process was more open than in the late nineteenth century. A Board of Selection was established in 1907, and candidates were permitted to take an entrance exam when they were between the ages of 22 and 25 as long as they had an official nomination.³⁶⁰ Subsequently, the private secretary had the power to promote and transfer diplomats. Eventually, there arose in Britain a reform effort to standardize the diplomatic exam system with that of the general civil service. This idea met with much resistance because diplomats recognizably had a different set of tasks to deal with than domestic bureaucrats. Eventually, in 1905 Lord Lansdowne decided to make diplomats and members of the Foreign

³⁵⁷ Ibid. p. 159.

³⁵⁸ Cecil. *The German Diplomatic Service, 1871-1914*. p. 21.

³⁵⁹ Ibid.

³⁶⁰ Steiner. *The Foreign Office and Foreign Policy, 1898-1914*.

Office take the Class I examination of the civil service. By doing this, the university requirement became necessary, and the emphasis on foreign languages was lowered. Before 1907, 60% of the entering diplomats were not university educated, and after 1907 this was true for only 15%.³⁶¹

In Germany a university education was standard, and from 1871 to 1914 just under one-third of the 548 diplomats had a doctor juris degree.³⁶² The first exam for an aspiring German diplomat tested legal knowledge. Besides the grueling eight hour oral exam covering such topics as European history since 1648, domestic and international constitutional law, international economy, political geography, and finance, candidates were closely judged for their social skills. This high degree of common knowledge and skills among the corps contributed to their sense of common identity. Bismarck left behind a tradition of diplomats who possessed social graces, good appearance, the ability to hold alcohol, and to easily engage in conversations. Prince Karl Max von Lichnowsky, who was chancellor from 1899 to 1904, was also concerned with the ability of candidates to fit in with a shared “social culture” and possess a comfort with *usage du monde*.

Qualifying exams were an important part of selection, and a source of great anxiety and preparation, however, diplomats were still often appointed to positions. Before, appointments were based exclusively on patronage and political connections, but in the early twentieth century, merit and career accomplishments increasingly had to be taken into consideration.³⁶³

In France, most of the major posts abroad were filled with professional diplomats, but the Foreign Minister would on rare occasion make ambassadorial appointments. The French tended to value professionalism much more than in other democratic countries. There were fewer

³⁶¹ Jones. *The British Diplomatic Service 1815-1914*. p. 168.

³⁶² Cecil. *The German Diplomatic Service, 1871-1914*. p. 27.

³⁶³ King Edward was easily swayed by personalities and networking relationships. After 1901 many of the diplomatic appointments were based on personal friendships with the King. For example, Charles Hardinge and Francis Bertie were known to exploit their relationship with the King to secure appointments that they wanted. Lord Hardinge used his influence with the King to get an appointment in London in 1903, and gain a more influential position at Court. He was later appointed to St. Petersburg in February 1904, and Bertie got a Paris appointment in August of the same year.

appointments, a greater recruitment of non-aristocrats, and even the advisory staff of the Minister of Foreign Affairs was a selected group of professional diplomats. However, in the post-war years, like in other countries, diplomats abroad were given less and less autonomy to make on-the-spot decisions.³⁶⁴ They continued to send policy suggestions back to Paris based on their specific knowledge and opinions, but they were consistently ignored. With Hitler's eventual rise to power, this disregard for the opinions and autonomy of professional diplomats had dire consequences.

Meeting Frequency and Technology

Meeting frequency had not changed much since the late nineteenth century. Diplomats from the same country met together often, but meetings with their foreign counterparts were less common. Bilateral meetings in major capitals took place, but multilateral meetings were reserved primarily for treaty negotiations, such as the Paris Peace Conference. The quality of meetings was affected by the somewhat shorter time periods that a diplomat would remain in one place, the lower professional status, and external criticism of the *corps*. Thus, cultivated relationships in one locale were of a shorter duration and dealt with less significant matters.

Appointments to an embassy were much shorter than in the late nineteenth century, with the average time around 4 years and 10 months.³⁶⁵ In the past, these appointments were often ten to twenty years. Odo Russell, for example, served for thirteen years in one place. One reason for this was the greater flexibility to make lateral transfers between the Foreign Office and the Foreign Service, particularly in Britain and France. Also, the age of the heads of embassies was younger. Between 1900 and 1914 the average age of the nine appointed ambassadors was fifty-

³⁶⁴ In Britain, the autonomy granted to individual diplomats declined since its high-point in the late nineteenth century, but diplomats sent to smaller countries had more autonomy than others. For example, the British ambassadors in Peking, Morocco, Persia, and Tokyo had more autonomy than those in Paris, Berlin, and Vienna. While interesting theories may be drawn about the relationship between autonomy and distance from the capital, regional European diplomacy was not affected by this.

³⁶⁵ Jones. *The British Diplomatic Service 1815-1914*. p. 196.

four. In France, the highest positions in the Quai d'Orsay were reserved only for diplomats who had served abroad, and returned to Paris with a distinguished record of representing France.³⁶⁶ Despite the continued small size of the diplomatic corps, the epistemic community expanded in membership by virtue of more meritocratic selection processes and job interchangeability within the governmental apparatus.

The telephone was the telegraph of the early twentieth century, but just like the telegraph, and internet today, widespread usage did not fundamentally change the nature of the diplomatic profession. Hamilton and Langhorne argue:

The statesman-diplomat had of course long been a feature of international politics. Yet there was during the inter-war years a quickening in the pace and tempo of ministerial diplomacy. ... None of this can be explained simply by reference to improved and faster methods of communication.³⁶⁷

M.S. Anderson agrees with Hamilton and Langhorne arguing that the telegraph did not tilt the balance in favor of inflexible orders, but meant that instructions were short, and required individual initiative on the part of the diplomats. In France, diplomats scorned the use of the telephone, telegraph, and typewriter as if the technology still had not proven its utility.³⁶⁸ Face-to-face meetings were still highly valued, and a part of the professional protocol of diplomatic negotiation. Statesmen and diplomats typically traveled by train or steam ship to attend multilateral conferences, at the same time demonstrating their respect for the status of other diplomats and for the tradition of face-to-face diplomatic negotiation.

Status

As mentioned earlier, status declined significantly during this period. The supposed failure of diplomacy to prevent the Great War was a big factor. There was also the ongoing negative image associated with secret diplomacy and foreignness. Practically since the

³⁶⁶ Craig, and Gilbert. *The Diplomats: 1919-1939*. p. 58.

³⁶⁷ Hamilton, and Langhorne. *The Practice of Diplomacy: Its Evolution, Theory and Administration*. p. 167.

³⁶⁸ Craig, and Gilbert. *The Diplomats: 1919-1939*. p. 60.

emergence of the profession, diplomats were regarded with suspicion or were thought to be spies because of the long periods of time spent overseas, but the Great War reinforced this perception. To a certain extent in the early twentieth century, status also experienced a decline because of democratization which worked against the previously aristocratic tendency of the Foreign Service.

The status *within* the Foreign Service community was weighted towards the political division. In Germany, an officer of the Political Division was known to interact with the highest officials in the Wilhelmstrasse directly. Lamar Cecil writes, “So great was the repute of the division that a counselor with long service there regarded being appointed minister to a minor German state as a demotion, while an envoy reassigned to Berlin considered being placed in any section other than the Political Division a similarly deplorable fate.”³⁶⁹ The political division was not required to share information with the other divisions, and served as the direct liaison with the diplomats. In Germany, diplomats were required to spend some time serving in the political division before receiving their assignments abroad. According to Bismarck, this enabled the domestic and foreign branches of the Foreign Service to become more compatible. In Germany, each newly hired diplomat would be assigned to a Foreign Office political officer who would orientate him to the Wilhelmstrasse. Upon receiving his post abroad, the new diplomat would then be assigned to the particular political officer in charge of the same geographical region. This counselor would be an important domestic contact, and would monitor the diplomat’s assignments, quality of work, and behavior.³⁷⁰

Nevertheless, the political officers of the Foreign Office had a slightly lower status than the diplomats, who were required to have a more in-depth knowledge of foreign languages and political systems. The Foreign Office, in turn, had a higher status than other divisions of the Civil Service. In sum, the overall status of diplomats had fallen, but political diplomats still had a

³⁶⁹ Cecil. *The German Diplomatic Service, 1871-1914*. p. 9.

³⁷⁰ *Ibid.* p. 11.

higher status compared to other governmental divisions, and this gave the transnational European corps a sense of shared identity and prestige.

Another European norm shared among diplomats was that they all tended to have transnational worldviews, and a clear sense of belonging to international society. M.S. Anderson argues:

High and assured social status helped to keep diplomats, especially high-ranking ones, as in the past distinctly cosmopolitan in outlook. The aristocracies which ruled so much of Europe could still see themselves even in 1914 as in some sense parts of a social order which transcended national boundaries. They were united across these dividing-lines by fundamental similarities of outlook and often of education.³⁷¹

Thus, growing professionalization and meritocracy did not detract from transnational ties, norms, and shared identity. Since most European foreign services engaged in reforms around the same time, the diplomats in the field still found that they had much in common. They were all subject to new entrance exams, education requirements, and training. They all experienced a gradual loosening of aristocratic and wealth requirements. Although they spent a smaller number of years in any given location abroad, they did this together, and were more likely to see someone they worked with in one country again in another country. High status of diplomats within the bureaucracy meant that they were together regarded as the governmental elite, despite falling status in the outside world.

Paradiplomacy and Amateur Diplomats

Inter-allied conferences of diplomats were numerous during the war. At the same, non-diplomatic representatives practicing “paradiplomacy”, defined as non-professionalized diplomacy, were in some cases considered more effective than traditional ambassadors. For the first time since before the Treaty of Westphalia, quasi-diplomacy reached a new popularity, and government called upon individuals with specific expertise to perform the job of diplomats. At the Paris Peace Conference, for example, the British Treasury, not the Foreign Office, sent

³⁷¹ Anderson, *The Rise of Modern Diplomacy 1450-1919*, p. 121.

representatives to attend the reparation commission. The attitude was that if old school diplomats could not deliver, leaders would not hesitate to rely on less traditional representatives.³⁷²

Reforms in the British Foreign Service introduced the “principle of interchangeability”, which contributed in a significant way to the employment of amateurs in overseas missions. Interchangeability meant that those who worked in the Foreign Office could become diplomats and vice versa. The result was that the overall quality and expertise of diplomats fell as non-experts were allowed to go out into the field with no prior knowledge of the diplomatic role overseas.

Defining the State: Propaganda, Publicity, and Public Opinion

Besides a lack of skill at professional negotiation, public opinion hampered politicians who were constantly striving to gain its support. Because the world was divided into two blocs, it was easy to identify who “the other” was and portray this group as the enemy. Public opinion was clearly more significant to foreign offices than in the past, and it was one of the prime factors driving governments to limit the autonomy of professional diplomats.³⁷³ Many created information *bureaux* within the FO like the Ministry of Information and Political Intelligence Unit, and some FOs employed Press Attachés. These various offices kept track of how newspapers reported events domestically and abroad, disseminated reports to diplomats, and sometimes attempted to spin the news themselves to impact public opinion. Increasingly, statesmen cared about how their policies and political stances were regarded abroad. Pressuring other countries’ domestic opinion was a means of indirectly impacting their foreign policies.

The role of public opinion was not really significant until the very end of the nineteenth century, and was still not a great concern in the early twentieth century, particularly compared to the late twentieth century. During the Great War, leaders were increasingly concerned with

³⁷² Hamilton, and Langhorne. *The Practice of Diplomacy: Its Evolution, Theory and Administration*. pp. 246-147.

³⁷³ See Strang, Lord. *The Foreign Office*. London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1957. p. 35.

public opinion, and tried to use propaganda through film and cinema to tilt it in their favor. When ideas of Wilsonianism and “open diplomacy” were spread among the European populace, it became more of an important consideration for statesmen working on foreign policy. While public opinion impacted the climate of the times and the processes of governmental decision-making, it only indirectly impacted diplomatic processes. In essence, public opinion became part of the definition of the state. So it was encompassed in instructions to diplomats, and provided a tight cage from which statesmen had to operate.

The Lead up to World War I

At the start of the First World War, France, Great Britain, and Russia were allies in the Triple Entente, and Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy were allies in the Triple Alliance. The members of the two blocs tried to maintain an equilibrium or balance of power, and they were willing to engage in military action to maintain it. Around the time when Otto von Bismarck retired from his Chancellorship in 1890, the balance began to fall apart. A second, then third Balkan crisis posed a threat to the precarious balance. In particular, the statesmen of the Austro-Hungarian Empire were looking for an excuse to go to war with Serbia, as they were concerned about increasing anti-Austro-Hungarian sentiment. In 1914, Serbian teenager Gavrilo Princip assassinated the Austro-Hungarian heir, Francis Ferdinand and his consort, which led to a domino effect of international conflict.

The war between Austria and Serbia grew to an all out world war in large part because of the alliance system. Each had to come to the other’s aid and they were all bound by treaties to do so. Austrian leaders blamed the assassination on a Serbian conspiracy, and issued an ultimatum that could not be met without a complete loss of Serbian independence. This was the excuse they needed to attack Serbia. Austrian leaders declared war on Serbia on July 28, 1914, and Russia mobilized its forces two days later. In response to Russia’s actions, German leaders mobilized their troops and declared war first on Russia (August 1, 1914) and then on France (August 3,

1914). France was an ally of Russia, and the German Plan was to march through Belgium, violating Belgian neutrality, to get to France, and then to turn around and engage Russia. Great Britain entered the war a few days later declaring war on Germany as its army entered Belgian territory.

The freedom of the US was born out of European rivalries, chiefly that of France and Britain. In addition, Britain controlled the oceans ever since 1815. The US entered the war in large part because the defeat of the European Allies would mean that the Atlantic shores would be controlled by German domination.³⁷⁴ In addition, Germany's indiscriminate attacks on ships caused many American merchant vessels to suffer attacks as well. In the summer of 1918, it became apparent to the leaders of Germany and Austria-Hungary that they could not win the war. On January 8, 1918, US President Woodrow Wilson made his "Fourteen Points" speech to Congress, and on October 3 Prince Max Von Baden, the German Chancellor, contacted Wilson to request an armistice based on the Fourteen Points.

The Negotiations

Well over 1,040 delegates and 70 plenipotentiaries from 32 countries met from January 12 to June 1919 in Paris to try to reach a compromise on the conditions of peace in Europe.³⁷⁵ Each of the Great Powers had five plenipotentiaries, and the smaller powers had between one and three depending on size and stake in the war. The negotiations continued for some time after these crucial six months, but the Treaty of Versailles, signed on June 28, 1919 contained the most important decisions regarding Germany. The primary participants were statesmen representing the victors of the war. These were Premier Georges Clemenceau of France, Prime Minister

³⁷⁴ Hajo Holborn, "World War, World Settlement and the Aftermath," in Lederer, Ivo J., ed. *The Versailles Settlement: Was It Foredoomed to Failure?* Edited by Ralph W. Greenlaw, *Problems in European Civilization*. Boston: D.C. Heath and Company, 1960.

³⁷⁵ Temperley, H.M.V. *A History of the Peace Conference of Paris*. 2 vols. Vol. 1. London: Oxford University Press, 1920. Footnote p. 245. This figure is from the French official *Composition et Fonctionnement* of April 1, 1919 counting the number of delegates, not including plenipotentiaries. It was not a complete count.

David Lloyd George of Great Britain, Prime Minister Vittorio Emanuele Orlando of Italy, President Woodrow Wilson of the United States, and occasionally, Makino of Japan. They each brought with them to Paris their foreign secretaries (Pichon of France, Balfour of Great Britain, Lansing of the US, Sonnino of Italy, and Chinda of Japan), hundreds of technical experts, and professional diplomats. Many other European and non-European states who were less involved in the war were also present at the negotiations, but the Allies excluded the defeated powers of Germany, Austria-Hungary, the Ottoman Empire, and Soviet Russia from the negotiations.

Table 2: Major Attendees at the Paris Peace Conference

Country	Politicians	Foreign Secretaries	Diplomats
France	Georges Clemenceau (PM)	Pichon	Jules Cambon André Tardieu Philippe Berthelot
Great Britain	David Lloyd George (PM) & Philip Kerr (personal secretary)	A.J. Balfour	Lord Charles Hardinge Sir Eyre Crowe James Headlam-Morley William Tyrrell
United States	Woodrow Wilson (President) & Colonel Edward M. House (personal aid)	Lansing	Dr. Sidney E. Mezes Harold Nicolson Christian A. Herter Charles Seymour
Italy	Orlando	Sonnino	
Japan	Makino	Chinda	
<i>Non-Attendee: Germany</i>	<i>Matthias Erzberger</i>	<i>Brockdorff-Rantzau</i>	<i>Kurt von Lersner</i>

The Council of Ten (a.k.a. Supreme Peace Council) was the original primary decision-making body at Paris, and it was an outgrowth and continuation of the Supreme War Council which held inter-allied meetings during the course of the war. The development of the Supreme War Council, largely attended by premiers, later provided the framework for the armistice and peace negotiations. F.S. Marston argues, “By the autumn of 1918, therefore, there had developed practices of consultation that were greatly to influence the form of the peace negotiations, and in the background was an elaborate organization of executive control.”³⁷⁶ The four major allies were members of the Supreme War Council, and gradually the United States began to take part so

³⁷⁶ Marston, F.S. *The Peace Conference of 1919: Organization and Procedure*. London: Oxford University Press, 1944. p. 10.

that there was no question that the US would continue to be involved in the peace negotiations. Following the war-time framework, the Council of Ten included the five premiers and their foreign secretaries.

Also in the room were their advisors, experts, and secretaries, and occasionally representatives of other countries would be invited to join in bringing the daily total attendance of the Council of Ten to over 30 individuals. The main disadvantages resulting from this set-up were inefficiency of progress and daily leaks to the press. It was inefficient because of the emphasis on holding informal “conversations” on irrelevant issues instead of formal negotiations, and ad hoc decision making instead of following an agenda. The lack of secrecy meant that there could be political repercussions for each opinion expressed by the plenipotentiaries. The system of circulation of printed copies of meeting minutes and decisions no doubt added to the lack of secrecy.³⁷⁷ On March 25, 1919 it was informally announced in the press that the Big Four (Wilson, Lloyd George, Clemenceau, and Orlando) would from then on meet privately in a Council of Four, with the Foreign Ministers forming a separate Council of Five. The secretariat of the Council of Ten, consisting of Henri Dutasta as Principal Secretary-General along with Mr. Grew, Count Aldrovandi, Saburi was essentially defunct, and Sir Maurice Hankey was informally appointed as the Secretary to the Council of Four. The system of printing and circulating the meeting minutes was abandoned at first then severely limited.³⁷⁸ Thus, pressure from public opinion and the press subsided for a while, until it was unleashed in full force with the eventual dissemination of the draft treaty.

Many scholars focus on the role of the Big Four (or Three as Orlando was in a subordinate position and at times withdrew) to the neglect of the diplomats who were also present in great numbers behind the scenes. The reason for this neglect, however, is somewhat justified

³⁷⁷ Temperley. *A History of the Peace Conference of Paris*. pp. 250-1.

³⁷⁸ The translator present at Council of Four meetings did manage to provide a thorough text of the meetings post-facto. Mantoux, Paul. *The Deliberations of the Council of Four (March 24-June 28, 1919)*. Translated by Arthur S. Link. 2 vols. Vol. I. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992.

as the status and autonomy of diplomats had fallen dramatically. Although many diplomats were present at the negotiations there was a divide between diplomats and non-diplomats, and this division was a great theme throughout the conference. Lovin argues:

This created an undercurrent of competitive activity at the conference between those who believed in traditional diplomacy and wanted to save its traditions and strengthen its position and those who believed diplomatic decisions had to be responsive to the public will and that the foreign service needed to be altered to include non-diplomatic types.³⁷⁹

There are many scholarly works expounding upon the mistakes made at the Paris conference, and how the statesmen fell short of accomplishing their goals. Another way of looking at these failures is to realize the ways in which the statesmen fell short of accomplishing what professional diplomats might have produced in their stead. The case study of the Versailles negotiations represents an empirical counter-factual to the other cases examined in this book.

There are numerous reasons why the Treaty of Versailles failed, but several stand out more than others. First and foremost, no one followed a preliminary plan or organization for the conference. Second, once the negotiators met in Paris, they did not know whether they were negotiating a final or preliminary treaty. Third, they did not know whether Germany would participate in the Congress or sign an imposed treaty. Finally, the negotiators as statesmen were oppressively hampered by the expected reaction of public opinion.³⁸⁰ All of these issues are connected to a fundamental lack of process and procedure, and all could have been eliminated had diplomats presided at the negotiations. The remainder of this chapter deals with this argument in more depth; then looks at the interaction of diplomats and statesmen of Great Britain, France, the US, and Germany at the negotiations, and the extent to which diplomats contributed to the outcomes of the Treaty of Versailles.

³⁷⁹ Lovin, Clifford R. *A School for Diplomats: The Paris Peace Conference of 1919*. Lanham, Maryland: University Press of America, 1997. p. 5.

³⁸⁰ These criticisms are mentioned by many scholars, but particularly conform to the emphasis of Harold Nicolson. See Nicolson, Harold. *Peacemaking*. London: Oxford University Press, 1933.

The Procedural and Organizational Failures of the Conference

On December 2 and 3, 1918 Clemenceau went to London to try to work out a program for the upcoming conference in Paris. Four points were discussed: that a Committee would immediately work on deciding the amount of German reparations, that the former Emperor would be tried in an International Tribunal, that the British dominions would be allowed representation in the relevant negotiations, and that a Committee would be set up to determine supply and relief for victims of the war devastation.³⁸¹ These initial agreements, however skeletal, were not followed at the conference. The French also made a strong effort to set up a preliminary plan and structure for the conference. Clemenceau requested that André Tardieu write a plan of procedure, and he submitted it to the conference in early January. This more detailed plan outlined the guiding principles and methods to address each of the territorial, financial, and economic problems as well as promoting the League of Nations. It also provided a break down of the conference into committees and sub-committees, and the precedence of issues according to urgency. The French plan was based on Wilson's Fourteen Points articulated in his message of January 8, 1918 and his speech on September 27, 1918.³⁸²

Ultimately, the negotiators followed neither the British nor French plan at the conference, and the Big Four adopted an ad hoc agenda. Rather than setting up commissions (topical committees) at the start of the conference to establish a firm pattern of division of labor and responsibility, they set up commissions as it occurred to them. This lack of organization or planning of any kind was really unprecedented. At the Treaties of Westphalia, Vienna, and Berlin among others, procedures and precedence were decided upon in advance, and the diplomats strictly adhered to them. These professional negotiators appreciated the difficulties and obstacles to compromise, and knew that contentious issues required organization and mediation

³⁸¹ Ibid. p. 82.

³⁸² Tardieu, André. *The Truth About the Treaty*. London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1921. pp. 88-93.

for the negotiations to be effective. Thus, not only was the Treaty of Versailles much more complex than earlier treaties, it was written with no advance preparation or a preliminary Treaty.

The disorganization of the conference existed in large part because as late as March 19, the leaders had still not decided whether their discussions were to go towards a preliminary or final treaty. The ad hoc committees and disorganized meetings of the Big Four proceeded with no clear idea of what was to be discussed, and in what order. They just continued to meet, and eventually decided that they had reached enough points of compromise for the Treaty to be final. Of course, this had a strong bearing on the third major undecided component of conference procedure: whether the treaty would be imposed or negotiated with Germany. In a kind of unconscious domino effect, the German plenipotentiaries were not included in the negotiations because the preliminary Treaty suddenly turned into the final Treaty and, in turn, there was no real conference procedure. In November 1918, five seats had actually been set aside for the German delegation, but these seats were never filled. Clemenceau, Wilson, and Lloyd George were even absent for a time during a critical phase of completion of the Treaty. This lack of procedure was mainly because they designated themselves, instead of professional diplomats, to conduct the peace negotiations, and subsequently followed the war-time practices of the Supreme War Council.

Historians cite many reasons for the failure of Versailles. Some argue that it was the overbearing and stubborn personalities of the leaders. Others argue that the Wilsonian ideal was simply not compatible with European needs at the time. Yet another popular argument is that the absence of German participation meant that the Treaty lacked legitimacy violating the principle of “open covenants of peace, openly arrived at,” and there was always the question of whether the enemy would follow its terms. I argue that the most overwhelming reason was that the statesmen fell short of the abilities of professional diplomats, and that because they were not diplomats with negotiation expertise, knowledge, and shared norms of understanding, they could not find a workable solution. It is clear that they did not realize the importance of a solid agenda, rank

ordering of precedence for the topics to be addressed, and who the participants would be. Also, because they were democratically elected, their attention was divided between the potential reactions of public opinion to the treaty, and their duties of domestic leadership instead of focusing on finding the best solution to the problem of peace. It can be debated whether or not it was a good thing that those negotiating foreign policy were democratically elected, however it is the nature of any democratic system to delegate decision-making authority to non-elected officials who are then held accountable to their elected leaders and are typically more expert at the finer points of international negotiation.³⁸³

The strong influence of domestic public opinion went hand-in-hand with the role of statesmen in negotiating the Treaty of Versailles. Many historians draw comparisons between the 1815 Congress of Vienna and the Paris Peace Conference arguing that the former is a strong example of “old diplomacy” and the latter marked the beginning of “new diplomacy.” At Vienna participants believed in secret diplomacy, the role of diplomats in determining outcomes based on whatever they saw fit, and the rationale of power based outcomes. At Versailles, “open covenants of peace, openly arrived at” meant that the negotiations would be open to public scrutiny. Wilsonianism also emphasized national self-determination instead of power relationships. As the negotiations progressed, Wilson and other strong supporters of “open diplomacy” realized that public opinion could be very damaging to the prospects for cooperation.

William R. Keylor argues:

Wilson's mounting apprehension about the potentially deleterious effects of public opinion on the peace negotiations prompted him to join his European colleagues in sacrificing the cherished principle of open diplomacy before the negotiations began. The world press became the chief victims, and eventually the harshest critics, of this change of heart.³⁸⁴

³⁸³ Whether democratically elected leaders should negotiate treaties and participate in all international decision-making is a debate that continues today in reference to the European Union. One source of the so-called “democratic deficit” is the fact that non-elected officials engage in a great deal of decision-making.

³⁸⁴ William R. Keylor, “Versailles and International Diplomacy,” in eds. Boemeke, Manfred F., Gerald D. Feldman, and Glaser Elisabeth. *The Treaty of Versailles: A Reassessment after 75 Years*. German Historical Institute, Washington D.C.: Cambridge University Press, 1998. p. 481.

Despite the fact that the statesmen abandoned the principle of “open diplomacy” from the start, each was still plagued by the strong pressures of public opinion. As politicians of democratic countries, it was never something they could escape. It is important to look at the role and interaction of statesmen and diplomats in more detail, to provide a comparison with other conferences, and to show the extent to which diplomats did play a role despite the obstacles. The analysis proceeds with a country-by-country investigation.

Great Britain

The British State: Lloyd George

It is often argued that Lloyd George tried to seek a middle ground between the positions of Woodrow Wilson and Clemenceau.³⁸⁵ He consistently tried to insure that the final Treaty did not stray too far from the conditions expressed by Wilson, but he would often change his mind on many of the particular issues, sometimes even within the course of one speech. Lloyd George had a sociable personality that enabled him to get along with some, but his mercurial, spontaneous qualities disconcerted others. In particular, the French at the Conference found him to be lacking in formality, and to be too merry, reckless, and unstable. He lacked knowledge of protocol, and often acted unilaterally. Clearly he was charismatic and unique, but had not acquired the dignity, knowledge, and reserve of a professional diplomat. He would often make quick decisions, and then rely on his debating skills. As a result, the British position in Paris changed considerably, and in unpredictable ways.

Anthony Lentins writes, “Practiced diplomats like Lords Hardinge and Curzon, whom he kept in the dark, deplored what they saw as the ‘complete absence of any system on the part of the Prime Minister, who declines to utilize the services of experts.’” Indeed, he alienated some of his aides before the negotiations even began. Although not a professional diplomat, he did not

³⁸⁵ The same is said of Woodrow Wilson. See House, Edward Mandell, and Charles Seymour, eds. *What Really Happened at Paris: The Story of the Peace Conference, 1918-1919*. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1921. However, Clemenceau does not have a similar reputation.

want to take advice from his assistants, in particular, Foreign Secretary Balfour. It is important to note that Lloyd George openly did not believe in the efficacy of professional diplomats and the Foreign Office. He himself enjoyed having personal contact with other states' representatives, instead of sending plenipotentiaries, and he argued that negotiation by statesmen was preferable.

Woodrow Wilson described him as a "chameleon", but he was also a very persuasive negotiator when the point-of-view he advocated happened to coincide with what he really needed to say. The British Prime Minister was at times a purposeful chameleon in light of his changing policy position during the negotiations, but he would also erroneously argue points that the British government did not support. He would arrive late to the first session of the morning, and start speaking without knowing the topic of discussion. Once his aides realized that he was presenting an argument against British interests, one of them would pass him a note, and shortly after he would announce that he did not support the speech he had just given.³⁸⁶ In general, Lloyd George's main priorities were Britain's naval power, a European balance of power, and protecting the boundaries of the Empire.³⁸⁷

Once the Council of Four more firmly isolated Lloyd George from his delegation, he was willing to accept the harsh terms of the Treaty. Later, he became sharply aware of this mistake when British public opinion was strongly critical of the treaty. The Left newspapers in Britain and elsewhere were outraged at the terms of the treaty which literally violated the entire body of Wilson's Fourteen Points. The clauses on trade and reparation meant that Germany could not even feed its own people, and the League of Nations was an alliance of Victors, not an enlightened international organization of peace. At the same time, the Right complained that the terms were too lenient. In sum, their choice was this:

³⁸⁶ Mee Jr., Charles L. *The End of Order: Versailles 1919*. New York: Elsevier-Dutton Publishing Co., Inc., 1980.

³⁸⁷ Maisel. *The Foreign Office and Foreign Policy, 1919-1926*. p. 91.

...either move toward appeasing both the Germans and the Left, even at the risk of further infuriating the Right extremists, or stand fast, even at the expense of paying off the ultra-Right, for fear that appeasement would dangerously embolden the Left.³⁸⁸

Lloyd George backed down from his united stance with Clemenceau, and argued for moderation, siding with the Left and Labor, during the crisis weeks between the draft and final treaties. In Britain, the Labor party had a loud voice against a harsh treaty, and as a politician, Lloyd George had to be careful as multiple strikes threatened to break loose. He chose to exaggerate the pressure of Labor to justify his support for German concessions, or at a minimum, gain popularity for his efforts at revision. He held Cabinet and Council meetings to try to push his case with the British government. As a result, Brockdorff-Rantzau, the German diplomat, sent a top-secret telegraph home, notifying Social Democrat Party Chairman Frederich Ebert that domestic pressure in the Allied countries was forcing the Big Four to concede to German requests. Eventually, his optimism would be checked as pressure from the Left and Labor only represented one facet of society.

British Diplomats

The British Delegation consisted of nearly 200 individuals, including typists and clerks.³⁸⁹ They were housed in five hotels. William Tyrrell was the only member of the delegation that appealed to foreign diplomats because they could relate to him and they found they shared the same worldview.³⁹⁰ Tyrrell was the director of the Political Intelligence Department of the Foreign Office. It was a relatively new department established in 1917, and was the primary division of the FO dealing with the initial armistice notes and memoranda between the Allies and Germany. Despite this advance preparation and the wealth of knowledge

³⁸⁸ Mayer, Arno J. *Politics and Diplomacy of Peacemaking: Containment and Counterrevolution at Versailles, 1918-1919*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1967. p. 775.

³⁸⁹ Temperley. *A History of the Peace Conference of Paris*. p. 243.

³⁹⁰ Maisel. *The Foreign Office and Foreign Policy, 1919-1926*. p. 54.

gathered by the Political Intelligence Department, Lloyd George chose General Smuts to prepare the British proposals for the conference.

Smuts was wholly unqualified for this role, and lacked an expert staff. Nevertheless, he put much effort into the task, and did come up with several plans. He could not, however, produce a coherent plan of action, and if it were not for the work of Philip Kerr, Lloyd George's private secretary, the British delegation would have left for Paris with little expert advice.³⁹¹

Later, however, Smuts, a strong Wilsonian, was one of the most radical supporters of revisions to the draft treaty calling it a "war treaty" that would inevitably lead to revolution.

Sir Headlam-Morley, who was the assistant director of the Political Intelligence Department, was also a key member of the British diplomatic delegation to Paris. He was on most of the territorial commissions, and took part in an exchange of intelligence information with the US starting in February 1919. He wrote many proposals for the treaty, and most of these were contingent on his assumption that the League of Nations would be a permanent supervisory organization that would insure the continued viability of the treaty. Headlam-Morley's memoirs are strikingly similar to other diplomatic accounts in Paris during the negotiations. He writes on January 19, 1919:

While all subordinate officials are producing their material and are ready to take up and to bring to a practical solution the matters with which they are charged, there remains as before a complete absence of leadership, statesmanship, decision and, apparently, of any sense of responsibility above.³⁹²

Thus, the diplomats yearned to contribute in the process, were prepared for the task, but were not permitted any autonomy to act.

³⁹¹ Headlam-Morley, James. *A Memoir of the Paris Peace Conference 1919*. p. XXIV.

³⁹² Ibid. p. 4.

France

The French State: Clemenceau

The French government played an important role in the negotiations especially since France served as the host state for the conference. Whereas all the other countries had to prepare special representatives and teams of experts to travel to Paris, the French could utilize their entire governmental apparatus. Although Geneva and Brussels were alternative locations for the Peace Conference, Paris won the bid as it was twice threatened by the enemy, and Versailles was the war-time venue of the Supreme War Council of the Allies.

Clemenceau was the Chairman of the Peace Conference and along with the Secretary-General was in charge of devising the agenda for the delegates. Prior to the conference André Tardieu and officers of the Quai d'Orsay proposed several revisions to a general conference agenda. However, Clemenceau virtually wasted his right to determine the conference agenda through the Secretariat and to appoint the Secretary General. He selected an unenterprising bureaucrat, Henri Dutasta (rumored to be his illegitimate son) as the Chief Secretary. A more natural choice would have been Philippe Berthelot, the Secretary General at the Quai d'Orsay, who expected to be appointed head of the delegation, and had served a vastly important diplomatic role since the beginning of the war. Because of Dutasta's lack of skill, the British diplomat Sir Maurice Hankey, chief secretary during the Supreme War Council meetings, promptly stepped in performing Dutasta's tasks, even though officially his title was only Deputy Secretary. Just as during the war, Hankey took the lead, and always had the appropriate documents and information on hand, making him extremely useful to Clemenceau.

At the conference, Clemenceau gave the impression of not listening half the time. He would frame a proposition or resolution in rapid fire: "*y a-t-il d'objections? Non?...Adopté*" (Are there any objections? No?...Adopted). He was also extremely rude and condescending to the small powers. When he was tired, he would simply interrupt a speech and declare "*c'est tout*"

(that's all) get up and leave the room regardless of pleas or protests.³⁹³ In addition, when technical advisors were called in from the ante-room he would often decide that they were unnecessary, and promptly and unceremoniously ask them to leave. They were not even granted enough time to gather their maps and documents.

Clemenceau was known as “the tiger” of the conference. His *Realpolitik* approach meant that he subordinated everything to the national security interests of France. Seymour's impression was that Clemenceau was permanently tied to old traditions to the point where they constrained him. He often got his way at the conference. He had an insistent negotiating style that asked for much, but with soft words surrounding harsh demands. His main demands were French occupation of the Saar Valley, the left bank of the Rhine, and a high level of reparations from Germany. France was the country most devastated by the war because the German troops had left northern France with much destruction. Coal mines, factories, orchards, and farms all lay in ruin. Thus, Clemenceau and the pressure of public opinion, to a certain extent, naturally pushed for the harshest treaty possible. Like Wilson, he shared the principles of reparations, guarantees, and restitutions. It was ultimately Lloyd George who worked against severity in this regard, although at first he was more in agreement with Clemenceau's position.

French Diplomats

The French diplomats' aim was to begin afresh with the peace negotiations to mark a separation between war and peace. They sought to establish a plan and procedure that would ensure the successful carrying-out of everyone's desires to reach a workable compromise. However, the pull of the war-time procedures worked against them, and with many of the same characters of the War Council present at the conference the tendency was to continue to sideline the diplomats.

³⁹³ Mee Jr. *The End of Order: Versailles 1919*.

André Tardieu, who later became Premier of France three times, was the major French diplomat involved in the negotiations. He was the author of the French conference plan, and even after it was abandoned was chief among the proponents of following a program and adhering to precedence of issues. Lloyd George was concerned that a strong Treaty would be unjust and would result in Bolshevism, an unsigned Treaty, or both. Towards the end of the negotiations, Clemenceau threatened to resign if Lloyd George continued to support German concessions. Tardieu was instrumental in responding to Lloyd George's principal of extreme moderation, and after the Treaty was submitted to German representatives he laid out his response in several Notes. Tardieu was a good person for the job as he got along well with the diplomats from other countries taking full advantage of the epistemic community.

Another major French diplomat participating in the negotiations was Jules Cambon, a diplomat since the end of the Franco-Prussian war in 1870-71. He was chairman of several commissions. Together, Tardieu and Cambon represented France in nearly all of the Commissions.

Philippe Berthelot, who was really denied his rightful place as Secretary General, did, however, have some role at the conference. He was on the commission establishing the new states of Central Europe with the fall of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Berthelot was involved in some way with most territorial clauses of the Treaty of Versailles. To the extent that Dutasta did live up to his appointment as Secretary General of the conferences, he relied on Berthelot's advice as they had a close relationship.

United States

Woodrow Wilson engaged in an ultimatum tactic, ordering the *George Washington* to Brest on April 7 if the French would not back down from their position on German reparations. The French argued that the Germans should pay as high a figure as possible while the British and

Americans believed that the German capacity to pay should be taken into consideration. The French position clashed with Woodrow Wilson's principles.

President Wilson was the creator of the Fourteen Points and the League of Nations. Among his main principles that he expressed on February 11, 1918 was that "there shall be no annexations, no contributions, no punitive damages."³⁹⁴ He was also the first US president to travel abroad during his term. He attended the Paris Peace Conference against the advice of his Secretary of State, Robert Lansing, as well as many others in the US, France, and Britain, and proceeded to push his own agenda at the conference. This was a dangerous step as the Republicans held the majority of seats in both the Senate and House of Representatives. He would have to get approval for the Treaty from the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate, which was heavily Republican, and most Europeans knew that his views were not really those of the US government. His legitimacy was tenuous.

Because of Lansing's independent viewpoints, Wilson tried to push the Secretary of State to the sidelines at the negotiations instead relying more heavily on his long-time friend, Colonel Edward M. House, a lawyer by training. Like Lansing, House eventually understood the extent to which the President was unwilling to compromise, and increasingly disagreed with Wilson's approach. By the end of the conference, House like Lansing had distanced himself from the President, and they never saw each other again. Wilson's personality combined idealism and uncompromising stubbornness, a mixture that was difficult to accommodate in Paris given the practical realities and complexities of the Treaty.

Harold Nicolson, a British diplomat, argues that whatever stubbornness and arrogance the President naturally possessed became even more exaggerated once he arrived in Europe.

Nicolson writes that compared with Lloyd George and Clemenceau, Wilson was much more

³⁹⁴ See Dockrill, Michael L., and Douglas J. Goold. *Peace without Promise: Britain and the Peace Conferences, 1919-23*. Hamden, Connecticut: Archon Books, 1981. p. 32.

informed and practical during the negotiations.³⁹⁵ His abilities at the conference were not hampered by his style of negotiation and presentation, which André Tardieu describes as professorial, but because of his “one-track mind” and unwillingness to consider other opinions. He was very predisposed against any Americans from the Republican Party because they were political opponents. He would request information from his expert advisors, but would rarely listen to their ideas or opinions either.

Throughout the conference, Wilson slowly shifted his emphasis from the Fourteen Points to the creation of the League of Nations. Naturally, this was disconcerting for many of the attendees whose sole reason for agreeing to the armistice was the hope they had for the fruition of the principles expressed in the Fourteen Points. Wilson shifted his focus because the League of Nations became a personal goal for him, and one he hoped would have a lasting impact. Seymour writes that at first the league was a “fantastic possibility”, then a “desirability”, and eventually an “absolute necessity.”³⁹⁶ One of the reasons he was less concerned about the viability of the actual stipulations of the Treaty was because he trusted that the League of Nations would continuously review and alter the Treaty as time passed. Thus, over time the Treaty did not have to be as harsh as it at first appeared. The great tragedy was that nine months later, the US senate rejected the Treaty and US membership in the League, and without the US the League was unworkable. Like Clemenceau and Orlando, Wilson was ruined by the political effects of their struggle to write the Treaty of Versailles.

US Diplomats

Charles Seymour was one of the prominent diplomats who represented the US at the negotiations. In his diary he writes that the diplomats often waited outside the room while the Big Four discussed the major issues. Occasionally one of them would come out and announce

³⁹⁵ Nicolson. *Peacemaking*. pp. 196-7.

³⁹⁶ Seymour, Charles. *Letters from the Paris Peace Conference*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965. p. 44.

their most recent decision. It was not until June 3, 1919 that all of the American delegation met together in one grand room to discuss the Treaty with the Germans. A major point of discussion was Lloyd George's new position, which advocated that the Allies grant many concessions to prevent the Treaty from being unjust, and to ensure that the Germans would be willing to sign. In this rare meeting, Wilson sought the expert advice of his diplomats, and each in turn gave their viewpoints to the American assembly on the issue of concessions to Germany. Wilson took a strong stance saying, "If the Germans won't sign the treaty as we have written it then we must renew the war; at all events we must not allow ourselves to flop and wobble trying to find something they will sign."³⁹⁷

Seymour backed up the President arguing that they must show resolve and respect for all the work that had already gone into the treaty. However, on June 19, 1919 with persisting gridlock about which concessions to make Seymour vented his frustration about the powerlessness of the diplomats. "It all shows the futility of the organization which keeps the Four by themselves, separated from the foreign ministers and the other Commissioners. Actually things went more speedily in the old Council of Ten."³⁹⁸ Balfour and Lansing were both angry that as foreign ministers they had virtually no authority in the decision-making. Thus, it appears that the decision to limit the talks to only the Big Four did not result in more efficiency, nor did it result in more success. Wilson's undiplomatic propensity to avoid social events and alienate his colleagues finally backfired. Overall, the American diplomatic corps was particularly strong despite being largely ignored by Wilson.³⁹⁹

³⁹⁷ Ibid. p. 256.

³⁹⁸ Ibid. p. 273.

³⁹⁹ The whole event also served as a reunion for the Harvard class of 1915 as most of the diplomats graduated in the same class.

Germany

The German delegation stands out as an anomaly at the Paris Peace Conference as it was the only delegation consisting primarily of traditional, professional diplomats whose government granted them real decision-making power. In addition, these diplomats exercised agency, despite the mix of confusion, lack of information, and inability to negotiate. The original primary plenipotentiary for Germany was Ulrich Brockdorff-Rantzau, an aristocratic diplomat newly appointed as foreign minister. He was trained as an old school diplomat, and was proud of this heritage. Thus, it is understandable that he firmly believed the Treaty would be negotiated among equals, and that Germany would accept no Treaty damaging to its honor. The delegation was largely traditional in its diplomatic approach. The Germans engaged in a great deal of advanced preparation for the negotiations they thought they would attend. Johann Bernstorff, the former German ambassador to the US, provided much of the preparatory material.

In October 1918, the Germans set up an armistice committee, chaired by Matthias Erzberger, and with Kurt von Lersner as the representative of the Foreign Office. Although young, Lersner had a distinguished career and many personal contacts with the military and political leaders of the war. Lersner was a member of the delegation, but not a plenipotentiary; nevertheless his strong diplomatic ties made him indispensable to the proceedings. During the armistice period, Lersner served as the intermediary between Erzberger and Brockdorff-Rantzau. This was a difficult task because Brockdorff-Rantzau refused to sign a dictated treaty, whereas Erzberger wanted to sign the Treaty as quickly as possible. The conflict between the two grew, and each tried to assert authority over the other. Ultimately, Brockdorff-Rantzau revamped the organization structure to make it necessary for Erzberger to report to him, and severely constrained Erzberger's flexibility in negotiations.

Accompanying Brockdorff-Rantzau was a team of economic experts, diplomats, and a press group. The German delegation hoped to use public opinion in their favor, and they believed that as long as the Americans retained power over the decisions in Paris, they would be treated

with leniency. When they arrived in France, a government sponsored train took them to the North of the country where they could witness the great devastation caused by the departing German troops. The delegation remained there for four weeks wondering when the negotiations would begin. During that time, they only had five meetings, and the delegates slowly returned home until only Max Warbur, a banker, and Lersner were left when the Germans were at long last summoned to Paris and Versailles.

In Versailles, they stayed at the Hotel des Reservoirs and were virtual prisoners surrounded by French guards and caged gardens. On April 29 the German delegates once more arrived in France, and they occupied the Hotel Vatel and Hotel Suisse as well. Telephones and telegraphs were set up in these two hotels, and the Germans, thinking that there were listening devices in the rooms, played music almost constantly to drown out their conversations.

The first task was the exchange of credentials, which took several days to verify. The German delegation was nervous during this waiting period because they were still in the dark about whether they would be negotiating the Treaty. They were allowed full contact with their counterparts in Germany, but no means of communication with the Allied delegations in Paris. Lersner was critical in getting information because he had friends in the French diplomatic corps. He used these connections to send a message to the Big Four that many of the Germans would have to return to Berlin if information was not forthcoming. Immediately, because of Lersner's initiative, they received a note from Clemenceau that the delegates were to meet to receive the Treaty on May 7. Only then did the Germans discover that they would receive a dictated Treaty.

On the afternoon of May 7 in the great hall of the Trianon Palace, Brockdorff-Rantzau famously did not stand to receive the Treaty. There is much speculation as to why he dared to defy protocol in this way. Some of those present thought that he was nervous and a poor public speaker, others thought that he was enraged by the terms of the Treaty, while some blamed his poor health. Whatever his true reason he ultimately refused to sign because he saw this imposed Treaty as an insult to Germany's honor that made slaves of the German people. The German

delegation had prepared for Brockdorff-Rantzau several possible speeches depending on the circumstances of the Treaty. Lersner and others urged him before-hand to accept the Treaty as quickly as possible, instead he decided to read the strongest one in opposition to the terms. As Arno J. Mayer describes it:

He chose to remain seated to deliver a speech which was pugnacious and defiant. He began by registering the victors' intense and passionate hatred for the vanquished, who, in line with their guilt, were to be punished. He then went on to contest Germany's war guilt, and stressed that only a peace consonant with Wilson's principles and the pre-Armistice agreement could be just and lasting.⁴⁰⁰

Clemenceau gave the German delegation two weeks to respond in writing, and the one hour session was over. Lersner remained behind to get a copy of the Treaty, have it translated into German, and disseminated to all the delegates. By this time, Lersner was a great necessity to Brockdorff-Rantzau for his diplomatic connections, and good reputation among the European *corps diplomatique*.

The next evening, the German diplomats met together to discuss their response. While they must have been tempted to pack up and leave, as Orlando, Wilson, and Lloyd George had all done or had threatened to do at one point or other, the German diplomats stayed. They were unanimously opposed to the harsh terms, except for two exceptions, but decided to negotiate to the best of their abilities in true diplomatic fashion. On May 8, each spoke in turn against the Treaty until Albert Schwarz, the Saxon Socialist Minister for Labor who had previously remained quiet, stood up and said:

Gentlemen! I cannot understand your despair. One would imagine, to listen to your speeches, that Germany's last hour had struck. But the German People wants to live; it *shall* live. It may be that the consequences of this Treaty will keep us down for twenty – even twenty-five years – but sooner or later we shall rise...⁴⁰¹

The speech urged the delegation to put an end to the evening, and spawned a kind of division in the delegation. Brockdorff-Rantzau opposed the Treaty completely, while some members of the

⁴⁰⁰ Mayer. *Politics and Diplomacy of Peacemaking: Containment and Counterrevolution at Versailles, 1918-1919*. p. 767.

⁴⁰¹ Lovin. *A School for Diplomats: The Paris Peace Conference of 1919*. p. 63.

Cabinet and others disagreed with him arguing that a harsh response would give the Entente powers an incentive to unite. Lovin writes, “Now the Germans were publicly divided; the entente powers were united; and Clemenceau was in the driver's seat.”⁴⁰²

Throughout this period of crisis, from May 9 to May 29, the Germans replied to the Treaty through a series of 15 short Notes, and Lersner constantly used his diplomatic contact with French diplomat Saint-Quentin to garner information for the isolated German delegation. The German Notes included, among other things, a protest about Germany’s exclusion from the League of Nations and the International Labor Organization, and the need to conduct oral negotiations to moderate the terms of the Treaty. Brockdorff-Rantzau took the opportunity to travel to Spa to meet with cabinet members of the new German republic, and inform them of the recent developments. He emphasized many times that domestic public opinion in the Allied countries was opposed to a dictated peace, and therefore the Germans should refuse to sign. Interestingly, he did not take further instruction from them, but emphasized that he would not allow the German delegation to be burdened with political dissension in Berlin.⁴⁰³ The diplomats would remain autonomous and keep the Paris decision-making in their own hands.

On May 30th, the German delegation’s final counter-proposals were submitted in the form of a diplomatic brief, consisting of 443 pages of details. It included a covering letter, designed to appeal to public opinion at home, passionately requesting that the allies not consider Germany as the sole country to blame for the war, and to recognize the impossibility of the terms of the Treaty.⁴⁰⁴ They were willing to succumb to the economic and military stipulations of the Treaty, but not the territorial ones. Lersner found out in advance that despite serious discussions to consider the German Notes, the allied powers were unwilling to make any major concessions. It turned out that domestic dissent and even strikes were not enough of a political threat for the Big

⁴⁰² Ibid. p. 67.

⁴⁰³ Mayer. *Politics and Diplomacy of Peacemaking: Containment and Counterrevolution at Versailles, 1918-1919*. p. 770.

⁴⁰⁴ Temperley. *A History of the Peace Conference of Paris*. p. 270.

Four. On the 16th of June, the delegation received official word that they had one week to accept the final draft of the Treaty, which did feature some minor concessions, or else the armistice would be called off. The German cabinet decided that it would be better to sign than to subject the struggling new republic to a takeover by the Independents and Communists, and subsequent anarchy.

Because of Lersner's inside knowledge and diplomatic relationships, he arranged for most of the delegation to return home before the official response from the Allies to minimize their loss of face and make their journey safer. Despite this, many inhabitants of Versailles gathered along the streets to throw stones at the German carriages, even inflicting permanent brain damage to one attendee. Lersner himself was left as the main German representative in Paris. Dr. Müller and Dr. Bell were designated to attend the signing ceremony at the Palace of Versailles on June 28, 1919 since Brockdorff-Rantzau would not sign the final Treaty. Clemenceau began with the ceremony stating, "We are here to sign a Treaty of Peace," and ended it shortly after with, "The meeting is over."

Diplomats as an Epistemic Community: The Commissions

Diplomats accomplished a great deal in writing the Treaty of Versailles, but they were uninformed and disorganized as a result of the lack of procedure and protocol. They had to proceed with their work based on certain critical assumptions. First, they thought that the suggestions of the commissions were only preliminary and would be further debated among the Big Four. As a consequence, they would articulate the maximum level of punishment for Germany in their documents, and would leave certain clauses in skeletal form assuming that they would be filled in later. Second, the diplomats assumed that many of their suggestions would receive their due elaboration during the discussions of the Big Four. The diplomats and experts in the commissions were constrained because they lacked instruction, and thus had to be satisfied with a degree of imprecision. However, the Big Four would often run out of time, and after a

quick glance at the commissions' documents would write them into the main treaty. Had the diplomats known how extreme and of poor quality the final documents turned out, they would have been appalled. Later, when the final treaty went to the German representatives for approval the diplomats were indeed aghast at the harsh nature of the terms. Third, the diplomats assumed that the German representatives would have the opportunity to negotiate the Treaty so at the very least the terms could be moderated.

Setting these assumptions aside, what was the nature of the diplomats' interaction and ability to cooperate? The commissions were the key bodies in which the diplomats could shine at the Paris Peace Conferences. There were 52 commissions, with the most renowned specialists from each country, that met 1,646 times (according to Tardieu's count) before the treaty was signed. After the commissions submitted their decisions, three bodies considered them: the Council of Ten, Council Four, and the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs.⁴⁰⁵ From March 24 to May 7, the focus was on the Council of Four who produced the final treaty.

The diplomats hesitated when making decisions because they knew that they really did not have the power to do so. The Heads of State could immediately change anything, without deference to their experts, if it suited them. However, it is important to recognize the extent to which the diplomats *did* have an impact on the outcomes of the Treaty. The commissions set up by the Big Four were comprised of the best diplomats and experts on each particular issue. These commissions had the responsibility to deal with a specific question of fact and policy, and much of their work was taken word for word as part of the Treaty.⁴⁰⁶ Clive Day argues, "Some of these commissions were entrusted with questions so important that their contributions to the settlement appear positively greater than those of the Council of Ten itself."⁴⁰⁷ Certainly, the selection of participants in these commissions was highly meritocratic, and was less based on convention.

⁴⁰⁵ Tardieu. *The Truth About the Treaty*. p. 97.

⁴⁰⁶ Clive Day, "The Atmosphere and Organization of the Peace Conference," in House, and Seymour, eds. *What Really Happened at Paris: The Story of the Peace Conference, 1918-1919*. pp. 33-34.

⁴⁰⁷ *Ibid.* p. 26.

The territorial commissions were the ones most populated by professional diplomats, while the finance ones consisted more often of bankers and businessmen. The Americans were prone to sending academics as representatives in the commissions. Diplomats were present, but conspicuously under-represented of the various expert professions in Paris because of the rising influence of soldiers and other governmental departments during the war.⁴⁰⁸ When the Big Four took over around two months into the conference they clearly proved themselves to trust more in the opinions of these commissions than even their own foreign ministers. As evidence of this, it was highly unusual for the Big Four to amend one of the draft articles of a commission, thus giving the diplomats an important, though uninformed role.

Counterfactual Consideration

What would have happened had diplomats served as true plenipotentiaries during the negotiations and drafting of the Treaty of Versailles? E.J. Dillon argues, “Traditional diplomacy would have shown some respect for the law of causality. It would have sent to the Conference diplomatists more or less acquainted with the issues to be mooted and also with the mentality of the other negotiators, and it would have assigned to them a number of experts as advisers.”⁴⁰⁹ The evidence in this chapter demonstrates the strong role of statesmen alongside their lack of diplomatic expertise.

As a case in point, Harold Nicolson, a professional diplomat of the British delegation, finished his preparatory work for the conference, and immediately set about making contacts with the American diplomats. He knew that these contacts would be extremely valuable in the future should they find themselves at the negotiating table. He formed relationships with several diplomats, including Mr. Rhys Carpenter, a subordinate member of the American delegation, who introduced him to Dr. Charles Seymour, Dr. Clive Day, and Dr. Lybyer. On one occasion he met

⁴⁰⁸ Temperley. *A History of the Peace Conference of Paris*. p. 244.

⁴⁰⁹ Dillon, E.J. *The inside Story of the Peace Conference*. New York: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1920. pp. 102-3.

with Mr. Alan Dulles, and the two discussed their opinions on the issues at stake at the conference. He writes, “We compared notes. Our opinions on every one of the subjects within our particular orbit appeared to be identical. It seemed to us that the drafting of peace would be a brisk, amicable, and hugely righteous affair.”⁴¹⁰ Even on issues that they had differences in opinion, they found that the details could easily be worked out with a little deliberation. This evident optimism of an outcome governed by diplomats was ultimately crushed as the conference progressed because “our relations were darkened by the wrangles of our respective chiefs.”⁴¹¹

Nicolson was not the only British diplomat to undertake relationship-building with other professional diplomats. His close colleague, Allen Leeper, had previously cultivated numerous relationships with the Americans, and sought to foster them in Paris. The majority of diplomats spent days of boredom waiting for instructions that would never arrive from their respective statesmen. Nicolson writes in his diary entry of May 24, “It is *such* a bore waiting on – without instructions. If I could be given a free hand I could easily settle all my stuff in a week.”⁴¹² He also argues that if the initial cooperative understandings reached between the American and British diplomats had been maintained, and not altered by the Chiefs of State, then the Treaty of Versailles would have been a much more workable document.

It is clear that had professional diplomats been granted plenipotentiary power, instead of the statesmen and their pet advisors, a clear program would have been followed.

Alternative Explanation: Bargaining Theory

The Versailles case clearly points to the inadequacy of bargaining theory in predicting outcomes. Rationalist predictions of outcomes are different from what a historical process-tracing approach reveals. More importantly, it is clear that despite the existence of a strategic ranking of preferences, statesmen may simply lack the skills to realize and accomplish them. The

⁴¹⁰ Nicolson. *Peacemaking*. p. 106.

⁴¹¹ Ibid. p. 107.

⁴¹² Ibid. p. 348.

preceding analysis proves that it matters who is negotiating. One cannot assume that the balancing out of competing preferences to find the Pareto Optimum can actually occur in all cases. It is necessary to understand which actors are negotiating and what qualities they possess.

Lloyd George's preferences were to protect Britain's naval power, form a European balance of power, and protecting the boundaries of the Empire.⁴¹³ Clemenceau's was most strongly realist, thus he called for harsh terms in the Treaty, and his decisions were guided almost entirely by France's national security interests. Lloyd George and Woodrow Wilson were more in line with each other, and both advocated toning down the terms of the Treaty so that Germany would sign it and German domestic reaction would not trigger a Bolshevik revolution. The Treaty was closer to Clemenceau's preferences, but the result was failure for everyone because the US government ultimately refused to accept it dramatically diminishing the viability of the League of Nations.

Another problem with statesmen acting as diplomats was that they were neither knowledgeable enough to persuade their home governments, nor able enough to anticipate what they could or could not get away with. While diplomats cultivate relationships within their epistemic community, these statesmen did not have membership in an epistemic community. The strength of the epistemic community contributes to diplomats' anticipation of how much agency they can exercise. The Big Four did not have the tools to anticipate their room for maneuver, nor the collective strength to persuade governments of their decisions.

Conclusion

The Treaty of Versailles was supposed to insure that the Great War could not repeat itself. To accomplish the task, the Allied delegations re-drew the borders of Germany, imposed war reparations in the form of payments and financial restrictions, and called for the

⁴¹³ Maisel, *The Foreign Office and Foreign Policy, 1919-1926*. p. 91.

establishment of the League of Nations. It is significant that all of the powers present signed this controversial Treaty, except for the Chinese who were protesting the Shantung settlement.

Statesmen articulated the desire to transform the diplomatic process into a transparent, open one in which public opinion could have an impact as the negotiations went forward. In the example of the Treaty of Versailles, they could not accomplish this, and much of the decision-making occurred behind closed doors with vague procedures and ad hoc protocol. Moreover, the major discussions occurred in separate rooms creating a cleavage between the statesmen in attendance who were together in one room, and the professional diplomats in other rooms. In this case, the statesmen did not grant power to their diplomatic representatives to the detriment of outcomes of international cooperation. I argue in this chapter that failure may have been averted had diplomats truly acted as plenipotentiaries during the negotiations for the Treaty of Versailles.

There was also a division between the traditional diplomats and amateur diplomats. The traditional diplomats and foreign ministers were surprised that they would not be involved in any meaningful way. Lovin argues, "All diplomats, regardless of rank, were disappointed because each of their political leaders expected to act directly in the activities of the peace conference as they had during the war. Their populist tendencies caused them to be suspicious of the elitist foreign service bureaucracies."⁴¹⁴

Public pressure eventually lashed out in full force with the dissemination of the Treaty. The response was mixed, but the leaders decided to push for their original terms, with only a few minor concessions to the Germans. The meetings of the Big Four were secret, but lacking in organization and coherence. Too many times, one or other threatened to leave and issued an ultimatum. Diplomatic negotiations benefit from protection of scrutiny of the public eye. In the early twentieth century, public opinion became an important force in international relations and foreign policy. It was a reflection of growing democratization, and democratically elected statesmen. While transparency and popular participation are positive developments, the

⁴¹⁴ Lovin, *A School for Diplomats: The Paris Peace Conference of 1919*. p.4-5.

diplomatic debate itself benefits from privacy. Diplomats are often more aware than statesmen of the invisible pressure of international opinion as they are members of international society.

The climate of “new diplomacy” during the post-war era provides an opportunity to examine the direction of diplomacy in the twentieth century, its move towards summitry, and an increasingly bureaucratized profession. At the same time, this case study is a natural example of what happens to the agency of diplomats and the quality of the diplomatic epistemic community when status suffers, and to the outcomes of international cooperation when diplomacy is performed by amateurs. The outcome of the conference, despite its treatment of diplomats, was to push diplomacy towards more professionalization as will be seen in the next chapter.

Chapter Six

The Late Twentieth Century and the Treaty on EU

“The question of whether or not ambassadors should be regarded as anachronistic relics, the eccentric survivors of the advent of electricity and steam, depends upon the activities ascribed to them.”⁴¹⁵

Climate of the Times

It is undeniably easier to identify and define the role of diplomats before the twentieth century, the growth of summitry, globalization, advances in technology, and the advent of international organizations. Before these contextual developments, diplomats formed a permanent elite international society and engaged in bilateral diplomacy in every major European capital. They held daily meetings to deliver *démarches*⁴¹⁶ and maintained carefully cultivated relationships with kings or statesmen, members of court or parliament, and with other diplomats. When the occasion called for it, they represented states at major multilateral congresses, defined as a congress of more than two countries. However, the diplomatic profession is marked by continuity as well as change. A diplomat of the seventeenth century could walk into an embassy today, and recognize his profession, but bureaucratization, professionalization, and institutionalization have led to many structural transformations.

What is happening to the structural trajectory of diplomacy? The mid-seventeenth century witnessed the unprecedented event of a large-scale multilateral congress. By the end of the nineteenth century, multilateralism was still not the norm for diplomatic practice, but after two World Wars, the shortcomings of bilateralism became apparent. Since the beginning of the twentieth century, multilateral diplomacy, the rise in importance of international organizations (IOs), and the popularity of summitry have characterized international relations. Firstly, multilateral diplomacy really took off in the twentieth century. The Congresses of Vienna and Berlin were exceptions to the more typical bilateral and secret diplomacy of the nineteenth

⁴¹⁵ Hamilton, and Langhorne. *The Practice of Diplomacy: Its Evolution, Theory and Administration*. pp. 231-232.

⁴¹⁶ The (French) diplomatic term for conveying information about a state's position or policy-goal in a given issue area.

century. Secondly, the rise of IOs made it possible for international agreements to be permanent, and the idea of the Concert of Europe to reach actualization. The twentieth century marks the rise of international organizations as permanent multilateral institutions with regular meetings.

Professional diplomats are less involved in conference diplomacy, although they are still occasionally called upon to act as plenipotentiaries. Diplomats and embassies, however, remain an integral step in the operation of international society. In medieval times diplomats represented non-state entities to other non-state entities, from the mid-seventeenth century to the late nineteenth century diplomats represented states to other states, but for the past few decades diplomats are once again involved in the relations with non-state entities. Whereas in medieval times the non-state entities consisted of the church, merchants, members of the nobility, and land-owners, today they consist of supranational institutions. The nature of the diplomatic profession is transformed such that embassy diplomacy is diminishing in importance in Europe, and diplomats are now called upon to represent their countries to institutions. In this respect, the diplomatic profession has taken a circular path to end up where it started, but the world is a very different place.

Because international organizations play such a central role in today's politics, many theories abound on the nature of institutions, in particular, why they arise, whether they act independently, and how change occurs over time. The prime new factor, the advent of international organizations, is an institutionalized and legalized version of the community of diplomats. Now, they do not just reside in embassies, but in the European Union (EU) buildings in Brussels. Rather than cultivating bilateral relationships at Kings' courts, diplomats work along side each other on a daily basis in a modern, professional bureaucracy.

Preventive diplomacy is the *modus operandi* of international relations. Since no wars have occurred among the members of the European Union since its inception in 1951, diplomacy to redraw territorial boundaries or deal with indemnities is not typical. As Peter Marshall writes, "The task is to look for signs of trouble and find ways of preventing the problem in question from

arising. Preventive diplomacy is the most economical and efficient branch of the profession.”⁴¹⁷ Diplomats and states consequently micro-manage relationships with hundreds of meetings, memos, and messages. Information, efficiency, and transparency of institutions are assumed. Yet, a completely rational approach to diplomatic interactions does not ensue alongside increased bureaucratization. Diplomats exercise agency and maintain an influential epistemic community that exists to a significant extent outside of the rules, regulations, and structure of the Brussels bureaucracy.

Who are the diplomats of today’s European Union, and what is their role? The traditional embassy diplomats are less important to international relations as they tend to concentrate on consular, cultural, commercial, and informational work, and their numbers are declining. In Britain there were 221 embassy posts overseas in 1997, one-fifth less than in 1982.⁴¹⁸ In 1997 there were 253 overseas embassy posts for France, 229 for Germany, and 265 for Italy. The British embassy to the Council of the European Union, separate from the British embassy to Belgium, had around 70 individuals.⁴¹⁹ Today, many member-states have their largest representations in Brussels. Diplomats who are assigned to represent their home states to international organizations such as the EU, NATO, and the UN are now increasing in numbers, and have taken over the political work of traditional embassy diplomats. It is worth noting that their role as multilateral interlocutors in international organizations is not strictly prescribed in treaties, but to a great extent determined by their own agency and their mutually constituted identity in an epistemic community. They themselves determine ‘the activities ascribed to them’. The diplomats of today’s European Union are the Committee of Permanent Representatives (Coreper), and the Commission diplomats represent EU member-states to outside countries. There is even talk of creating a European diplomatic corps that would represent the EU to the outside world with one voice. Coreper was not a requirement in the Treaty of Rome, which

⁴¹⁷ Marshall. *Positive Diplomacy*. p. 167.

⁴¹⁸ Ibid. Chapter 8.

⁴¹⁹ Moncrieff, Geoff Meade and Chris. *The Press Association*, July 1 1992.

stated that a committee of diplomats *may* be established, and this would be the prerogative of the Council of Ministers.⁴²⁰ Now, the Permanent Representatives are arguably one of the most important contributors to the EU decision-making process. The foreign ministers increasingly rubber-stamp the pre-negotiated agreements determined by Coreper in advance of ministerial meetings.

One tendency among EU scholars is to treat each EU institution as a black box, much the way realists treat states. Scholars rarely concentrate on what happens within institutions to produce outcomes.⁴²¹ Another tendency is to treat EU interaction as purely intergovernmental in the realist sense that only states, as black boxes, make decisions. Yet another approach is found at the individual level of analysis; sophisticated bargaining theories ascribe outcomes to state leader preferences alone, recognizing no significant impact from supranational or national representatives. I argue that it is necessary to look at *processes* of diplomacy to understand outcomes. Are diplomats agents of political cooperation in the EU or simply transmission belts of member states? In other words, to what extent do diplomats really deliberate, and why? Analysis of this question informs the larger debate among contemporary EU scholars about whether there is a “democratic deficit” in European Union supranational governance, and if so, whether it will impact future efforts at integration.⁴²²

Europe’s multi-leveled, mixed bag of foreign policy approaches means that each decision requires cooperation among member states to an unprecedented degree, and thus relies heavily on diplomatic skills and negotiations. Despite the fact that national differences remain, too many scholars speak of EU institutions as if they are unitary actors. To understand the process of

⁴²⁰ Sherrington, Philippa. *The Council of Ministers: Political Authority in the European Union*. London: Pinter, 2000. p. 45.

⁴²¹ Some of these exceptions include Hayes-Renshaw, and Wallace. *The Council of Ministers*.; Nugent, Neill, ed. *At the Heart of the Union: Studies of the European Commission*. 2nd ed. London: MacMillan Press Ltd, 1997.; Beyers, and Dierckx. "The Working Groups of the Council of the European Union: Supranational or Intergovernmental Negotiations?"

⁴²² “Democratic deficit” is defined as a lack of open and transparent processes in EU institutions when compared to the standards of democratic processes in domestic institutions.

diplomacy in the EU, it is necessary to disaggregate these “actors as institutions”, and decipher how and why states agree to common policies. What processes brought about consensus and why? Can bargaining theories which emphasize state leaders’ stable preferences predict outcomes or do diplomats exercise collective agency separate from their states?

The Society of Diplomats

The diplomatic corps today represents a culmination of centuries of professionalization and bureaucratization, followed by general democratization in the mid to late twentieth century which triggered an era of reforms. The evolution of the corps over time is neither uni-directional, nor characterized by constant improvement. Today, there is a particular lack of study devoted to the European diplomatic corps. In English, there is only one book, two dissertations,⁴²³ and a handful of articles that deal specifically with the role of the Permanent Representatives in today’s EU. Coreper is conspicuously under-studied and under-recognized, evoking surprise whenever it is (accurately) characterized as *the* decision-making body of the EU. A journalist writes:

Jacques Delors, president of the European Commission in 1985-94, thought it was the only European body that really counted. Heads of government? The council? No, he meant the Committee of Permanent Representatives, which every week brings together members’ ambassadors to the EU, and which prepares for all council meetings and European summits. Coreper has huge clout.⁴²⁴

Only a handful of scholars recognize the importance of Coreper,⁴²⁵ but the vast majority of scholars emphasize the foreign ministers and statesmen to the exclusion of this elite, powerful group of diplomats. A journalist’s interview reveals, “‘Without us,’ said one senior ambassador, ‘the machinery of European government would collapse.’ Yet who has heard of any of these

⁴²³ Zwaan, Jaap W. de. *The Permanent Representatives Committee: Its Role in European Union Decision-Making*. Amsterdam: Elsevier, 1995. And Dissertations by Jeffrey Lewis and Fiona Hayes-Renshaw.

⁴²⁴ "The Power-House." *The Economist*, March 8 1997, 62.

⁴²⁵ For example, Lewis, Jeffrey. "Is the 'Hard Bargaining' Image of the Council Misleading? The Committee of Permanent Representatives and the Local Elections Directive." *Journal of Common Market Studies* 36, no. 4 (1998): 479-504. Beyers, and Dierickx. "The Working Groups of the Council of the European Union: Supranational or Intergovernmental Negotiations?", Hayes-Renshaw, and Wallace. *The Council of Ministers*.

players? Who has heard of Coreper - the name their unelected club adopts?"⁴²⁶ Other scholars recognize their existence, but regard them as transmission belts for states, only acting within their delegated autonomy.⁴²⁷

Training, meeting frequency, social background, and status have consistently been important indicators of the strength of the epistemic community of diplomats since the seventeenth century, though they tend to vary significantly, and not in tandem. The professional norms that result from these factors create a widely recognized "culture of compromise". Poul Christoffersen, Secretary-General of the Council of Ministers during Maastricht, wrote in a personal communication to me, "This culture of compromise has played an essential role in moving the Union forward, both in the daily work on the many practical issues that cross the table of Coreper, but also in the major negotiations."⁴²⁸

The remainder of this chapter will focus on the evidence for these variables in the make-up of today's European corps, and will then take the example of the 1992 Maastricht Treaty to further elucidate this process of decision-making among diplomats, and to draw out the evidence for diplomatic agency. First, given increasing bureaucratization and the importance of institutions as umbrellas under which diplomats operate, it is necessary to specifically address the structure of Coreper, which provides both a hindrance and an incentive for diplomatic agency.

Structure of Coreper⁴²⁹

The Council of the European Union is the primary decision-making body of the EU, and within this intergovernmental institution is Coreper, founded in 1958.⁴³⁰ It is divided into

⁴²⁶ Helm, Sarah. "The 15 Men Who Run Europe on Our Behalf; EU/ the Real Decision-Makers." *The Independent*, June 18 1995, 17.


⁴²⁷ Moravcsik, and Nicolaidis. "Explaining the Treaty of Amsterdam: Interests, Influence, Institutions."

⁴²⁸ Personal Communication, September 2004. Poul S. Christoffersen is currently the Danish ambassador to Italy in Rome. He was Secretary General of the Council of Ministers 1980-1995, and the Danish Permanent Representative to the EU 1995-2003.

⁴²⁹ For a good overview of the structure of Coreper See: Bright, Christopher. *The EU: Understanding the Brussels Process*. Colorado Springs: Wiley Law Publications, 1995. p. 18.

Coreper II, comprised of ambassadors, and Coreper I, comprised of deputy ambassadors. Coreper I typically deals with questions of budget, transport, social and environmental issues, transport, trade union and institutional issues. Coreper II focuses more on general *dossiers* dealing with political issues.⁴³¹ Above Coreper is the Council of Ministers, and below Coreper are a variety of working groups, which are created and called to session based on the needs of Coreper. The two most important groups are the Antici and Mertens groups. The working groups that are dedicated to more general or political issues often have diplomats as members, but scientists deal with more technical issues. In 1993, there were around 170 working groups in session. Today, there are around 250.

Council of the European Union Organizational Chart



The purpose of this three tier structure – Ministers, Coreper, and working groups – is to divide up the necessary and daily task of negotiation within the Council. The ambassadors are not required to set-aside their national interests in favor of the community interest, like

⁴³⁰ The Council of the European Union (the Council) should not be confused with the Council of Europe, a non-EU institution in Strasbourg, and the European Council, which is a summit forum for policy formulation that meets twice per year.

⁴³¹ Sherrington. *The Council of Ministers: Political Authority in the European Union*. p. 47.

Commissioners who have to swear an oath to this effect. However, over time, Coreper members have developed norms of collegiality and consensus as a result of their shared professional status, meeting frequency, social background, and training. Ironically, within Coreper the norms of collegiality and consensus are often stronger than within the Commission.⁴³²

The Council of Ministers is only called to Brussels if Coreper and the working groups cannot come to a resolution. By the time the policy issue reaches the level of the Ministers, it is most often rubber-stamped. In EU-speak, those policies that are resolved at the Coreper level are labeled “A” and those that are not are labeled “B”.

Weekly Coreper meetings typically deal with the preparation for up to six upcoming Council meetings, up to twenty policy decisions on a wide variety of topics, and very controversial issues such as the common foreign and security policy (CFSP) and voting rights that are too controversial for a ministerial-level meeting.⁴³³ In all, ambassadors spend over 100 days of the year together, and thus as Lewis argues, “they know each other extremely well, and this often leads to a mutual respect because of the workload, time pressures, and decisional demands that they must live with.”⁴³⁴

All levels of the Council are granted a high degree of secrecy so that discussions can be direct, frank, and uninterrupted by external factors or domestic public opinion. Records of meetings are not required, and if they do exist are not openly distributed. Around 70% of negotiations are formally concluded at the working group level, the remainder is divided by

⁴³² With the 2004 enlargement from 15 to 25 member-states, the Commission and Parliament lag behind Coreper in terms of assimilation of the new members. Among other things, there is a lack of translators to handle the new official languages of the EU and many new Commission delegations can not understand the proceedings. By contrast, in Coreper assimilation was rapid, and the language barrier did not pose a problem since professional diplomats all speak English. Ambassador Tranholm said, “In Coreper, the enlargement has taken place and has been carried through, but in most parts of union it is not a reality. In Coreper, the new members have become fully integrated. There are no language barriers, these are professional diplomats.” (Interview)

⁴³³ Lewis, Jeffrey. "The Methods of Community in EU Decision-Making and Administrative Rivalry in the Council's Infrastructure." *Journal of European Public Policy* 7, no. 2 (2000): 261-89.

⁴³⁴ *Ibid.* p. 265.

Coreper and the Ministers.⁴³⁵ The creation of working groups is not stipulated in the EU treaty, but emerged as a result of Coreper initiative. Nevertheless, they accomplish a great portion of the work, and often achieve compromise so that further negotiation is unnecessary. Westlake argues, “In fact, working parties are the Council's lifeblood.”⁴³⁶ The working groups are primarily comprised of diplomats, some of which will become Coreper Ambassadors when they gain more experience.

Coreper and its working groups together informally resolve around 90% of policy debates before the ministers even begin to address the issues.⁴³⁷ Even when a decision is marked “B” and is passed on to the Council, a “*navette*” (shuttle service) occurs in which draft agreements are shuttled back and forth between the Ministers and Coreper. Coreper’s official role is the preparation of all tasks assigned to the Council, and it has effectively taken-over around 90% of these tasks from start to finish. Permanent representatives also sit in on Council meetings as they are the most familiar with the issues. Because of the “*navette*” and Coreper presence in Council meetings, diplomats are still heavily involved in the remaining 10% of decision-making. Thus, combined with the negotiations conducted by the working groups, Brussels diplomats take on nearly all of the decision-making. However, the goal of ambassadors is to decide as much as possible so that issues are *not* passed to the Ministers. In effect, the rule of subsidiarity metaphorically applies within the Council. An ambassador will negotiate with his or her capital to change the instructions so that a compromise can be reached before it gets to the ministerial level. A “B” decision is used as a last resort.

There remains a system of contact between the foreign ministries and Coreper. The Permanent Representatives are growing in significance as a community decision-making body,

⁴³⁵This statistic is from Hayes-Renshaw, and Wallace. *The Council of Ministers*. Other scholars argue that as much as 90% of the Council’s work is accomplished at the working group level. For a summary of data pertaining to working groups see: Beyers, and Dierckx. “The Working Groups of the Council of the European Union: Supranational or Intergovernmental Negotiations?”

⁴³⁶ Westlake. *The Council of the European Union*. p. 312.

⁴³⁷ David Spence, “Foreign ministries in National and European context,” in Hocking, Brian. *Foreign Ministries: Change and Adaptation*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999.

but Coreper officially remains an extension of nation-states, and thus foreign ministries.

However, the foreign ministries are largely cut out of the process. Brian Hocking argues that foreign ministries serve as “gate-keepers” or “points of interface” between the domestic and international realms.⁴³⁸ Foreign ministries have a more hands-off relationship with the EU than they have with traditional embassies, tending to express viewpoints without really interfering in the technical aspects of EU processes.⁴³⁹

What does this mean for voting, a structural component of EU decision-making? Council voting is weighted so that countries with larger populations have more votes. As of May 2004, Germany, France, Italy, and the UK each had ten votes, Spain had eight, Belgium, Greece, the Netherlands, Portugal had five each, Austria and Sweden had four, Denmark, Ireland, and Finland have three each, and Luxembourg had two.⁴⁴⁰ For most issues, the Council follows qualified majority voting, but on a few specific and more sensitive issues voting decisions must be unanimous. Despite these finely chiseled rules on voting, it is only one mechanism for determining decisions, and is rarely used by the Council of Ministers.⁴⁴¹ Coreper, in fact, never votes. In light of this, it is clear that the work of Coreper and the working groups, where most of the decisions are made through persuasion and unofficial agreement, is clearly of great significance to the decision-making process.⁴⁴² The Chairman knows which ministers will support a measure before they vote, and even the ministers themselves do not always vote.

Since the Maastricht Treaty came into effect, the responsibilities of Coreper have been substantially expanded. It is the only body which reviews all policies presented to the ministers,

⁴³⁸ Ibid. Introduction.

⁴³⁹ Paulette Enjalran and Philippe Husson, “France The ministry of Foreign Affairs: 'something new, but which is the legitimate continuation of our past...' in Ibid.

⁴⁴⁰ http://europa.eu.int/institutions/council/index_en.htm See this website for updated vote weighting information after the ten new states officially join the EU.

⁴⁴¹ Hayes-Renshaw, Fiona, and Helen Wallace. "Executive Power in the European Union: The Functions and Limits of the Council of Ministers." *Journal of European Public Policy* 2, no. 4 (1995): 565.

⁴⁴² It is important to note that consensus decision systems have become commonplace in most international organizations. However, Ambassador Christoffersen writes that with enlargement the consensus mechanism becomes more difficult and majority voting may take over a greater percentage of the decision-making process going forward. (Personal Communication, September 2004)

and is thus in charge of all the Council's activities, particularly in regards to Community political cooperation and the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) pillar. Since, as mentioned earlier, the ministers rarely meet, Permanent Representatives bear nearly the entire weight of political responsibility and consistency in the EU.⁴⁴³

Social Background and Training

As in the early twentieth century, foreign ministries still play an important role in the selection and training of diplomats. Foreign ministries emerged in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and developed alongside the modern state as a kind of home base or coordinator for diplomats. In the nineteenth and most of the twentieth centuries, foreign ministries were not meritocratic and candidates would often require personal connections, a private income, or even a title to be considered for the diplomatic corps. In the early twentieth century, reforms were introduced in many European countries, but they were postponed with the devastation of World War I, and then again with World War II. During the late twentieth century, however, foreign ministries were finally able to take the steps necessary to accomplish a fully meritocratic system that at least seeks to be representative of society, professionalized, and standardized.

Diplomats today are selected through a regular exam system administered by the foreign ministries, where they receive their training, and where they can alternate as diplomats or as foreign ministry officers. Many of the ambassadors of Coreper originate from this process and work their way up through the bureaucracy until they are experienced enough to receive an appointment as an Ambassador. An Ambassadorship in Brussels is one of the most prestigious posts to hold for the European corps. It was at a meeting of Foreign Ministers in Paris on 6 and 7 January, 1958 that a decision was made that Coreper would be comprised of Ambassadors, the

⁴⁴³ Tom Heukels and Jaap de Zwaan, "The Configuration of the European Union," in eds. Dierdre Curtin and Ton Heukels, *Institutional Dynamics of European Integration: Essays in Honour of Henry G. Schermers*. Vol. 2. Boston: M. Nijhoff, 1994.

highest rank of diplomats.⁴⁴⁴ All Permanent Representatives receive the title “Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary” except for the Italian and British Permanent Representatives who are simply called “Ambassador”.⁴⁴⁵

Training on-the-job is particularly important as diplomats work their way up to the title of Ambassador. Whereas for statesmen, policy-makers, and European citizens many high-profile negotiations can reach crisis proportions, for the European corps, even the toughest scenarios are precisely where their training and expertise lies. In September 1992, when the post-summit Maastricht negotiations were on shaky ground, Coreper continued to work both on Maastricht drafts as well as budgetary issues. “While the world may be falling all around them, EC ambassadors continue to adopt a business-as-usual approach.”⁴⁴⁶

Despite the numerous reforms that enable a more representative and meritocratic diplomatic corps, opportunity still favors candidates of a similar social and educational background. They are largely white, male, and drawn from upper-middle class families. Until 1993, all Permanent Representatives were all male. Even below the rank of Ambassador and Deputy Ambassador, the staff of Coreper was only 6 % female in 1992 and 1993.⁴⁴⁷ In this regard, the European corps retains some of the characteristics of the early twentieth century and the Paris Peace Conference, which historians describe as a collection of university reunions.⁴⁴⁸ The corps is becoming more diverse with at least five women in the current Coreper. The first ever female Coreper, Irish Ambassador Anne Anderson, is still a relatively recent addition to the Brussels corps.

⁴⁴⁴ Zwaan. *The Permanent Representatives Committee: Its Role in European Union Decision-Making*. p. 15.

⁴⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁴⁶ Sean Flynn, “Windfall in structural funds now under threat,” *The Irish Times*, September 23, 1992, City Edition. p. 8.

⁴⁴⁷ Page, Edward C. *People Who Run Europe*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997. p. 71. Data drawn from *The European Companion* (1992, 1993)

⁴⁴⁸ The Versailles Treaty was negotiated by diplomats from Harvard class of 1915 and *Ecole Libre des Sciences Politiques*.

A greater variety of universities feed into the diplomatic corps today and are more meritocratic in their own selection, but by the time graduates begin their professional diplomatic training, a large portion of the socialization has already taken place. This is particularly apparent at Oxford, Cambridge, and *Les Grandes Ecoles* in Paris. It is required for French civil servants to receive a three-year post-graduate degree from ENA, a highly selective school of public administration, after attending one of *Les Grandes Ecoles*. The new graduates then choose their assignment based on their ranking at ENA. Typically, the top quarter of graduates always pick the diplomatic corps.

Most countries have an examination system to select diplomats. Denmark is one exception with no entrance exams except for the university entrance exam. In Denmark, usually a Master's degree is required, but some diplomats prove themselves to be very skilled and qualified for the job without one. Selection is based on grades and the profile behind each candidate, such as the languages they speak and any international experience. In some rare cases, they can even have no university degree at all, but prove themselves to be of a high enough quality.⁴⁴⁹

Diplomats are also socialized during prior bilateral diplomatic engagements in other countries, before they are sent to the EU. The elite of the British diplomatic corps has a "clubbish" atmosphere formed through a sense of upper middle class culture and the public school environment. Despite this clear similarity in social background, experts on Europe still debate the relevance of this variable. Edward Page argues that a similar educational background has no impact on social integration among EU officials while Fiona Hayes-Renshaw et al. argue that it does.⁴⁵⁰ While it may not be the only important variable, it certainly contributes to the cohesiveness and prior socialization of the corps.

⁴⁴⁹ Danish Ambassador Tranholm, personal interview, October 11, 2004.

⁴⁵⁰ Hayes-Renshaw, Fiona, C. Lequesne, and P.M Lopez. "The Permanent Representations of the Member States to the European Communities." *Journal of Common Market Studies* 38, no. 2 (1989): 119-37, Page. *People Who Run Europe*.

The final stage of socialization occurs in Brussels. Ambassadors appointed for a post in Brussels have long prior diplomatic experience,⁴⁵¹ an expertise in European integration, an air of authority, and have earned a high level of trust in their capitals.⁴⁵² They have usually engaged in numerous multilateral and bilateral experiences and by the time they are appointed ambassadors in Brussels they have experienced a little bit of everything.⁴⁵³ Although diplomats tend to be generalists, the European ambassadors are different. Ambassador Tranholm said, “There is an exception for European policies because in Brussels we prize specialization. It makes sense to know the institutions, how they work, and to know the people who work there.”⁴⁵⁴ Because of the prior experience at other postings, diplomats often know each other once they arrive in Brussels and these prior relationships help them in their work. French Ambassador Masset said, “I know three other ambassadors in Coreper with whom I worked with before – Luxembourg, Belgian, and Spanish. It is extremely useful to know people.”⁴⁵⁵ Ambassador Anderson said, “Many are specialists and share memories of negotiations that happened a decade ago and have common points of reference.”⁴⁵⁶

As a social group, members of Coreper engage in a similar lifestyle. Many live in the suburbs of Brussels, send their children to the European School, spend their weekend afternoons in Bruges, and winters skiing.⁴⁵⁷ They are also of a similar age. 46.7 was the average age of Permanent Representatives in 1993.⁴⁵⁸

The personal qualities of a diplomat remain surprisingly much the same as in the seventeenth century when François de Callières wrote *De la Manière de négocier avec les*

⁴⁵¹ This differs from the American Ambassadors who are usually appointed from outside of the diplomatic corps. Interestingly, unlike in the past, the European Ambassadors do not need to bring a letter of credence to their posts in Brussels. They are accredited the same privileges, immunities, and diplomatic status as in the past.

⁴⁵² Zwaan. *The Permanent Representatives Committee: Its Role in European Union Decision-Making*. p. 15.

⁴⁵³ Danish Ambassador Tranholm, personal interview, October 11, 2004.

⁴⁵⁴ Tranholm interview, October 11, 2004.

⁴⁵⁵ French Ambassador Masset, personal interview, October 11, 2004.

⁴⁵⁶ Anderson personal interview.

⁴⁵⁷ Page. *People Who Run Europe*. p. 69.

⁴⁵⁸ Ibid. p. 73. Data drawn from *The European Companion* (1992, 1993)

souverains.⁴⁵⁹ While there is no longer the requirement that a diplomat be handsome or engage in courtly manners, today's diplomat must possess an ease with foreign cultures and languages, an ability to negotiate without getting too passionate, a talent in probing the thoughts of others, and good judgment. Sharing these qualities gives him a step-up in reaching consensus, and establishing a common platform prior to negotiations.

Thomas Risse states that before processes of arguing, deliberation, and persuasion can occur, there must be a basis of shared understanding.⁴⁶⁰ He rightly differentiates between bargaining and "truth-seeking" in striving towards compromise. The latter, emphasizes mutual understanding, while the former is indifferent to the actual personalities and qualities of the negotiators. Mutual understanding is a near constant within Coreper because of shared qualities, norms, and continual interaction. Thus, even though the process within the Council is officially intergovernmental, diplomats take the initiative to form a collective, and are facilitated in this endeavor through similar qualities and identity. The convergence of worldviews and sense of Community is not unique to Coreper in the EU. Anne-Marie Burley (now Slaughter) and Walter Mattli made the same observation of judges in the European Court of Justice. Like judges, once diplomats arrive at their posts, they often "switch their loyalties"⁴⁶¹ from purely home-state interests to the community interest. Even if they are selected for their unswerving interest in their own state, the climate within Coreper and other international institutions makes this attitude difficult to maintain. Despite the fact that they do not swear an oath of loyalty to the EU, as the Commissioners do⁴⁶², their professional background and subsequent socialization make this unnecessary.

⁴⁵⁹ François de Callières. *On the manner of negotiating with princes*. Boston, New York: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1919.

⁴⁶⁰ Risse. "'Let's Argue!': Communicative Action in World Politics."

⁴⁶¹ Burley, Anne-Marie, and Walter Mattli. "Europe before the Court: A Political Theory of Legal Integration." *International Organization* 47, no. 1 (1993): 41-76. They cite Ernst Haas in regards to shifting loyalties.

⁴⁶² See Nugent, ed. *At the Heart of the Union: Studies of the European Commission*.

Meeting Frequency

Permanent representatives (Coreper) meet on a weekly basis, spending an average of 119 days per year in meetings together.⁴⁶³ Coreper II has one formal meeting per week, and Coreper I has two, every Wednesday and Friday. They also are responsible for preparing six Council meetings. They assist the minister and flank him on the right-hand side.⁴⁶⁴ Their everyday interaction and informal “working lunches” or “working coffees” are also important in enhancing a collective identity and *esprit de corps*. Working lunches are particularly important when the issue to be discussed is sensitive and the diplomats want to be able to speak openly. Danish Ambassador Tranholm said, “From time to time we have a working lunch, when a Commissioner joins us to discuss an issue that is politically difficult. This way we can talk openly about a sensitive issue without people taking notes to better understand what is behind the issue.”⁴⁶⁵ In addition, every six months the Presidency organizes an informal trip to his member-state, and diplomats go together to visit the institutions and companies of the member-state. In this case, spouses are invited to the three to four day trip, and only with a very good excuse can they avoid the trip. Tranholm said, “This is clearly an occasion to get to know each other.”⁴⁶⁶ Other informal meetings are dinners and social events when someone leaves the EU. At the Coreper II level, ambassadors meet even more often, sometimes spending whole days together in meetings, and typically having dinner together at least once per week. “Even if we don’t know each other prior to Brussels, we quickly develop intense relationships. We have a huge exposure to each other, and get to know each others’ personalities and sense of humor quickly.”⁴⁶⁷

Additionally, the level of cohesion brought about through the high number of meetings is unique to the Brussels trans-diplomatic corps. At bilateral embassies, the focus is on the host-country and not the other diplomats. In other multilateral settings such as the UN, diplomats rely

⁴⁶³ Sherrington. *The Council of Ministers: Political Authority in the European Union*. p. 46.

⁴⁶⁴ Irish Ambassador Gunning, personal interview, October 12, 2004.

⁴⁶⁵ Personal Interview, Brussels, October 11, 2004.

⁴⁶⁶ Personal Interview, Brussels.

⁴⁶⁷ Personal Interview, Ambassador Anderson, October 13, 2004

more on informal meetings because the formal ones are so big. In Coreper, the formal meetings are where they get to know each other and where relationships are developed.⁴⁶⁸

Permanent Representatives initiate and maintain a strong consensual ethos and camaraderie abounds. Although they come from many different countries, with centuries-long evolution in the diplomatic profession, they have similar systems of recruitment and training, and on the international level, they have shared status and membership in an elite international society.

Professional Norms

There are two broad types of norms in the European corps. First, are the enduring historical norms that are passed down through generations of diplomats, and second are the new, EU norms maintained through institutional memory and interaction in the multilateral, institutional setting. One major historical norm is the pomp and displays of status accompanying major diplomatic meetings. In Britain, diplomats are still sent out from Buckingham palace with their credentials stamped with the regal seal of the British monarchy. The flowery words that bestow plenipotentiary power on the diplomat bearing the letter of credence are so elaborate that they seem to empower him with the fate of the world.⁴⁶⁹ Euro-diplomats regard themselves as the elite or *crème de la crème* of civil servants in every EU country.

At the same time, the new norms developing in the EU are far less formal than in the past. Instead of following a strict protocol, the goal is to accomplish meetings efficiently and effectively. French Ambassador Masset explains:

Even though we may be on a first name basis with the chairman outside of the meeting room, we all refer to him as Mr. Chairman inside the meeting room. We show him respect. We also speak only one at a time and it is important that we get our point across quickly. We have discipline instead of protocol.

⁴⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁶⁹ For the exact wording of the credentials see: Dickie, John. *Inside the Foreign Office*. London: Chapman, 1992. pp.12-13.

Diplomats continue to develop and maintain norms of consensus and a shared desire to reach agreement more than a desire to gain the biggest concession for their own states. Westlake writes, "The ministers in the Council and their diplomatist assistants in Coreper are frequently prepared to forego unattainable excellence for an attainable good, and they are prepared to compromise and make concessions and package deals. This, understandably, is anathema to the pure scientist."⁴⁷⁰ Thus, despite the official intergovernmental role of the Council, a norm of accomplishing results in the form of common agreement remains paramount. Diplomats today, as in the past, play a dual role. They represent their states to the Community, and the Community to their states. The latter case is even stronger because of the lasting nature of the Community.

Related to this, is a norm of collegiality. Diplomats strive to maintain working relationships. A news journalist writes, "Permanently in Brussels, ambassadors know each other well, and can feel out deals faster and more effectively than can most ministers."⁴⁷¹ An intergovernmental perspective would predict that Coreper simply reflects the Council as an intergovernmental body, but in actuality the two are very different. The members of Coreper, by virtue, of training, background, diplomatic qualities, and a high frequency of meetings, comprise an epistemic community, which makes consensus a much higher priority.

Many scholars have described the norm of collegiality among Euro-diplomats. Lewis, through extensive interviews and research, convincingly demonstrates that Permanent Representatives share a *vue d'ensemble*. Ambassador Gunning said, "There is no question that there is an *esprit de corps*. It's absolutely tangible in a meeting of colleagues. It follows from that esprit that there is a willingness to find a solution."⁴⁷² Most are experienced diplomats who are experts in EU affairs, and they want to successfully negotiate for a variety of reasons. According to Lewis, these include the shadow of the future (knowledge that negotiation will happen again), a desire to make the Council a strong EU institution, and to be able to report back

⁴⁷⁰ Westlake. *The Council of the European Union*. p. 320.

⁴⁷¹ "The Power-House."

⁴⁷² Irish Ambassador Gunning, personal interview, October 12, 2004.

to their home states that they were successful. This norm of collegiality is stronger than it was in the past because Coreper is a permanent body performing continuous work. Because of all the new issues on the table, new risks are involved, and this is extremely important. French

Ambassador Masset said:

Each matter could be dealt with in separate streams, which increases the complication and creates a risk that there will no longer be synthesis and coordination. Everything goes to Coreper so is this where you can find coordination and coherence. You need a body which makes the whole process consistent. Coreper does this for the day-to-day business. Coreper insures the coherence of the whole EU machinery.

More recent norms have emerged, though they often have elements of the past. For example, Permanent Representatives continuously lobby Commissioners on behalf of their states' interests, much the way that early modern ambassadors lobbied statesmen and kings at court. Other norms are true of many EU institutions, such as language. Although French was the predominate language of European diplomacy, English has continued to grow in importance, but they typically alternate among German, French, and English. The development of "EU-speak" is a norm of communication in the EU that includes a mixture of languages, use of particular sentence structure, and a whole new vocabulary invented in the EU. After many years in Brussels, even native English speakers have difficulty translating "EU-speak" into natural English.

It is customary for diplomats to remain in Brussels for five to seven years or more as they are appointed to Brussels several times. This is longer than the average diplomatic stay, and indicates the importance of expertise and status overtime, relationships held between diplomats, and the nature of the agreements in the EU.

Status

Ambassadors in Coreper II tend to have a slightly higher status than those in Coreper I. Whereas Coreper II is more involved in the typical work of ambassadors, Coreper I receives assignments that a diplomat does not expect to do. Irish Ambassador Gunning said:

Coreper I is not the most popular position. It does not involve traditional foreign policy. Coreper II is regarded by diplomats as an important and desirable post. Coreper II has all the responsibility for dealing with the entire EU. It deals with the European Council, Ecofin, and the General Affairs Council.

Coreper I deals with much more technical legislative issues that are less political, and have less of a grand-scale impact. However, Ambassador Gunning thoroughly enjoys his position. He said that diplomats tend to have preconceptions about the role of Coreper I, but it is actually a fascinating job. Posted in Brussels, he learns more about the Irish stance on a great multitude of issues that he would otherwise not be exposed to.

The status of Coreper in Brussels tends to be slightly lower than that of the Commissioners. As noted, many people have not heard of this elite, unelected group. Among the diplomatic community, they are the *crème-de-la-crème*, but in the entire EU structure, they receive less attention than the Commissioners and Parliamentarians.

Technology

Since the advent of the telegraph in the mid-nineteenth century, there has been much speculation by scholars about the role that technology plays in diplomatic interactions. While it seems intuitive that greater technology would mean closer control of statesmen over diplomats, in practice this has not been the case. Technology such as the telegraph, telephone, fax, and email tend to change the means by which diplomats communicate with their home states, but not the substance of this communication.⁴⁷³ If anything, the ease of communication associated with improved technology has made communication shorter, enabling diplomats to take more leniencies with state instructions. In the seventeenth century, state instructions were elaborate and verbose containing specific instructions for a variety of scenarios. In the late nineteenth century with the advent of the telegraph, such instruction was shortened to 5-10 lines. Today, email and telephone are primary means of diplomatic communications, although in the early-mid

⁴⁷³ See Anderson. *The Rise of Modern Diplomacy 1450-1919*.

1990s, telegraph was still used. Telephone calls tend to be short, typically 5-10 minutes, and emails are used only to hint at future instructions because of the danger of internet hackers.⁴⁷⁴

Interestingly, emails face the same threats as ciphered documents of the seventeenth century that had to be carried by couriers across dangerous terrains. They both face a similar threat of infiltration.

Diplomatic Autonomy and Agency

Today's epistemic community of diplomats tends to have a low degree of autonomy, but demonstrates a relatively high degree of agency. Autonomy is the amount of flexibility granted to diplomats by the state or by structural factors in the decision-making process. It is the room for maneuver and flexibility afforded diplomats according to the rules. Diplomats can have autonomy, and not necessarily exercise agency. Agency occurs when diplomats themselves take the initiative to differ from state instructions and suggest their own solutions, or to exercise authority in a realm that it is not their domain. Thus, they take actions beyond the limits of their explicit autonomy; the ability and desire to do so rests on the strength of their epistemic community.

In terms of autonomy, Coreper officially has no decision-making authority and it is impermissible for any EU body to delegate powers to it, yet in practice it is the leading institutional decision-making body of the EU, indicating a high level of agency. Ambassador Christoffersen writes, "Of course the permanent representatives have not got unlimited possibilities to move national positions, but practice shows that a skilled permanent representative can obtain a considerable margin of maneuver."⁴⁷⁵ The highly bureaucratized, institutionalized, and rule-bound nature of the EU means that there is far less structural autonomy than in past centuries.

⁴⁷⁴ Personal Interview, March 2004.

⁴⁷⁵ Personal Communication, September 2004.

Over time, since the creation of the EU, the level of diplomatic autonomy has become more operationalized in EU Treaties, and as the relationship between the institutions of the Court, Parliament, Commission, and Council becomes more defined, diplomatic autonomy is decreasing. However, there is also a growth in issue areas for which the diplomats (or the Council more generally) are responsible, giving some incentive for diplomats to act decisively to create new policies, and keep the operations of the EU going.

Besides looking at factors that would encourage the ability of diplomats to act as an epistemic community, such as training, social background, status, and face-to-face interaction, to what extent do they actually take advantage of this, and push the boundaries of their autonomy? Ambassadors receive instructions from their home governments, just as in the past. These instructions consist of an explanation of what stipulations state leaders are willing to accept in an upcoming negotiation. In some cases, the instructions will require strict adherence, as well as formal approval from the capital. Based on these stricter instructions, an ambassador will express at meetings a “*reservation*” or a “*scrutiny reservation*”, meaning that he still needs to confer with his capital. If an ambassador supports a negotiated agreement, he can agree “*ad referendum*”, meaning that he believes the agreement is best for his state, but he does not formally approve it.⁴⁷⁶ A final option is to express a “*waiting reservation*”, which leans much more strongly in favor of the potential agreement, and indicates that approval from the home state is simply a formality.

Ambassador Christoffersen writes:

In the actual negotiations he has to rely on his intuition as to how far he can move his own authorities. He will never accept anything that goes against an explicit instruction, but if he is confident that he has a chance of moving the national position, he will take a waiting reserve or announce in the meeting that he will recommend a certain solution.⁴⁷⁷

Because there is a high level of trust between the Ambassador and the statesmen in his capital, in most instances, when the Ambassador supports a proposed agreement, his home state

⁴⁷⁶ Zwaan. *The Permanent Representatives Committee: Its Role in European Union Decision-Making*. p. 192.

⁴⁷⁷ Personal Communication. September 2004.

will approve the decision. In the rare instance that the home state does not grant approval, the issue up for negotiation will formally pass out of the hands of Coreper to the level of the Council of Ministers.⁴⁷⁸ As mentioned, even decisions marked “B” are typically sent back to Coreper for re-negotiation, resulting in Coreper participation in 70-90% of decision-making.

There also exists a mechanism by which Ambassadors exercise the agency to appeal their instructions before negotiations begin. By writing a “reasoned request” they try to persuade statesmen to change their instructions or policy stance. In light of the increasing duties of the Council, the growth in the number of issues on the table, and the growing instances of qualified majority voting (as opposed to unanimity voting) Coreper’s duties are multiplying rapidly. For cooperation to take place, statesmen realize the greater importance of granting autonomy to Coreper, and accepting changes to their instructions. At the same time, the Permanent Representatives are better able to anticipate their ability to push the boundaries of their autonomy and persuade statesmen of their collective preferences within Coreper. Ejner Stendevad, former Head of Division in the Directorate General, writes, “The representative of a member state works of course with instructions, but I have seen many examples of very experienced diplomats taking the risk of going beyond the brief in order to contribute to a compromise.”⁴⁷⁹ The degree of diplomats’ agency from their home-states has increased over time because of their own initiative, ability to persuade those in their capitals, and success at producing compromised outcomes within their epistemic community. Ambassador Anderson said:

It is common to make an effort to be creative in finding solutions. We are not a prisoner of our instructions. We don’t just sit on a position. There are situations in which everybody makes concessions... If the capital’s instructions will not be acceptable to the other member-states, then we go back to our capitals and explain the negative dynamic created by those instructions.

Overall, diplomats do exercise a high level of agency, and enjoy some degree of autonomy from their state leaders. However, in the highly bureaucratized institutional apparatus of the EU,

⁴⁷⁸ Zwaan. *The Permanent Representatives Committee: Its Role in European Union Decision-Making*. p. 193.

⁴⁷⁹ Stendevad, Ejner. April 24 2004. Personal Communication.

Coreper's decisions can be restricted as draft agreements are passed back and forth among the European Parliament, Commission, and to a lesser extent, the Council of Ministers. This degree of agency and goal of compromise contrasts sharply with the way the statesmen operate. French Ambassador Masset said:

The capitals do not have the same consensus culture as us. When the politicians are confronted with a draft proposal from the Commission, they may immediately try to block it. If they don't like it, they will do everything they can to block it. They will aim to get their points accepted completely without compromise.

If faced with an obstinate response, the diplomats will try to explain why this approach will not work, and what the consequences will be. They try to convince their home governments and offer a second-best alternative that will better incorporate the general will. They know what is or is not possible, and based on experience and knowledge of the other diplomats, they can convince the government of a workable alternative.⁴⁸⁰

This overview of the European corps provides the basis for understanding not only the way diplomacy works today, but the extent to which it is professionalized, cohesive, and transnational. This inductive analysis provides the groundwork for looking at the Treaty of Maastricht and the role of the epistemic community of diplomats from a more deductive angle.

The Lead up to Maastricht: European Political Union

To provide some background, in the late 1980s, there were several worldwide factors pushing towards a re-evaluation of the EU Treaty, and the push for the development of a more explicit political union. It was a period of economic downturn, the fall of the Berlin wall, and political crises in Iraq, Kuwait, the Soviet Union, and Yugoslavia. Statesmen from Germany and France, in particular, wanted to re-emphasize Germany's commitment to the European Union, in light of German reunification, by suggesting the formal creation of political union alongside monetary union.

⁴⁸⁰ Interview, Ambassador Tranholm.

The European Council in Dublin, 28 April 1990, issued special instructions to begin the process of political union and to plan an intergovernmental conference to this effect.⁴⁸¹ The instructions from Dublin were the following:

A detailed examination will be put in hand forthwith on the need for possible Treaty changes with the aim of strengthening the democratic legitimacy of the union, enabling the Community and its institutions to respond efficiently and effectively to the demands of the new situation, and assuring unity and coherence in the Community's international action.⁴⁸²

The Ministers officially approved the intergovernmental conference (IGC) on Political and Economic Union in June 1990, and the diplomats began the specific preparatory negotiations shortly thereafter.

The Maastricht summit consisted of parallel talks concerning both monetary and political aspects of the union however the monetary issues were largely worked out before the summit under a long term initiative by the Delors Committee, and it was primarily the political issues that were still under debate. The summit agenda of the political union dealt with issues as broad and diverse as the 'federal vocation' of the Treaty, the role of defense, industrial policy, subsidiarity⁴⁸³, immigration policy⁴⁸⁴, majority voting, Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), workplace regulations, future integration, reform of decision-making institutions, and whether to create a common social policy.⁴⁸⁵ In particular, CFSP created the greatest controversy, and at first it was difficult to reach consensus between the British and Danish representatives on the one side opposing CFSP, and the German and French on the other side.

⁴⁸¹ Article 48 of the EU Treaty stipulates that a member state or the Commission can initiate an IGC by submitting a proposal to the Council. The Council, in consultation with the Parliament and the Commission then decides whether or not to hold the IGC. The President of the Council convenes the conference, Coreper performs the preparatory work, and the foreign ministers conduct the preliminary decision-making. The heads of state have final ratification and negotiation power.

⁴⁸² European Documents 9431/90

⁴⁸³ "Subsidiarity" means that if the policy is best tackled by regional or national government, it should not be brought to the EC level. Decisions should be taken at the lowest level of government possible.

⁴⁸⁴ Immigration came under the umbrella of "questions of common interest" which dealt also with political asylum, employment and residency rights, narcotics, terrorism, and Europol.

⁴⁸⁵ Laursen, Finn, and Sophie Vanhoonacker, eds. *The Intergovernmental Conference on Political Union: Institutional Reforms, New Policies and International Identity of the European Community*, European Institute of Public Administration. The Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1992.

Spain and Greece⁴⁸⁶ also threatened to block the possibility of compromise towards a political union, and representatives of the Commission and Parliament demanded increased powers. It is important and interesting to note that the Maastricht Treaty significantly expanded the particular power of Coreper in decision-making regarding the political union. The Maastricht Treaty gave Coreper the responsibility for all the preparatory and follow-up work involving CFSP cooperation. Thus, the Treaty elevated Coreper to the level of a major EU institution with regard to CFSP.

This case study will focus on negotiation processes, state positions, and Coreper involvement leading to the agreement on Common Foreign and Security Policy as the major and most controversial part of political union. The member-states had been trying to reach some kind of agreement on common foreign policy since the early 1950s, but the worldwide concern over German re-armament, the idea of defense as an important part of national sovereignty, and the early beginnings of Coreper prevented it from reaching fruition at that time. The second major push towards CFSP was in 1961 when the French government proposed the “Fouchet Plan”, but this also failed to gain support. Finally, in the 1990s the effort to create CFSP was successful. The issue was again taken seriously because of the vacuum of power created with the collapse of Eastern European communist countries, and the ongoing desire of German leaders to concretize Germany’s ties with the European Community.

The strength and abilities of Coreper enabled a successful outcome. As early as January 1989, the Council of Ministers invited Coreper to draw up a European Defense Concept along with US input.⁴⁸⁷ Negotiations and proposals continued, and for approximately two years *before* the Maastricht summit the ambassadors negotiated member states’ positions. At the European Council of Rome on 14-15 December 1990 the official beginning of the negotiations for political

⁴⁸⁶ The Greek Prime Minister threatened to veto if Greece did not gain membership in the Western European Union. Denmark and Ireland were also excluded from membership. The concern with Greece was that it may bring the WEU into conflict with Turkey.

⁴⁸⁷ Mortimer, Edward. "European Union Advocated." *Financial Times*, January 16 1989, 3.

union took place, and the work of Coreper, the working groups, foreign ministers, and statesmen began in earnest.

The Negotiations

While the press portrayed the Maastricht negotiations as a 21 hour event on 11 and 12 December 1991, the real negotiations began two years prior when foreign ministers invited EU ambassadors to draw up a European Defense Concept. Although Coreper is officially not responsible for IGCs statesmen and ministers appointed Coreper ambassadors (or former Coreper ambassadors) as personal representatives to do the preparatory work in the lead up to Maastricht. Most of the personal representatives of foreign ministers were members of Coreper,⁴⁸⁸ and were even chosen to accompany the statesmen in both the political and monetary union negotiations instead of foreign ministers. The cohesion, strength, and expertise of EU diplomats gained through their primary role as permanent representatives enabled a successful outcome in their secondary role as personal representatives. The Treaty was not the product of the Maastricht Summit, but of many meetings among the foreign ministers and ambassadors well before the IGC. The Ministers met once per month, while the ambassadors met every week and even more often in the lead up to the IGC. Once the statesmen arrived at Maastricht, they were handed a full draft of the Treaty.⁴⁸⁹

The main controversy over CFSP in 1991 was that the governments of several member-states were concerned that it would supercede the authority of NATO thereby alienating the US from European affairs. The three main CFSP points up for consideration were: the so-called Asolo list of areas that would come under joint action; the procedure for implementing joint

⁴⁸⁸ Personal Communication, Poul S. Christoffersen, September 2004.

⁴⁸⁹ The foreign ministers approved the Treaty on February 7, 1992. After the Maastricht summit, the Treaty approved by all member states in August 1993.

action; and whether the issue of defense would be portrayed in the Treaty as federal or intergovernmental.⁴⁹⁰

European Political Cooperation was already in place, but it was significantly different from having a common foreign and security policy. While European Political Cooperation or EPC had an intergovernmental method of cooperation, CFSP would have a common method (i.e. one based on supranational consensus). EPC had a larger role for the European Parliament, whereas CFSP would mainly just inform Parliament. EPC did not involve a transfer of powers to the EU while CFSP did, but specific actions would be decided on a case-by-case basis. EPC only entailed a moral obligation while CFSP was officially binding with a unified execution – i.e. a single, combined military effort. Table 1 summarizes the main differences between the existing EPC, the proposed changes to create CFSP, and how this differed from a completely federal system of common policy.

⁴⁹⁰ Laursen, and Vanhoonaeker, eds. *The Intergovernmental Conference on Political Union: Institutional Reforms, New Policies and International Identity of the European Community*. p. 18.

Table 1. Summary of the proposed changes to create CFSP, provided by the Spanish Delegation⁴⁹¹

Before Maastricht: European Political Cooperation	Proposed Common Foreign and Security Policy	Single Foreign and Security Policy (Hypothetical)
Intergovernmental cooperation	Integrated and common method	Federal method (single and exclusive)
Consistency between EEC & EPC	Consistency between political and economic areas within Union	Total unity
Sphere: depends on the will of the members	Initial Sphere: Community method (EEC external relations) & Common method (foreign and security policy)	Initial and final sphere no differentiation.
Non-compulsory pooling	Compulsory pooling based on common policy, case-by-case transfers, national policies compatible with common policies	Total transfer: policies are single and exclusive, no national policies
No transfer of powers	Council decides on basis of unanimity and case-by-case, certain CFSP policies are exclusively within Union	Total transfer
Moral obligation only	CFSP policies are binding	Acts specific to Union are compulsory
Any improvements do not require amendments to SEA	CFSP necessitates amendment of Treaties	European Union Treaty
Diversified execution, decision-making, preparation, monitoring, implementation; no guarantees of coordination	Unified execution: CFSP is formulated through a single voice	Single execution
European Parliament "closely associated"	European Parliament is informed and consulted regularly, may or may not be asked to deliver assent	European Parliament fully integrated, federal model

CFSP clearly represented a big step beyond the original EPC, but it also fell far short of a fully Federalist agenda. It was a compromise solution that created an unprecedented framework for security integration, which would allow for a potentially much greater degree of common policy at the discretion of the Council. The following sub-sections will analyze the specific role of the diplomats and their political counter-parts in reaching this historic agreement from the perspectives of the individual delegations involved.

⁴⁹¹ EU Documents 10356/90, November 26, 1990. ADD 1, Annex 3, p. 5. These stipulations clearly went further than the Commission's earlier proposal. On October 23, 1990, the Commission represented by Jacques Delors also contributed to the debate writing to the President of the Council Gianni De Michelis.⁴⁹¹ Under Article 23, they proposed calling a Conference of member-states to amend the Treaty, and incorporate political union. They explicitly agreed to the goal of establishing a common foreign policy, which would include security, with the aim of taking a "flexible and pragmatic approach".

The Diplomats

To what extent were the permanent representatives involved in the Maastricht negotiations and to what extent did they follow state instructions or exercise agency of their own? The processes leading to the Maastricht Treaty demonstrate the important role of the ambassadors as permanent representatives in Coreper alongside their role as “personal representatives”. In addition, they were extremely active throughout the preparatory and follow-up negotiations.⁴⁹² Ambassador Tranholm said, “The personal representatives are the most effective negotiators because they have the network and understand the details.”⁴⁹³

The role of the ambassadors extends beyond their day-to-day decision-making in Coreper, and in particular, included major contributions leading to the creation and acceptance of the Maastricht Treaty. In this regard, the ambassadors operated outside of the institutional boundaries of Coreper. Still, as in the past, the diplomatic epistemic community exists with or without the institutional boundaries of the EU. In other areas of policy, the ambassadors have no formal authority in relation to IGCs, however, as permanent and personal representatives they were constantly writing and distributing memoranda that related directly to the terms of the Treaty.

Documentation of the memorandum distributed during 1990-1992⁴⁹⁴ demonstrates the ambassadors’ role in creating initial proposals and preparing drafts of the Maastricht Treaty.⁴⁹⁵ These memos and non-papers also show compromise over time, and the extent to which most issues were decided before the Maastricht summit of statesmen. After the first meeting in Dublin, Coreper along with the Political Committee were charged with work of determining the agenda

⁴⁹² Westlake. *The Council of the European Union*. p. 298.

⁴⁹³ Interview, October 2004.

⁴⁹⁴ Documents provided by the General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union. Through special consideration, they granted access to these documents despite the 30-year rule that typically determines declassification of documents. (i.e. Once the documents are more than 30-years old, they are declassified.)

⁴⁹⁵ Falkner, Gerda. "How Intergovernmental Are Intergovernmental Conferences? An Example from the Maastricht Treaty Reform." *Journal of European Public Policy* 9, no. 1 (2002): 98-119.

for political union and summarizing the options available.⁴⁹⁶ By the time the statesmen gathered in Maastricht in December 1991, the diplomats had prepared a tenable draft Treaty for political and monetary union.

Table 2. Summary: Diplomat Delegations' Initial Negotiation Stances Founded on State Preferences

Countries	Major changes?	Negotiation Emphasis
Britain	No	Consensus across all member-states. Long-term perspective. No definition of community citizenship. Proceed with caution. WEU serves as bridge between the Union and NATO. NATO should be the cornerstone of defense.
Denmark	No	Economic benefits, close attention to relationships with third countries. No common military, no cooperation on defense policy. Proceed with caution.
Netherlands	No	Step-by-step approach: No increase in intergovernmental nature of the Union; in decision-making must be in line with NATO. Put NATO and the US before EPC.
Germany	Yes	CFSP shall embrace all fields of foreign relations; enhance security of all member states.
France	Yes	Same as Germany. Also, supports single currency so Western Europe not dominated by German Mark.
Ireland	No	Initially, no explicit direction; maintain balance between political and economic integration, gradual development of political role.
Italy	Yes	The Union should control all aspects of security without limitations. Re-define decision-making process. Extensive and radical reform with institutional safe-guards. Federalist overall.
Spain	Yes	National policies must be compatible with the common policy. Greater degree of integration and unity. Amendment of the Treaties necessary. Consensus decision-making, explicit vote not necessary. Rich countries subsidize poorer ones.
Belgium	Yes, with transition.	Extend security definition – anything involving security in the international fora and anything involving disarmament. Should have a transitional phase. Federalist overall.
Portugal	No	Preserve existing institutional balance, gradual progress towards political union, foreign policy necessarily implies a security component
Greece		Wants admission to WEU.
Luxembourg Presidency	Yes	Three-pillar structure: CFSP and internal security policies separate from Community jurisdiction stipulated by the Treaty of Rome.
Dutch Presidency	No	(1) Unity and coherence of the Community's international action (defense); (2) political union emphasizing transfer of competence, subsidiarity and community citizenship; (3) democratic legitimacy; (4) effective and efficient institutions ⁴⁹⁷

⁴⁹⁶ Mazzucelli. *France and Germany at Maastricht: Politics and Negotiations to Create the European Union*. p. 70.

⁴⁹⁷ EU Documents 8724/1/90 European Communities: The Council, Brussels, 2 October 1990

Table 3. Approximate order of negotiation stances from Least Federal to Most Federal

Least Federal

UK
Ireland
Denmark
Portugal
Greece
Luxembourg
The Netherlands
Spain
Belgium
Italy
France
Germany

Most Federal

Overall, most countries supported a more federalist Union, but only for the particular policy areas that they believed were best decided at the Community level. Because there are no meeting records from Coreper meetings, printed summaries of opinions distributed among the delegations are the best means to follow the decision-making process. Unlike the historical cases, it is not possible to examine personal communications as the diplomats involved are in most cases still active, and have not written memoirs.

Clear Initial Disagreement

From the beginning, there was a clear divide between those in favor of CFSP and those who opposed it. Primarily, the British and Danish were the most opposed while the French and Germans were fully in favor of it. In fact, the French and Germans actually wanted to work towards federalism and a *Single* Foreign and Security Policy, which was even more supranational than CFSP. The Danish were more interested in economic union and only wanted political union in so far as it was necessary to achieve economic union.

Danish ambassadors sent provisional points on political union to Secretary-General of the Council Niels Erbsøll and the other delegations on May 11, 1990.⁴⁹⁸ The Danish diplomats argued for improved democratic processes, transparency, and unity and cohesion in international

⁴⁹⁸ EU Documents 6356/90

actions. They also asked for closer cooperation with Central and Eastern European countries. Their emphasis, however, was more on the ways in which the European Economic Community can help political unity, instead of focusing on political union as an end in itself.

October 4, 1990, Danish Ambassador Jakob Rytter distributed a memo which expressed his country's skepticism about CFSP. The memo states, "The Government rejects the idea that European Political Cooperation should come to include cooperation in defense policies, *inter alia* the setting-up of common military forces." Rytter emphasized in particular his desire to be inclusive of countries outside of the European Community (third countries) since the need to expand EU membership was tied to the credibility of the Community. The Community would serve as the central structure for many countries to participate.⁴⁹⁹ Overall, the main goals outlined aimed to keep integration at a broad level with gradual cooperation. The Danish diplomatic delegation sent provisional points on political union to Secretary-General of the Council Niels Ersbøll and the other delegations on May 11, 1990.⁵⁰⁰ They argued for improved democratic processes, transparency, and unity and cohesion in international actions, however, their emphasis was more on the ways in which the European Economic Community could help political unity, not political union as an end in itself.

Like the Danish, the British diplomats expressed initial reservations to CFSP. They argued that above all it was necessary for consensus across all member-states to be achieved. The British position, articulated in a letter from J.R. de Fonblanque to Council Secretariat Poul Christoffersen, was that caution was the essence of the day. Fonblanque writes on 25 September 1990, "We would favour a more tentative approach to new provisions on inter-governmental cooperation and do not accept an automatic link with any arrangements for foreign and security

⁴⁹⁹ EU Documents 9046/90 Annex

⁵⁰⁰ EU Documents 6356/90

policy”.⁵⁰¹ Fonblanque cautioned that nothing could be assumed until discussions between the member-states had occurred, particularly when it came to Community citizenship.

However, the British and Danish skepticism was only one side of the spectrum of opinions being articulated at the time. An earlier letter sent to Ersbøll from the Belgians highlighted their optimistic vision for political union.⁵⁰² The Belgian ambassador writes that the European Community will only gain recognition in the international sphere by being unified in its policy stance. Moreover, this political purpose has been an integral part of the European Treaties. He writes, “We will be taken seriously only insofar as we assert ourselves”.⁵⁰³ Rather than cautioning the other delegations about moving forward with political integration, the Belgians urged that it was *necessary* for improvement of the democratic deficit and addressing the problems of Central and Eastern Europe. In particular, he advocated the convergence between political cooperation and Community policy, and recommended that Coreper and the Political Directors alongside the Ministers for Foreign Affairs should be vested with the power to devise a solution. Diplomatic delegations distributed many more memos expressing this basic division over the extent to which political cooperation should proceed. With such starkly opposing starting positions, why was CFSP ultimately agreed upon?

Naturally, the diplomats could draw upon their Coreper relationship even in their secondary role as personal representatives. In addition, the diplomats were concerned about the process of negotiation and convinced their statesmen of this. J.R. de Fonblanque, a British government official wrote to the Council, of “the need my Ambassador expressed yesterday to adopt a more open and interrogative approach, and to avoid either rejecting any options or exaggerating the extent of consensus at such an early stage in preparatory discussion”.⁵⁰⁴ Thus,

⁵⁰¹ Fonblanque Letter, September 25 1990, EU Documents 521497

⁵⁰² EU Documents 5519/90, March 21, 1990

⁵⁰³ Ibid.

⁵⁰⁴ Fonblanque Letter 521497.

the diplomats were not only involved in expressing and negotiating policy positions through gradual compromise, but were concerned with process and protocol.

Closer to CFSP

At this stage, the Presidency of the Council issued a paper representing the sum of the deliberations of the working parties and personal representatives thus far. One of the primary goals summarized by the Presidency was the proposal for CFSP and unity in the Community's international actions. The Presidency stipulated that CFSP should include the widening of the notion of security to include industrial and technological cooperation, involvement in UN mandated military initiatives, a common position for the EU in the UN Security Council, and initial moves towards a common defense policy.

One aspect of greater consensus suggested by the Presidency was increased cooperation between embassies in third countries, and diplomatic protection of Member-states' citizens. In other words, the Presidency requested diplomatic recognition of "community citizenship" to aid in the workability of common policies.⁵⁰⁵

On October 18, 1990, the Presidency of the Council summarized the memos and areas of agreement put forward by the personal representatives. The memo stipulated that the key to making the European Community a significant actor in international relations is to establish a European identity and to create a structure that embodies common interests.⁵⁰⁶ At this point, most delegations agreed that the creation of CFSP, going beyond the system in place, would be the necessary next step to accomplish the goal of a European identity. The Presidency stipulated that there was general agreement that CFSP, if it were to be adopted, should include the widening of the notion of security to include industrial and technological cooperation, involvement in UN mandated military initiatives, a common position for the EU in the UN Security Council, and

⁵⁰⁵ EU Documents 8724/1/90 Revtrat 12, p. 10.

⁵⁰⁶ EU Documents 9233/90 Revtrat 16: 2

initial moves towards a common defense policy. At the same time, some delegations still had reservations about CFSP, and emphasized improving the Political Cooperation system in place rather than trying to go beyond it. One of the primary goals summarized by the Presidency was the proposal for CFSP and unity in the Community's international actions.

Illustrative of this continuing divide over CFSP were the proposals from Italy and the UK contained in the addendum to this report. The Italian delegation supported a real common foreign policy, and recognized the necessity of redefining the decision-making process and rules of implementation. For CFSP to be of real value, they argued, "It would in fact be difficult to justify maintaining limitations with regard to security, which constitute the essential component of a foreign policy".⁵⁰⁷ The British continued to disagree, but with a subtly different argument that change was possible; it should just be adapted gradually from the current path of EPC. The UK delegation argued that the kind of international recognition that the Italians want to strive for has already been achieved. They write, "Far from having to strive to make the Community voice heard, EC involvement is now expected and actively sought on most major international issues".⁵⁰⁸ Consequently, according to the British delegation, the evolution in political cooperation that started twenty years ago should continue on the same gradual path. At this stage, universal consensus on CFSP had not been reached, but some of the major positions and proposals were being clearly articulated by the ambassadors.

Points of Agreement on CFSP

On December 4, 1990 the General Secretariat of the Council distributed a second round of opinions from the personal representatives which consisted of non-papers dealing with CFSP

⁵⁰⁷ European Documents 9233/90 Add 1, Revtr 16, Annex 1

⁵⁰⁸ Ibid. Annex 2

from the Spanish, Belgian, and Dutch delegations. These written contributions were the result of further negotiations among the personal representatives.⁵⁰⁹

The Spanish contribution stated that CFSP should include the Community's external relations, all areas of foreign policy that were previously performed by European Political Cooperation (EPC), and security issues. Along with emphasizing the community nature of CFSP, the Spanish diplomats argued that the national policies must be compatible with community policy. CFSP would have a higher degree of integration and consistency, a decision-making process involving consensus and/or unanimity, and a unified execution of decisions. They suggested that Coreper and the Political Committee integrate their processes to ensure the efficiency and continuity of CFSP, and that the General Affairs Council may become the central decision-making institution. These stipulations clearly went further than the Commission's earlier proposal.⁵¹⁰ The Spanish diplomats' proposal also specifically treated the issues surrounding the Common Security Policy (CSP). They argued that CSP should include commitment to mutual defense, non-proliferation arrangements, transfers of military technology to third countries, negotiations on disarmament, and participation and coordination of military initiatives.⁵¹¹

The Belgian delegation's Non-Paper of November 12, 1990 examined CFSP with an emphasis on implementation.⁵¹² They recognized that there would be a transition phase, and that the key to successful implementation would involve gradualism. They also extended the domain of political union to incorporate all security matters in the international arena, and all issues involving disarmament. They suggested a provision to expand the domain of CFSP even further

⁵⁰⁹ EU Documents 10356/90, Add 1

⁵¹⁰ On October 23, 1990, the Commission represented by Jacques Delors also contributed to the debate writing to the President of the Council Gianni De Michelis. Under Article 23, they proposed calling a Conference of member-states to amend the Treaty, and incorporate political union. They explicitly agreed to the goal of establishing a common foreign policy, which would include security, with the aim of taking a "flexible and pragmatic approach".

⁵¹¹ Ibid. Annex 3

⁵¹² Ibid. Annex 4

by enabling the Council to add issue-areas to the common policy upon receiving a proposal from a Member State or the Commission, and after consulting with Parliament. Moreover, the Belgian delegation proposed that the Council be permitted to act unilaterally on situations that are urgent based upon a qualified majority. In conclusion, the Belgian diplomats emphasized the conditions following the transitional phase of CFSP. After the transition, they argued, “All sectors of common interest will be the subject of a common policy”.⁵¹³

In the same packet of memos, the Dutch delegation contributed a Non-Paper dated 23 November 1990.⁵¹⁴ Like the Belgian delegation, they advocated a step-by-step process of implementation for CFSP. Their approach, however, was decidedly less Community oriented than the Spanish and Belgian proposals. They made a point emphasizing the necessity to respect the jurisdiction of NATO and to avoid deciding anything that would alienate NATO and the US. At the same time, they wrote, “The inclusion of foreign policy and security in EPU should not lead to an increase in the intergovernmental character of European integration”.⁵¹⁵ Thus, they did not want common policy to go backwards, but were cautious about the extent to which they wanted it to go forward.

The remainder of the memo provides many details on the qualities of CFSP. The Dutch diplomats stated that the issues belonging to CFSP should include: elements of defense industry policy, policies on arms exports, non-proliferation, participation in UN peace-keeping, and joint operations. In terms of defense policy, the memo emphasizes that this is meant in a narrow sense. Ultimately, the Non-Paper concluded that the boundaries of CFSP would depend greatly on the political will of the member-states.

By November 1990, there was some degree of agreement among ambassadors about foreign and security policy, but several different visions for how it would be created. The points of agreement included: the Union should deal with all aspects of foreign and security policy;

⁵¹³ Ibid.

⁵¹⁴ Ibid. Annex 5

⁵¹⁵ Ibid.

there will be a single decision-making body; the Commission will have a greater role; external representation will be with a single voice; and the European Parliament will be regularly informed and consulted.⁵¹⁶ The major area of difference was whether to strengthen the current form of political cooperation by increasing its scope and effectiveness or to entirely transform the current form to create CFSP. The second option would entail a unique decision-making procedure and transfer of powers from the member-states to the Union.

The Luxembourg Presidency

The Foreign Ministers met for the first time in the middle of December 1990 to decide on the protocol and timetable for the upcoming IGC at Maastricht. They met twice, and agreed that the personal representatives would continue the negotiations in the lead up to Maastricht. The diplomats persisted with their step-by-step consensus until in January 1991 all delegations had agreed that CFSP would be adopted. A whole new round of discussion ensued over what the precise stipulations would be. At the end of January, the Luxembourg Presidency once more issued a summary of the progress made towards an agreement on CFSP.⁵¹⁷

The delegations agreed to implement common policy in the areas of “industrial and technological cooperation in the armaments field, the transfer of military technology to third countries, arms control, involvement in peace-keeping operations and humanitarian action”.⁵¹⁸ Still left to be debated was the relationship with the Atlantic alliance embodied in NATO and the UN.

The Italian delegation was the first to distribute a detailed plan regarding all aspects of CFSP. Italy’s previous position on CFSP was favorable for reaching consensus as the diplomats advocated both gradualism as well as substantive change, and they addressed the issue of EU cooperation with NATO and the UN. In light of this, they changed the final clause of the four

⁵¹⁶ EU Documents 10356/90. p. 14.

⁵¹⁷ EU Documents SN 1030/91 (UP)

⁵¹⁸ Ibid. Annex I, “Implementation of a Common Security”

areas of common security policy to read, “Involvement in and coordination of military initiatives, notably peace-keeping operations, in particular in the framework of a United Nations mandate”.⁵¹⁹

As a sign of the continuously unified stance of the delegations, the German and French delegations issued a joint Note on February 6, 1991. They emphasized that CFSP represented the center principles involved in political cooperation and would encompass all fields of international relations. Moreover, the European Union in their opinion was incomplete without aiming to establish a common defense. They argued that defense should not be restricted to only the political and economic aspects, as long as member-states maintain their commitment to NATO and the US. They added that the Council should have the power to decide which policy topics would become common policy as they arise. The Franco-German proposals became a cornerstone to the remaining negotiations. A few days later, it was clear that even the Dutch were convinced as they suggested going even further in the definition of foreign policy. The Dutch delegation tried to position themselves as being just as cooperative as the French and German delegations, if not more so.

With the Dutch convinced of a strong role for CFSP, all that remained was the Danish and British delegations. On February 21 1991, Danish Ambassador Riberholdt sent proposals to Secretary General Ersbøll for amendments to the EC Treaties. In a major turnaround from their previous stance, the Danish delegation proposed amendments to incorporate CFSP. They proposed six articles: (A) That CFSP shall protect and promote Member States’ common values, peace, security, democracy, and the rule of law; (B) it shall cover all aspects that Member States agree upon, but still respect other defense commitments; (C) the Council shall unanimously establish CFSP, while the Presidency, Member States or the Commission can submit proposals; (D) the Parliament shall be involved; (E) the Presidency shall be responsible for CFSP’s external conduct, with the Commission involved; and (F) for all ambiguous areas Member States will

⁵¹⁹ EU Documents CONF-UP 1720/91 Annex

systematically coordinate.⁵²⁰ This proposal brought the Danish stance much closer in line with the general consensus.

On 12 April 1991, the Luxembourg Presidency presented the first full Draft Treaty proposal for Political Union to the delegations. It included the well-known “three-pillar” structure for the new European Union. Although all member-states generally supported CFSP, the UK and Denmark thought it went to far while Italy, France, Germany, and Belgium would have wanted to see more federalism in the document. To help assuage the desires of the more federalist members, on 18 June 1991 the Luxembourg presidency created a second draft, which introduced the “federal vocation” and a single framework to the Community’s structure.

The Dutch Presidency: A Temporary Crisis

The Dutch leadership held the presidency during the lead up to the Maastricht IGC, (July-December 1991) and looked for a middle path between the French-German call for an independent EC military and concerns that this would harm transatlantic relations with US. The Dutch draft Treaty was an attempt to tie the economic union to the political union, but it faced immediate opposition from Britain and Spain. Only the Belgians and the Commission supported the plan.

The Dutch Presidency published and distributed its own proposal on November 11, 1991. Prior to this, the representatives met in Brussels on September 26, 1991 to discuss the Dutch draft. The British, Danish, and French diplomats were completely against it. It did not contain any of the concessions that the British had worked hard to secure, and even contained the words “federal goal”. The Germans and Belgians supported it, but the Italians and Irish criticized it for re-opening already resolved questions. On September 25, 1991 the Dutch Presidency warned that the final agreement on European political union would not be ready as scheduled for the December 9-10, 1991 Maastricht summit. The proposal went against the popular precedence

⁵²⁰ EU Documents CONF-UP 1777/91 ANNEX p. 34.

established by the Luxembourg presidency which contained the “three-pillar approach”. The Dutch proposed granting more power to the Commission and Parliament, creating a two tier process with richer member-states joining the economic and political union first, and providing an “opting out” clause for all countries who did not want to be apart of the single currency.⁵²¹

The new controversy over the Dutch draft led to gossip that French President François Mitterrand and German Chancellor Helmut Kohl would possibly convene a special meeting for only those countries that supported a security union.⁵²² On September 30, also known as “Black Monday”, all delegations except for the Belgians rejected the Dutch draft outright. The diplomats went back to the Luxembourg draft, and started to negotiate amendments from this previous rendition.

Yes to CFSP, but How?

Although the second round of negotiations had resulted in universal support of CFSP, the details of the proposal still had to be worked out. There still existed a fundamental difference of opinion over CFSP between the Franco-German and the Anglo-Italian perspectives. A Note circulated on November 8, 1991 outlined the differences in approach. Table 3 reproduces some of the major points in the Note. The underlined portions represent the text that was included in the joint provisions of the Treaty, thus it is the compromise of the two positions. The Table also indicates the areas of emerging compromise after a year of negotiations among the permanent representatives.

⁵²¹ Lhuillery, Jacques. ““Federal” Row Revives Doubts over Dutch Tenure of EC Presidency.” *Agence France Presse*, December 4 1991.

⁵²² Palmer, John. “Federalists Set to Leave Britain in Cold.” *The Guardian*, November 19 1991.

Table 3. November 8, 1991 Note. Underlined portions denote actual Treaty language adopted.

Franco-German Text	Anglo-Italian Text
<p>The purpose of the Union is to assert its identity on the international scene, particularly through the implementation of a common foreign and security policy <u>which in the longer term will include a common defense.</u></p>	<p>Political union implies the <u>gradual elaboration and implementation of a common foreign and security policy and a stronger defense identity with the longer term perspective of a common defense policy</u> compatible with the common defense policy in NATO. The development of a European identity in the filed of security and defense shall be pursued through <u>an evolutionary process involving successive phases.</u></p>
<p>This Article's provisions will be reviewed on the basis of a report presented by the Council at the latest in <u>1996</u>, in consultation with the competent WEU institutions and <u>in light of the progress achieved and experience acquired to date.</u> In accordance with the guidelines set by the European Council, the Council takes the necessary measures for the subsequent progress of the process.</p>	<p>The role of the WEU and its relationship with the Alliance and the Union will be reviewed by 1998 in the <u>context of Article 12 of the Brussels Treaty.</u></p>
<p>Strengthening of the role of the WEU, which is a <u>full part</u> of the European unification process with Union as its goal. Need to form a genuine <u>European defence and security identity.</u> Construction in stages of the WEU as a defense <u>component</u> of the Union. Invitation to DK and GR to become members of the WEU, and offer to IRL of observer status. Consultation of the Commission in areas within its competence.</p>	<p>Nothing</p>
<p>Development of a <u>clear organic relationship</u> between WEU and the Union: harmonization of the sequence and duration of the Presidencies; synchronization of sessions; cooperation between the secretariats and between the assemblies. <u>Transfer of the WEU Secretariat to Brussels.</u></p>	<p>Better coordination via synchronization of meetings and appropriate links between Secretariats, Presidencies and Parliamentary Assemblies. <u>Transfer of the WEU Secretariat to Brussels.</u></p>
<p>Creation of a WEU planning and military coordination group. Closer military cooperation complementing the Alliance. European arms agency, regular meetings of Chiefs of Staff, etc.</p>	<p><u>Autonomous European Reaction Force</u> outside the NATO area, developed by Member States of WEU.</p>
<p>Strengthening of the Atlantic Alliance as a whole by strengthening the role and responsibility of the Europeans and by forming a <u>European pillar</u> within it. Establishment of practical provisions ensuring <u>transparency and complementarity between WEU and the Alliance.</u></p>	<p>The review of the Alliance's tasks and strategy and the development of a common foreign and security policy in the context of political union are <u>complementary</u> and must proceed in <u>parallel.</u> The development of a European defense identity should be construed in such a way as to <u>reinforce the Alliance.</u></p>

On November 29, 1991, a few weeks following the distribution of this Note, the Presidency had received new comments and proposals from the delegations, and decided that the representatives would work out a compromise and agreed text of CFSP in time for the final

Ministerial meeting on 2-3 December 1991 in Brussels.⁵²³ Some of the new suggestions were as follows:

1. "Consideration should be given for allowing Member States in case of imperative need to take action.... They shall inform the Council immediately of any such decision."
2. "A member State shall not be obliged to take or refrain from action if to do so would damage a supreme national interest."
3. "Member States who are also Members of the United Nations Security Council will consult and keep the other Member States fully informed. France and the United Kingdom will, as permanent members of the Security Council, in the execution of their functions ensure the defense of the positions and interests of the Union, without prejudice to their responsibilities under the provisions of the UN Charter."
4. "A Political Committee consisting of Political Directors shall monitor the international situation in the area covered by CFSP and deliver opinions to the Council at the request of the Council or at its own initiative..."
5. "If there is a change in circumstances having substantial effect on a question subject to joint action, the Council shall review the principles and objectives of that action and take the necessary decisions."
6. "The Council shall by unanimity define those matters on which decisions are to be taken by qualified majority."

In addition to these proposals, several proposals had already been agreed upon by the delegations⁵²⁴:

1. Long term goal: objective "Formulation of a common defense policy."
2. Short term goals: The CFSP shall include all questions related to the Security of the Union; The Union may request the WEU which is an integral part of the process leading to EU, to elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the Union which have defense implications...
3. Activities under CFSP shall respect NATO policies, and not affect the specific character of the defense policy of certain Member states.

The Dutch were among the most concerned over the Franco-German approach. While previously, they had been the most pro-integrationist, they feared at this point that the French motivation was to diminish US dominance within NATO, a move that would ultimately harm the longevity of the Atlantic Alliance.⁵²⁵ Meanwhile, the British delegation still tried to push for intergovernmentalism within the stipulations of CFSP. On July 18, 1991, they had proposed a

⁵²³ European Documents CONF_UP 1858/91. NOTE from the Presidency.

⁵²⁴ Ibid.

⁵²⁵ "European Defence: Initial Rapprochement among the Twelve." *European Information Service*, March 28 1991, 5.

case-by-case formula for decision-making. The response from other delegations that such a procedural debate would result in delays every time there was another issue to consider.⁵²⁶

Only two months later and a few weeks before Maastricht, consensus was once more on track.⁵²⁷ The UK delegation agreed to grant more power to the European Parliament. However, they downgraded their rejection of CFSP to an expression of serious reservations about CFSP and a European defense identity. The Danish, Irish, and Portuguese delegations followed the UK in this opinion. One week before Maastricht, explicit reference to common defense was included in the Draft treaty, and no longer posed a problem for any of the delegations. It was agreed that “federal” would be left out (although the Dutch claimed it was still there). Meanwhile, the US had also approved of European efforts at creating an independent common foreign and security policy making discussions even more relaxed.⁵²⁸

The foreign ministers met one last time only a few days before the summit, but decided that the final decisions about defense should be left to the statesmen. Nevertheless, as the draft Treaty stood, agreement on CFSP was all but accomplished. The British had agreed to support it, and only expressed reservations about using qualified majority voting as the decision-making procedure for common foreign or defense action. They pushed for unanimity of votes, and also continued to emphasize the primary importance of NATO. The draft treaty contained a list of areas for joint action including arms control, restriction of arms sales, and nuclear proliferation. It did not include reference to EC relations to the US and Soviet Union.

While the EU documents cannot express motivations of diplomats, the culture of consensus among the European diplomats, the documented process of gradual compromise, and the ability of diplomats to persuade recalcitrant statesmen (discussed in the next section) provide

⁵²⁶ "Political Union: UK Proposes Taking Foreign Policy Decisions on a Case-by-Case Basis." *Europe Information Service*, July 20 1991, 2.

⁵²⁷ "Political Union: Ministers Move Ahead Inch by Inch." *Europe Information Service*, November 26 1991.

⁵²⁸ "Political Union: A Week before Maastricht, Compromise Begins to Emerge." *European Information Service*, November 30 1991, 4.

evidence that agreement on CFSP rested on the strength of the epistemic community of diplomats and their willingness to negotiate with their capitals. An Ambassador described how on occasion a minister would be sent to Brussels to negotiate particularly important components of Treaties, however, he would never show up at the relevant meetings. The Ambassador said:

I have seen how they have flown in ministers or deputy ministers and they did not show up for meetings because their Permanent representative went for them... They are very intelligent, high-profile, and able men but it is difficult for them to do it if they are not used to negotiating or do not know the treaty. Even those who have chosen others rely on their Personal Representative.⁵²⁹

The next section describes the role of the statesmen at Maastricht to emphasize the difference in their role and preferences compared to the diplomats.

The Statesmen at Maastricht

To what extent were the statesmen involved in the negotiations leading to the new Treaty on European Union? The Maastricht agenda for political union was replete with an expansive array of issues on the table. There was not even enough time in the twenty-one hours of the summit to even *mention* all of the policies up for consideration let alone engage in substantive negotiation. Even with the issue of subsidiarity, for example, state leaders could not agree upon a definition. Some statesmen such as Britain's John Major insisted that subsidiarity stopped at the government level, whereas others argued that it extended down to the individual level.⁵³⁰

Most issues were worked out ahead of time by the permanent representatives, and those which were still outstanding after Maastricht were passed back to the diplomats for re-negotiation. At the summit itself, only the heads of state and foreign secretaries were allowed in the room, but a buzzer was provided for each delegate to summon his ambassador or aide. The negotiations were highly complex as there were not just compromises on single policy areas, but negotiations among multiple issues, as well as ultimatums that statesmen had issued in the lead up

⁵²⁹ Anonymous, personal interview

⁵³⁰ See "EC Finance Ministers Meet on EMU Transition Compromise." *Agence France Presse*, September 19 1991.

to the Maastricht summit.⁵³¹ The statesmen's stubborn personalities and personal agendas did not help in resolving these outstanding issues at the summit itself. As at Westphalia, Berlin, and Versailles, the statesmen at Maastricht proved once more how diplomacy by amateurs falls short of professional diplomacy, and the extent to which diplomats were able to accomplish a great deal in comparison.

Germany and France

German Chancellor Helmut Kohl set the most drastic agenda in the run up to Maastricht. His firm belief was that economic union could not progress further without a strong commitment to political union.⁵³² This would enable him to overcome domestic trepidation over re-building Germany's military role, and enable the German government to exert influence in European relations through legitimate, institutional means. Kohl's motive was to strive towards German unification, while supporting the Atlantic Alliance and the European Union. Compared to the statesmen from Paris, London, and Rome, Kohl had the most radical agenda.⁵³³ He was so determined to gain real progress on political union that he threatened to withdraw support for the economic union treaty.

An important feature of the two-day meeting was the partnership of Helmut Kohl and French President François Mitterrand, and their efforts to avoid marginalizing British Prime Minister John Major. Mitterrand mostly spoke with rhetoric, was uninterested in the details, and was described as really showing his old age.⁵³⁴ Kohl was adamant about EMU as necessary and irreversible. He was known as "a doer and not a thinker" who, like Mitterrand, also avoided the

⁵³¹ For example, the Netherlands dropped a directive on working hours because the UK threatened to veto a range of compromises at Maastricht.

⁵³² Eisenhammer, John. "Germany's True Believer Who Will Not Be Fobbed Off." *The Independent*, June 28 1991, 10.

⁵³³ Ibid.

⁵³⁴ Duff, Andrew, John Pinder, and Roy Pryce, eds. *Maastricht and Beyond*. London: Routledge, 1994.

details.⁵³⁵ His chief motivation was his belief that the European institutions would act as a safeguard for Germany's recent unification.

The French and German leaders have traditionally been pro-federalist, while the British have tried to maintain the intergovernmental nature of the EU. The issue of defense was a sensitive issue for the British delegates because of their preference to maintain the security apparatus embedded in NATO. In the words of one journalist:

The wording on defense in the Maastricht treaty is an uneasy compromise between France, which wants the Western European Union -- a group of nine EC countries that are also members of NATO -- to become the Community's military wing, and Britain, which would limit EC ambitions in this field, lest they undermine NATO.⁵³⁶

Kohl was prepared to make the most sacrifices to strengthen the European parliament, and assure Germany's position as an integrated European power. Yet, Mitterrand's stance differed from Kohl's in terms of political union because he did not want to strengthen the powers of the European Parliament in any meaningful way. Mitterrand was able to rely on the support of the Italians. The French government's objective was to reduce the influence of the US and NATO in Europe thereby gaining more autonomy. To accomplish this, it was necessary to advocate increased integration. If not for the increased flexibility in the lead-up to the summit, it would have been impossible for the leaders to agree, each with their own hard-line approaches.

Britain, Denmark, and Spain

At Maastricht, the UK and Denmark had to make concessions regarding CFSP. Because of this, all statesmen agreed that the European Council would have the role of deciding the specific areas of joint action, and that a degree of joint implementation would be decided by majority voting. By the time statesmen arrived at Maastricht, the Asolo list, stipulating the areas of joint action had already been negotiated, and added as an annex to the Treaty to be approved.

⁵³⁵ Pond. "German Unification and Maastricht, 1989-93." In *The Rebirth of Europe*, 1999. p. 39.

⁵³⁶ Correspondent, From our Brussels. "European Community; Thunder Off." *The Economist*, September 12 1992, 48.

These joint action areas included the process of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, the issues of nuclear non-proliferation, the economic aspects of security, and the policy of disarmament and arms control.⁵³⁷

Belgian Prime Minister, Wilfried Martens, and Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mark Eyskens, had a federalist goal in mind, but their proposal for CFSP was cautious. Like British Prime Minister John Major the Belgian statesmen wanted intergovernmentalism within the parameters of CFSP. When Martens left the Maastricht summit, he was unhappy with the final results.⁵³⁸

Major was described as the most “pugnacious” statesman at the summit. Despite the fact that most of the delegations did not share his position, he was the most determined to stick to his negotiation stance. A journalist writes, “‘Disaster for Europe, success for Britain,’ was how one diplomat put it, after an often-chaotic summit which showed, he claimed, just how unsuited heads of state and government are to negotiating detailed treaty texts.”⁵³⁹ Another diplomat said, “Most of them did not know what they were doing.”⁵⁴⁰

The British government’s approach was more to define issues according to what they did not want, instead of what they would accept. Ultimately, such an inflexible stance meant that they were willing to threaten the possibility of a veto to the whole treaty in the worst case scenario. Sir John Kerr, the British Permanent Representative, was probably the most visibly outspoken and involved in the Maastricht Summit. A British journalist in 1991 writes, “If there is a deal at the end of the day in Maastricht, the glory should be claimed more by Sir John [the British Ambassador] and his fellow permanent representatives than any other single group of

⁵³⁷ Laursen, and Vanhoonacker, eds. *The Intergovernmental Conference on Political Union: Institutional Reforms, New Policies and International Identity of the European Community*. p. 22.

⁵³⁸ Ibid. p. 46.

⁵³⁹ Buchan, David. "Pugnacious Major Outshines His Counterparts -the UK Prime Minister Impressed, the Italian One Slept, the French President 'Was Just Plain out of It.'" *Financial Times*, December 12 1991, 2.

⁵⁴⁰ Ibid.

negotiators".⁵⁴¹ Kerr was widely recognized as the British man who most contributed to the Maastricht Treaty, making it a success despite the British government's stubbornness.

Following British opinion, the Danish also gave an initial "no" to the Maastricht Treaty in June stipulating that the NATO defense structure should have clear priority and that the US should be encouraged to have troops in Europe as well. Denmark's foreign minister, Uffe Ellemann-Jensen said, the WEU "should not have its own standing forces or duplicate the command structure of NATO, which should have primacy".⁵⁴² Ultimately the Treaty was passed with a final "no" from the Danes, and an "opt-out" clause for the British in regards to the currency union and social legislation. Nevertheless, as late as September 1992, the 11 member-states' representatives were still trying to seek a compromise solution that would include the Danes otherwise the whole Treaty would be untenable.

The Spanish leadership also fell more on the side of the British, hesitating to so closely adhere political and economic union. Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez demanded that richer EC countries give more money for development of poorer countries such as Spain, Portugal, Greece, and Ireland.

The Maastricht Ratification Process

In 1992, it was then given to the personal representatives once more to work out the application of the Maastricht Treaty. Once ratified by national parliaments it would begin to take effect on January 1, 1993. European statesmen and foreign ministers played a big role in getting the Treaty accepted in their states from around September 1992 to August 1993, when Germany ratified the Treaty. Coreper worked alongside the statesmen, who had to appeal to domestic concerns, to find a workable solution at the international level. Referenda were held in many countries to enable citizens to play a role in the process. The Treaty was ultimately passed with

⁵⁴¹ Palmer, John. "The Road to Maastricht: The Dapper Scot with a Firm Hand on the Minister's Elbow - Key Player: Sir John Kerr." *The Guardian*, December 2 1991.

⁵⁴² Correspondent. "European Community; Thunder Off." p. 48.

ratification from each member state almost two years after the summit. Britain was the 11th to ratify it on August 2, 1993, and Germany was the last. The most difficult part, however, was to create a Treaty document that was likely to be passed in the ratification process, and this is where the role of Coreper lies.

The Maastricht summit resulted in an 18 month political struggle in British parliament. Tory Euro-skeptics did not want to approve the Maastricht Treaty at all. For them it represented the “end of the road” for their cause because of the strong moves towards increased supranationalism, particularly in regards to majority voting on issues that would impact British politics. The Maastricht Treaty was described as an “immensely damaging episode for the Conservative party.”⁵⁴³

Diplomatic Agency

It is important to note that the Maastricht Treaty significantly expanded the particular power of Coreper in decision-making regarding the political union. Coreper was made responsible for all the preparatory and follow-up work for cooperation relating to CFSP. Thus, the Maastricht Treaty elevated Coreper to the level of the EU institutions (Court of Justice, Parliament, Commission, and Council) in this regard. The agreement on CFSP represents an unprecedented level of community method plus “common” method instead of intergovernmental cooperation. It is also officially binding through Treaty amendments, and highlights the important role of Coreper, despite being an intergovernmental body, in carrying through this policy.

In the case of Maastricht, the role of the ambassadors before and after the summit was of absolute necessity, and determined the outcome of the political union by producing a Treaty that was tenable for the member-states. A British journalist in 1991 writes, “If there is a deal at the

⁵⁴³ Rice, Robert, and David Owen. "Maastricht Ratified as Rees-Mogg Bows Out." *Financial Times*, August 3 1993, 6.

end of the day in Maastricht, the glory should be claimed more by Sir John [the British Ambassador] and his fellow permanent representatives than any other single group of negotiators.”⁵⁴⁴ Kerr was widely recognized as the British man who most contributed to the Maastricht Treaty.

The Head of Division in the Directorate General Agriculture of the European Commission Ejner Stevdedad commented on the nature of the diplomatic epistemic community.⁵⁴⁵ He writes:

The representative of a member state works of course with instructions, but I have seen many examples of very experienced diplomats taking the risk of going beyond the brief in order to contribute to a compromise. The decision process of the EU of today is based on a negotiation culture: A constant process of finding a realistic and balanced compromise. In this process the skilled and experienced diplomat has a platform of his own. It is very often so, that there is an understanding between the negotiators, that nothing is agreed before everything is agreed, a kind of single undertaking.... The risk of being overruled exists always, but when I look back on the many cases I have been involved in, it is very rare it has happened.

While it is clear that diplomats played an important role in negotiating the Maastricht Treaty, it is valuable to highlight here their impact in determining the outcomes even beyond their delegated autonomy.

Alternative Explanations

In today’s environment, it is difficult to conceive of a purely realist world. With the exception of the leader of the world’s superpower, it would be hard for states to act purely according to relative power, with no consideration of the larger international society. The very existence of the European Union is a case in point. The huge bureaucratic apparatus that supports the EU institutions is obviously populated with thousands of officials who make important contributions to the effective operation and decision-making of this supranational entity. The interesting question is to what extent diplomats exercise agency to impact outcomes of cooperation beyond what rational choice theories would expect.

⁵⁴⁴ Palmer. "The Road to Maastricht: The Dapper Scot with a Firm Hand on the Minister's Elbow - Key Player: Sir John Kerr."

⁵⁴⁵ Personal Correspondence, 2004.

While it is clear that diplomats played an important role in negotiating the Maastricht Treaty, it is valuable to highlight here their impact in determining the outcomes even beyond their delegated autonomy. What would rationalist bargaining theory predict? To reiterate, the premise of bargaining theory is that state preferences are determined early in negotiations, and remain stable despite any influence from supranational or transnational actors. In the lead up to Maastricht, state preferences were clearly articulated as summarized in Table 2 of this chapter. There were major divisions in state preferences with Britain, Denmark, the Netherlands, Ireland, and Portugal generally against major changes to the common foreign policy in place, and Germany, France, Italy, Spain, and Belgium generally in favor of major changes. The most vociferous and influential member-states were Mitterand, Kohl, and Major.

I argue that these leaders would not have expected at the beginning to agree to the terms that they ultimately accepted at the end. Mitterand and Kohl were adamant about a federalist vision of the future EU, and wanted this to be reflected in the new treaty with the use of the word “federal”. It was not until late in the negotiations that “federal” was removed from the draft treaty, thereby making it more acceptable to other countries. Major was perhaps the strongest case of a statesman who had to agree to terms that were far different from his initial expectations. This was in large part due to the skill and compromise approach of Sir John Kerr. When Major arrived at the Maastricht summit, he did not have the same skills of treaty negotiation and creation, and he did not have the same membership in the diplomatic epistemic community. It would be difficult for bargaining theory to predict the outcome of the negotiations without considering the collective agency of the diplomats.

The preceding analysis demonstrates the process whereby diplomats sent a multitude of memos, working papers, and draft treaties to each other, and the secretariat summarized the points of common agreement as the debate proceeded. The drafts and points of agreement were a clear product of compromise and shared understandings. As usual, diplomats defined success as a compromise agreement, and this trumped pure appeasement of state preferences. Since the

statesmen ultimately signed-off on the agreement during the two-day summit at Maastricht, it is evident that diplomats were skilled at persuading statesmen to change their preferences throughout the negotiations, and could anticipate the degree of change that would be acceptable. Their confidence about their ability to persuade was borne out of the strength of their epistemic community.

Conclusion

Within the case of the EU, there is still much debate about the extent to which it is intergovernmental or transnational, and whether deliberation actually occurs in the international meetings or whether there is a democratic deficit that precludes any real negotiation and compromise from taking place. There is much criticism of EU decision-making processes particularly concerning the role of Coreper. This body of Ambassadors is permitted complete secrecy, they are appointed officials, and many of its decisions are rubber-stamped. Such a process leads many Euro-citizens and scholars to point a large democratic deficit at the supranational level. Whether one can expect a supranational, non-state entity to adhere to the same criteria as a democracy is a hotly debated issue. Moravcsik argues that the EU is not a state therefore it is not necessary to hold it up to the same standards as states. Thomas D. Zweifel argues that even if you compare the EU to “model democracies” like the US and Switzerland it still scores well in comparison.⁵⁴⁶

Hayes-Renshaw also emphasizes the importance that Coreper’s preparation of issues for the Council of Ministers. In her case study of the negotiation of the public supplies directive in the 1980s, statesmen met in London for four days to agree to instruct their Permanent Representatives to reach an agreement.⁵⁴⁷ However, for Hayes-Renshaw, Coreper is equated with

⁵⁴⁶ Zweifel, Thomas D. "...Who Is without Sin Cast the First Stone: The EU's Democratic Deficit in Comparison." *Journal of European Public Policy* 9, no. 6 (2002): 812-40.

⁵⁴⁷ Hayes-Renshaw, Fiona. "The Role of the Committee of Permanent Representatives in the Decision-Making Process of the European Community." PhD, University of London, 1990. Ch. 7.

member-state involvement, and their role as a community-based entity is overlooked as she does not look *within* Coreper to the deliberations of the ambassadors themselves.

Like in the seventeenth century, diplomats in today's EU continue to be torn between duty to the state and duty to the international community. The duo-role of diplomats represents a common signal that international society exists, and has an impact on international relations beyond issues of relative power. Ambassador Christoffersen writes:

To prevent conflict between the two roles, the Permanent Representative is in constant dialogue with his national authorities (not just the Foreign minister or the foreign ministry, but all parts of the national administration) to make sure that the authorities have a full picture of how the negotiations are moving, and to suggest adaptation where it is difficult to find an overall compromise on the basis of the original position.⁵⁴⁸

The epistemic community of European diplomats constitutes a highly professionalized community with shared norms and a culture of compromise by virtue of their social background, training, meeting frequency, and status. Despite the constraints of bureaucracy brought about the institutional structure of the EU, diplomats continue to play a strong role in outcomes of international cooperation. Whether this will remain the case in the new, enlarged EU is the topic of the next chapter.

⁵⁴⁸ Personal Communication, September 2004.

Appendix

EU Member States	State leaders	Foreign Ministers	Coreper
United Kingdom	John Major	Douglas Hurd	Sir John Kerr David Durie
The Netherlands	Ruud Lubbers (Chair) Queen Beatrix	Hans van Den Broek	Pieter Nieman Ate Oostra
Germany	Helmut Kohl (Chancellor)	Hans-Dietrich Genscher	Jurgen Trumpf Jochen Gruenhage
France	Francois Mitterand	Roland Dumas	François Scheer Pierre Sellal
Spain	Felipe Gonzalez (PM)	Carlos Westendorp (State secretary for EU affairs)	Camilo Garcia- Villamil Carlos Sagiüs
Italy	Giulio Andreotti (PM)	Gianni De Michelis	Fredrico di Roberto Rocco Antonio Cangelosi
Luxembourg	Jacques Santer (PM)	Jacques Poos	Jean-Jacques Kasel Jim Cloos
Belgium	Wilfried Martens	Mark Eyskens	Philippe de Schoutheete Jan de Bock
Portugal	Anibal Cavaco Silva	João de Deus Pinheiro	Jose Paulouro Vasco Valente
Ireland	Gerard Collins Charles Haughey (PM)	Gerard Collins	Padraic MacKernan Eamonn Ryan
Denmark	Poul Schlüter	Uffe Ellemann-Jensen	Gunnar Riberholdt Niels Henrik Sliben
Greece	Constantine Mitsotakis (PM)	Antonio Smaras	Leonides Evangelidis Jean Corantis
European Commission	Jacques Delors (President) Frans Andriessen (VP)		
Council	Niels Ersbøll (General Secretary) Gianni de Michels (President)		

Chapter Seven

The Twenty-First Century European Corps

Climate of the Times: Euro-skepticism

The member states of the European Union deal with conflicting preferences. On the one hand, they must integrate further to combine power and gain influence in the international arena. On the other hand, they are still nation-states driven by the classic realist interests of sovereignty and security. Much political science scholarship about the EU as well as public commentary in Brussels focuses on the ways the EU falls short of supranational cooperation, particularly political and military integration.⁵⁴⁹ They argue that the member states are fundamentally sovereign, and only cede authority to the supranational level if it is secondary to their fundamental interests. Therefore, the member states continuously grant increased authority to the Brussels institutions to control economic, monetary, and commercial policy, but hesitate when it comes to political, military, and diplomatic sovereignty.⁵⁵⁰

Another source of skepticism on the part of political scientists and European experts arises from a belief that political and military policies agreed to on paper and codified as law in Treaties is of little importance. The unprecedented Common Foreign and Security Policy of the Maastricht Treaty which states that “the common foreign and security policy shall include all questions related to the security of the Union, including the eventual framing of a common defense policy, which might in time lead to a common defense,” is nonetheless regarded as inconsequential, despite the fact that it later evolved into the EU Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) in 1999 and includes an EU military force of 60,000 troops and a staff of 200 in 2004. Fifty-five years ago the idea of the European Union emerged and its political aim to eradicate war in Europe was laid out in the 1957 Treaty of Rome. Javier Solana writes in 2004:

⁵⁴⁹ Moravcsik, and Nicolaidis. "Explaining the Treaty of Amsterdam: Interests, Influence, Institutions." and Gnesotto, Nicole. "Introduction ESDP: Results and Prospects." In *EU Security and Defence Policy: The First Five Years (1999-2004)*, edited by Nicole Gnesotto. Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies, 2004.

⁵⁵⁰ Gnesotto. "Introduction ESDP: Results and Prospects." p. 19.

It is today on the basis of that fundamental historical *acquis* that the Union wishes to project to the outside world the stability that it has patiently constructed within by adding a common security policy to its traditional competencies; this is why it now wishes to promote, in the international system, a European Security Strategy, based on values, norms and capabilities shared by the 25.⁵⁵¹

Thus, along side Euro-skepticism, there still remains the overarching belief, shared by all EU members, that a strong Europe with international influence can only be accomplished through a common European identity and a single European voice, and this is based on values developed through the lessons of war.

Rather than examining the ways in which the EU falls short of supranationalism, this book provides one theory to understand the extent to which it is. It focuses on a particular network of influential actors, the diplomats, to demonstrate how processes of international cooperation reveal much more than simply looking at the end results. The processes among diplomats shows that even the Council, the major intergovernmental institution of the EU, includes supranational processes by virtue of the cohesiveness and community among Coreper. Gnesotto writes, "In 1999 no one would have reasonably bet that the Union would, in 2005, have a Minister for Foreign Affairs, a mutual solidarity clause and a common security strategy."⁵⁵² I argue that a consideration of diplomatic agency and epistemic community can predict the degree to which consensus and cooperation will occur.

The Diplomatic Epistemic Community: A Cross-Time Comparison

The evidence tends to suggest that diplomats are agents of international cooperation in Western Europe. They exercise agency independent of state instructions depending on the strength of the norm of consensus within their epistemic community. If their epistemic community is strong, they impact outcomes of cooperation in ways that neo-realist and bargaining theories would not predict because their preferences change during the course of

⁵⁵¹ Solana, Javier. "Preface." In *EU Security and Defence Policy: The First Five Years*, edited by Nicole Gnesotto. Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies, 2004.

⁵⁵² Gnesotto. "Introduction ESDP: Results and Prospects." p. 20.

negotiation. The cases illustrate that across time the strength of the diplomatic epistemic community has waxed and waned, and this has triggered a similar pattern with the level of diplomatic agency. The following table shows the compiled results of the four cases examined in the preceding chapters.

Table 1: Summary of Results

Time Period	Professional Training?	Similar social background?	Professional Status?	Meeting Frequency?	Strength of shared norms?	<i>Demonstrated agency of diplomats?</i>
Mid-17 th Century Westphalia	Low* * only on the job	High	Medium	Low	Medium	<i>Medium</i>
Late-19 th Century Berlin	Medium	High	High	Medium	High	<i>High</i>
Early-20 th Century Versailles	Medium	High	Low	Low	Medium	<i>Low</i>
Late-20 th Century Maastricht	High	High	High	High	High	<i>High</i>

It is important to note the value of a cross-time analysis in contributing to these conclusions. Just looking at diplomacy today does not show the weight of each variable, but merely its presence or absence. By looking to the past, it is possible to decipher which variables have had a lasting impact on the formation of the epistemic community of diplomats, and hence which are likely to endure.

During the mid-seventeenth century, diplomats had a relatively medium-strength epistemic community. This was the stage at which diplomats were a distinctive professional group residing in major capitals throughout Europe. They were not yet fully bureaucratized, with training on the job and selection by appointment. However, they had acquired a degree of status for themselves as well as a practice of meeting informally at Courts across Western Europe. They also corresponded regularly with each other, which created a nascent international society, and a European transnational network. Diplomats cultivated relationships with each other and relied on these relationships when it was time to make major decisions impacting the cooperative

outcomes in the fledgling state system. While bilateral meetings were common-place, multilateral meetings were extremely rare, and disorganized leadership meant that there was rivalry and competition among diplomats from the same state. During the Treaty of Westphalia, arguably the first major multilateral conference among states, diplomats made their mark by exercising some degree of agency in the decision-making process.

The late nineteenth century is characterized as the golden age of diplomacy. With the bureaucratization of the state and early beginnings of democratization, it was a new era of diplomacy. Diplomats were fully professionalized with a high degree of status and shared strong norms. They met quite frequently, but not as often as the diplomats in the multilateral setting of the European Union. Their similar social background also contributed to a cohesive diplomatic corps, but selection was not yet meritocratic. Although the invention of the telegraph revolutionized the mode of communication, it did not impact the ability of diplomats to exercise agency from the state as would be expected. Rather, diplomats found themselves supplementing their own instructions just as much as in the past because of the shortness of these high-speed communications. Instructions were skeletal, and allowed diplomats to take license with them. The role of diplomats at the 1878 Congress of Berlin demonstrated their level of professionalism and abilities. Advances in technology such as the steam engine and railroad enabled statesmen to attend the conference with relative ease however it was the diplomats who carried them through the negotiations.

Following the Great War, the nature of professional diplomacy was once more transformed. This time, it took a turn for the negative because diplomats had lost their status as a result of the breakdown in the alliance system that occurred in the lead up to the war. Prior to the war, diplomats had begun a round of reforms to the diplomatic profession with the aim of making it more meritocratic, professional, and career-oriented. At last, the aim was to allow people who were not independently wealthy to pursue a career in the Foreign Service. However, these reform efforts were put on hold during the war, and instead of multilateral meetings of diplomats,

statesmen took over the diplomatic function forming the Supreme War Council. Diplomats maintained the shared norms that had characterized the profession for centuries, but they did not have any influence. The negotiations leading to the 1919 Treaty of Versailles demonstrated the culmination of this decline in status. Diplomats attended the Paris Peace Conference alongside statesmen, but they met in separate rooms, and had a debilitating lack of information during the negotiations. The so-called “Gang of Four”, George, Wilson, Orlando, and Clemenceau, attempted to design a workable peace on their own, but it was one that was doomed to fail. The statesmen’s radical personalities, stubbornness, and lack of diplomatic experience made it difficult for them to engage in treaty creation, something for which only the professional diplomats were wholly qualified.

Finally, in the most recent case, the 1992 Treaty on European Union at Maastricht, diplomats exhibited a strong epistemic community, which continues to be so today. The advent of international organizations in the twentieth century with permanent negotiations marks another distinctive phase of diplomacy. Professional diplomats posted to multilateral organizations now have a greater political role than their bilateral embassy counterparts. Selection of diplomats is highly meritocratic, yet diplomats continue to be drawn largely from a similar social background. Representatives to the European Union have a very high status, and meet several times per week. For the most part, they receive specialized training prior to beginning a career in the Foreign Service followed by years of on-the-job training. During the years of negotiation leading to the Maastricht Summit, members of the Committee of Permanent Representatives, serving as personal representatives, played a significant role. They exercised agency by constantly negotiating with their statesmen to change their instructions based on the climate in Brussels and their knowledge of how far the other diplomats could go to reach a compromise. Without a strong epistemic community of diplomats, and their ability to convince statesmen, an agreement would have been impossible.

The four cases show under what conditions diplomats really deliberate, and the variables that lead to a stronger epistemic community. The counter-part to diplomatic agency is structure, defined as the rules, norms, and institutions that restrict diplomatic agency. Structure provides the context or environment for the diplomatic epistemic community in a given time-period. Rather than looking simply at the absolute level of agency exercised by diplomats, it is necessary to consider agency relative to autonomy.

To what extent do diplomats, as an epistemic community, go beyond their granted autonomy? Autonomy is provided by state leaders, norms, and more recently, institutions. Leaders delegate to diplomats “space” for decisions-making authority through their instructions. Norms or rules govern diplomatic behavior, protocol, and precedence during negotiations. For example, if a diplomat independently violates protocol or issues an ultimatum as a negotiation tactic, he has violated the rules of the game and is unlikely to be included in consensus-shaping. Diplomats define their own norms, so although norms restrain autonomy in certain aspects, they simultaneously strengthen the epistemic community by reinforcing a collective identity through shared knowledge of these norms. Institutions also set the bounds of autonomy as any bureaucracy typically does.

If diplomats as a collective push the boundaries of their autonomy they have exercised agency. In most instances, they do this by going beyond or even violating their instructions. In the seventeenth century, diplomats had little autonomy and exercised some agency. In the late nineteenth century, the golden age of diplomacy, they had some autonomy and exercised a high level of agency. In the early twentieth century, they had no autonomy because of fallen status, but still exercised a little agency. Finally, in the late twentieth century, bureaucracy restricts autonomy, but diplomats exercise a high degree of agency.

Table 2: Autonomy vs. Agency

Time Period	Level of delegated autonomy?	Strength of epistemic community?	Demonstrated agency of diplomats?
Mid-17th Century Westphalia	High	Medium	Medium
Late-19th Century Berlin	Medium	High	High
Early-20th Century Versailles	Low	Medium	Low
Late-20th Century Maastricht	Medium	High	High

Table 3 shows some of the examples in which diplomats exercised the strongest type of agency, acting against state instructions, in the case studies considered here.

Table 3. Examples of Diplomatic Agency Against State Instructions

Negotiation	State Instructions	Diplomatic Agency	Outcome
Westphalia	May 1646, Mazarin demanded that the diplomats compromise over Philippsburg as soon as possible.	French diplomats continued to demand Philippsburg.	Diplomats were successful.
Westphalia	Mazarin wanted an immediate truce with Italy.	French diplomats sought a different compromise.	Diplomats acted against Mazarin's instruction.
Westphalia	Mazarin thought that Bavaria was pre-disposed towards France.	Diplomats knew that the representatives of Bavaria were not.	Diplomats convinced Mazarin of their opinion.
Westphalia	Mazarin insisted on the exchange of Catalonia for the Spanish Low Countries.	Diplomats advised against this.	Mazarin didn't listen to the diplomats, and this ended in disaster.
Westphalia	Chancellor Oxenstierna believed that the only way to protect the long Swedish coastline was to control the opposite shore at the same time.	Swedish diplomat Salvius argued that negotiations should be based on international consensus, not Sweden's fear of its neighbors.	Instructions of July 11, 1643 were changed to reflect Salvius' goal of international consensus.
Westphalia	Queen Kristina and Axel Oxenstierna maintained Sweden's controversial occupation of Pomerania, an important principality along the German Baltic coast that belonged to the Brandenburg elector, Frederick William, by treaty.	Swedish diplomats argued that Sweden had no right to control Pomerania, and despite personal differences, wrote letters to Stockholm strongly opposing the occupation of Pomerania.	The state eventually gave ground to their diplomats allowing that Salvius' partition idea could serve as a last resort during the negotiations.
Berlin	Emperor Francis Joseph and other realists in the government believed that nationalism did not matter, and their main aim was to acquire more land.	Andrássy, a diplomat and statesman, like Metternich in the past, believed that Austria's stable position rested on the integrity of Turkey.	Andrássy remained faithful to his alliance with the German and Russian leaders, and did not threaten war to protect Austrian interests during Russia's advance towards Constantinople. At the Congress, he could have demanded territory for Austria, but he sought economic and political ties, as well as to uphold the idea of sovereignty.
Maastricht	Several statesmen of the EU did not want any move towards a common foreign and security policy (CFSP) because they saw it as a heavy encroachment on state sovereignty.	The Brussels ambassadors carefully worked out a compromise that all states could accept, vesting power in the Council on decisions about CFSP and significantly augmenting their own power in the process.	After referenda in nearly all of the member-states, CFSP was approved as part of the Maastricht Treaty on Political Union in 1992.

These few examples highlight some of the instances in which diplomats have openly and blatantly exercised agency against the state. However, there are many more subtle examples, which can be understood through process-tracing of diplomatic negotiations.

Trends across Time

To the extent that there is a grander historical trajectory in the development of European diplomacy and epistemic community it can be found in increased bureaucratization, longer-lasting international cooperation, and democratization. These three factors affect the rules that constrain diplomats, the types of issues they negotiate, and the worldviews they bring to the table. From the seventeenth century to the late nineteenth century, bureaucracy was non-existent or extremely limited. From the late nineteenth century to the mid-twentieth century, democracy and international cooperation were very limited. From the mid-twentieth century to today, all three factors are strong. Western Europe is comprised of democratic states that are fully bureaucratized and engage in large-scale international cooperation. Democracy and bureaucracy go hand-in-hand⁵⁵³, but now it is international cooperation that enforces this further, particularly as enlargement of the EU progresses and newly transitioned democracies seek membership.

Although bureaucracy, democracy, and international cooperation are exogenous to the variables affecting the strength or weakness of the epistemic community of diplomats, the growing presence of these three factors would lead us to believe that the role of diplomats has experienced a decline. While bureaucratization constrains diplomats to strict rules of the game, hierarchy, and limited autonomy, democracy holds states democratically accountable. Even though diplomats are not democratically elected, they represent democratic nations abroad and if they overstep their bounds, citizens have a right to complain to their democratically elected leaders and call for restraint. Permanent international cooperation also emphasizes

⁵⁵³ Suleiman, Ezra. *Dismantling Democratic States*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003.

intergovernmentalism among states as actors, not diplomats. The institutions created to serve permanent international cooperation are regarded as extensions of domestic bureaucracies and of domestic policies, further constraining the role of professional diplomats.

The preceding chapters show that diplomats do exercise collective agency depending on the strength of their epistemic community, and they do so despite these exogenous factors. Whatever the issues up for negotiation – whether to end war, prevent war, or sustain a lasting peace – European diplomats have behaved professionally and relied on their shared professional norms to get the job done. In several cases, they have gone beyond getting the job done to accomplish outcomes that are even more cooperative than would have otherwise been expected.

At the same time, the results show that the diplomatic epistemic community has by no means augmented in cohesiveness across time. There is no historical trajectory for the strength of the epistemic community. Rather, at times the European corps is strong, and at other times weak. This fact highlights the need to recognize the role that diplomats play. Rather than any continuous effort on the part of state leaders to improve the quality of their diplomatic corps, the diplomats themselves have pushed for their own professionalization.

Thus, one endogenous factor that creates a notable historical trend is the professionalization of the diplomatic corps. A profession has distinct membership, skills, selection, and knowledge. Professionalism from today's perspective also includes meritocratic selection and promotion. It was only late in this past century that diplomats were paid enough such that people from any social class could earn an independent living as a diplomat. It was only in the past ten years that women were assigned as Ambassadors to the EU. The process of professionalization in Western Europe lasted for centuries, and this may explain to some extent why other regions of the world have not yet progressed as far.

There is another endogenous factor in this analysis and that is time. While causality can be shown between the strength of the epistemic community and outcomes of a particular negotiation, if one were to take a longer-term perspective even outcomes of the negotiation are

mutually constitutive with the epistemic community itself. As can be observed with the Treaty of Vienna and the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, often outcomes of particular negotiations provide stipulations for the future role of diplomats. Thus, the treaties that diplomats negotiate in turn affect their epistemic community.

Overall, the diplomatic epistemic community is stronger now than it was in the past, but it may not continue becoming more cohesive. With enlargement of membership, more diplomats are coming to Brussels to become part of the European diplomatic corps yet they may have less in common with their counter-parts who have been in Brussels for decades and cultivated certain professional norms for much longer. It is likely that new members will adapt quickly, but there may be a significant period of transition before the diplomatic epistemic community increases in strength. At the same time, the intensification and increasing permanence of bureaucratic rules may work against this trend.

Democracy or Deception?

To what extent do the processes of diplomacy in the European Union (EU) help or harm supranational democracy? In other words, do European diplomats contribute to supranational democracy or instead to the “democratic deficit”? There is much criticism about the growing delegation of authority to EU institutions because the additional layer of governance removes member-state citizens from the decision-making process. Since the member-states are democratic countries, these critics point to a growing “democratic deficit” as a result of increased supranational integration without democratization. Some argue that representative democracy has been replaced with big and unwieldy supranational bureaucracies.

Should we be alarmed knowing that a group of unelected technocrats can have such a big role in international policy-formation? During the Maastricht Treaty referendum, Danish and French citizenry hotly debated the potential for a democratic-deficit embodied in the Maastricht Treaty. At the time, the German constitutional court issued an objection to the Maastricht Treaty

for this reason, but later ruled that the Treaty was still governed by a union of sovereign states.⁵⁵⁴

How can it be appropriate to speak of democracy if not in the context of a state?

Thus far, the EU is not a super-state, nor is it even a federalist collection of states. Nevertheless, as an institution with the mandate to continue domestic policy at the supranational level, it is important to investigate whether or not it does this democratically. One of the key definitions of democracy is accountability. Ironically, diplomats may be a part of the “democratic deficit” because of their “behind-closed-doors” decision-making, but they may also be instrumental in pushing democratization forward because of their shared norms.

Over time European diplomats do have agency in determining the extent of cooperation through deliberation. Much of this agency derives from their membership in an epistemic community. Diplomats are actors in their own right, and the stronger the transnational community of diplomats, the more likely it is that they will reach agreements during international negotiations. However, what does this mean for the future of EU integration, and in particular, supranational democracy? Diplomatic agency only answers part of the question. Just because diplomats exercise agency to reach agreement does not necessarily mean that their agreements benefit policy-making in democratic societies. Are diplomats aiding democratization or deceiving citizenry when they make decisions behind-closed-doors?

The evidence tends to suggest that diplomats, for the most part, are not harming national and supranational democracy in today’s EU. Since democracy is a concept applied to states with territorial boundaries it does not really apply to the EU. No elected leader is expected to make all of the decisions himself, and even at the domestic level a statesman will delegate decision-making authority to non-elected officials. Ultimately, a diplomat is held accountable to his or her statesman who in turn is accountable to the people who elected him.

⁵⁵⁴ Zweifel. "...Who Is without Sin Cast the First Stone: The EU's Democratic Deficit in Comparison."

Towards a Single Voice: European Diplomacy with the World

The stated goal for 2005 is to create the post of European Foreign Minister, and alongside this, a European diplomatic corps. While such developments will certainly change the nature of the EU's diplomacy with the rest of the world, it is unlikely to change Coreper's role which will remain to resolve issues within the EU. After all, the EU is still fundamentally international relations among states. As political integration continues, issues within the EU will come to include the EU's common position with the rest of the world. It is likely that as a true European diplomatic corps evolves, it will have to keep close contacts with Coreper as the Permanent Representatives will still be critical to determining of what the European's single voice will consist.

Since the recent Iraq war and America's decision to act unilaterally, the need for a single European foreign policy has become more critical. Since its inception, EU officials and member state leaders have been careful about confirming US support in their initiatives, whether in creating a free-trade zone or a common defense policy. Until US President George W. Bush demonstrated his will to act with complete freedom, regardless of international consensus, the fate of the EU was fundamentally tied to the US through NATO. Europeans would not pursue purely European military integration out of respect for the prior existing role of NATO and the promise it held for US support. The EU is now emerging from the shadows of the US, and it is clear that at least in the near term, a European identity will be critical.

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